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A SECOND VINDICATION OF Mr. *LOCKE*,

Wherein his SENTIMENTS relating to

Perſonal Identity

Are clear'd up from ſome Miſtakes of

The Rev. Dr. *BUTLER*,

IN HIS

DISSERTATION on that Subject.

And the various OBJECTIONS rais'd againſt Mr. *LOCKE*, by the learned Author of *An* ENQUIRY *into the* NATURE *of the* HUMAN SOUL, are conſider'd.

To which are added

REFLECTIONS on ſome Paſſages of Dr. WATTS's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS.

Cenſure is the Tax a Man pays to the Publick for being eminent. Lord BACON.

By VIN. PERRONET, *A. M.* Vicar of *Shoreham* in *Kent*, and Chaplain to the Right Hon. Earl *STANHOPE*.

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THE

PREFACE

HOW far the learned and ingenious Gentlemen, whom I have taken the Liberty of diſſenting from in the following Pages, have either rightly underſtood Mr. *Locke*, or have themſelves been rightly underſtood by me, is intirely ſubmitted to the Judgment of others.

As to the learned Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, I ſhall here only beg Leave to obſerve, that, if he had thought it proper to have confined himſelf to

to the *Demonſtration* of the Soul's *Immateriality*, and to the Proof of the *real*, but *dependent* Exiſtence of *Matter*, he had been confined to a Taſk, to which he has ſhewn himſelf abundantly equal.

But 'tis plain, the ingenious Author judged ſomething more to be needful. The Victory could not be compleat, without numberleſs Attacks upon Mr. *Locke:* With what Succeſs, let the judicious Reader determine.

P. S. It is the firſt Edition of Dr. *Butler*'s Book, which is here made uſe of. But the ſecond Edition both of the *Enquiry*, and of Dr. *Watts*'s *Eſſays*.

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ERRATA.

ERRATA.

P. 2. l. ult. for *Doubt it*, read *Doubt about it*. P. 30. l. 29. for *Page* read *Face*. P. 43. l. 23. place a Comma after *all*. P. 81. l. 24. for *ſeparate*, read *ſeparable*. P. 85. l. 9. dele *he*. P. 93. l. 21. dele *to*. P. 113. l. 31. for *Divertſiy* read *Diverſity*. P. 117. l. 17. for Mr. *Locke*, read Mr. *Locke's*. P. 120. l. 27. for *it*, read *is*.

Lately publiſhed, by the ſame AUTHOR,

A VINDICATION of Mr. *LOCKE*, from the CHARGE of giving Encouragement to SCEPTICISM and INFIDELITY, and from ſeveral other Miſtakes and Objections of the learned AUTHOR of the PROCEDURE, EXTENT, and LIMITS of HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. In ſix *Dialogues*. Wherein is likewiſe enquired, Whether Mr. *LOCKE*'s TRUE OPINION of the SOUL's IMMATERIALITY was not miſtaken by the late learned Monſ. *LEIBNITZ*.

Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON, at the *Bible* and *Crown* in *Ludgate-Street*.

Mr. *LOCKE*'s SENTIMENTS

Relating to

Perſonal Identity, &c.

THAT Perſons of acknowledged Candor and Ingenuity may ſometimes miſtake the Meaning of the beſt of Writers, ſeems plain from the learned Author of the *Diſſertation on Perſonal Identity*. Who tho' he has carefully diſtinguiſh'd between Mr. *Locke*, and thoſe who have made a very abſurd and wicked Uſe, of what is ſaid by him upon this Subject; yet that he has not every where rightly apprehended him, will I hope appear from the following Reflections. But firſt, Dr. *Butler* obſerves, that

" Great Difficulties have been raiſed by ſome " concerning *Perſonal Identity*, or the Sameneſs " of *living Agents*. * That ſtrange Perplexities " have been raiſed about the Meaning of that " *Identity* or Sameneſs of Perſon, which is im- " ply'd in the Notion of our living Now and " Hereafter, or in any two ſucceſſive Moments. " And that the Solution of theſe Difficulties " hath been ſtranger than the Difficulties them- " ſelves. For *Perſonal Identity* has been ex- " plain'd ſo by ſome, as to render the Inqui- " ry concerning a future Life, of no Conſe- " quence at all to Us, the Perſons who are " making it. Now when it is aſked, wherein " *Perſonal Identity* conſiſts, the Anſwer ſhould " be the ſame, as if it were aſked, wherein con- " ſiſts Similitude or Equality. That all Attempts " to define, would but perplex it."†

Had Gentlemen, who treat of this Subject, made a proper Uſe of Mr. *Locke*'s Obſervations, I am perſuaded many of thoſe *Difficulties* and *Perplexities* the Dr. complains of, had been entirely avoided.

" The Difficulty or Obſcurity, ſays Mr. " *Locke*, that has been about this Matter, ra- " ther riſes from the Names ill uſed, than from " any Obſcurity in Things themſelves. For " whatever makes the ſpecifick *Idea*, to which " the Name is apply'd, if that *Idea* be ſteadily " kept to, the Diſtinction of any thing into " the Same and Divers, will eaſily be conceived, " and there can ariſe no Doubt about it."‡

* See a late excellent Treatiſe, entituled, The Analogy of Religion Natural and Reveal'd, to the Conſtitution and Courſe of Nature P. 11. † P. 301. ‡ Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 28.

Indeed

Indeed ſuch an " Explanation of *Perſonal* " *Identity* (which the Dr. mentions) *as renders* " *the Inquiry concerning a future Life of no Con-* " *ſequence at all to us*," may, it is greatly to be " fear'd, proceed from a much worſe Principle.

As to *Perſonal Identity* itſelf, if a Doubt ſhould ariſe, whether a *Perſon* was the *ſame* to Day, he was Yeſterday; it would, I preſume, be very neceſſary to enquire, what was meant by *Perſon*, before any ſatisfactory Anſwer could poſſibly be given. But when Men had ſettled amongſt themſelves, what they meant by this Term, they might, I think, very eaſily agree, whether he were the *ſame*, or a *different* Perſon. So that I muſt beg leave to diſſent from this Gentleman's Opinion, that *all Attempts to define Perſonal Identity, or That, in which it conſiſts, would but perplex it.* I rather take what he immediately ſubjoins, to be much righter, that *there is no Difficulty at all in aſcertaining the Idea.* Tho' the Difference between *This*, and ſettling the *Definition**, ſeems to me rather in the Expreſſion, than the Thing itſelf. But this Ingenious Writer thus proceeds:

" Upon the Conſciouſneſſes of ones Self or " ones own Exiſtence in any two Moments, " being compared, there immediately ariſes to " the Mind the Idea of *Perſonal Identity*. [This] " Compariſon, not only gives us the Idea of " *Perſonal Identity*, but alſo ſhews us the *Iden-* " *tity* of ourſelves in thoſe two Moments: " The preſent, ſuppoſe, and that immediate- " ly paſt, or the preſent, and that, a Month,

* See Locke's H. Und. B. III. C. 4. § 6.

"a Year, or twenty Years paſt." Or in other "Words, by reflecting upon That, which is "myſelf now, and That, which was myſelf "twenty Years ago, I diſcern They are not "two, but one, and the ſame Self." *

Again, "Every Perſon is conſcious, that he "is now the ſame Perſon or Self he was, as far "back as his Remembrance reaches; ſince when "*any One* reflects upon a paſt Action of his own, "he is juſt as certain of the Perſon who did that "Action, namely Himſelf, the Perſon who "now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the "Action was at all done. Nay very often a "Perſon's Aſſurance of an Action having been "done, of which he is abſolutely aſſured, "ariſes wholly from the Conſciouſneſs that he "Himſelf did it." †

What the Dr. here maintains, does not ſeem very different from what is laid down by Mr. *Locke:* Who affirms "it to be the ſame Con-"ſciouſneſs that makes a Man be himſelf to "himſelf. —— And that as far as any intelli-"gent Being can repeat the Idea of any paſt "Action with the ſame Conſciouſneſs it had of "it at firſt, and with the ſame Conſciouſneſs it "has of any preſent Action; ſo far it is the "ſame *Perſonal Self.* For it is by the Conſci-"ouſneſs it has of its preſent Thoughts and "Actions, that it is *Self* to *Itſelf* now, and ſo "will be the ſame *Self*, as far as the ſame Con-"ſciouſneſs can extend to Actions paſt, or to "come. ——— The ſame Conſciouſneſs uniting "thoſe Diſtant Actions into the ſame *Perſon.*" ‖

* The Analogy, *&c.* p. 301, 302. † Ibid. p. 308.
‖ Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 10.

But

But how far theſe Gentlemen do really agree, will better appear hereafter.

" Tho' Conſciouſneſs, ſays Dr. *Butler*, does " thus aſcertain our *Perſonal Identity* to ourſelves; " yet to ſay, that Conſciouſneſs makes *Perſo-* " *nal Identity*, or is neceſſary to our being the " ſame Perſons, is to ſay, that a Perſon has not " exiſted a ſingle Moment, nor done One Acti- " on, but what he can remember; indeed none " but what he reflects upon. And one ſhould re- " ally think it ſelf-evident, that Conſciouſneſs " of *Perſonal Identity* preſuppoſes, and therefore " cannot conſtitute *Perſonal Identity*, any more " than Knowledge in any other Caſe, can con- " ſtitute Truth, which it preſuppoſes."*

It muſt appear perfectly evident from theſe Objections, not only that Dr. *Butler*'s *Idea* of *Perſon* here differs from Mr. *Locke*'s, and which we ſhall more fully obſerve hereafter; but that the Dr. did not here reflect, that Mr. *Locke* expreſsly makes a Diſtinction betwixt the ſame *Man*, and the ſame *Perſon* †. And therefore it will be very proper to conſider in this Place, what Mr. *Locke* means by *Perſon* or *Self*; and what by *Perſonal Identity*.

" *Perſon* then he defines, a thinking intelli- " gent Being, that has Reaſon and Reflection, " and can conſider itſelf as itſelf, the ſame think- " ing Thing in different Times and Places; " which it does only by that Conſciouſneſs, " which is inſeparable from Thinking."‖ Again, " *Self* is that conſcious thinking Thing " ——which is ſenſible, or conſcious of Plea-

* The Analogy, *&c.* p. 302. † H. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 15. 20. ‖ Ibid. § 9.

" ſure

" ſure and Pain, capable of Happineſs or Mi-
" ſery, and ſo is concern'd for *Itſelf*, as far as
" that Conſciouſneſs extends." *

" By this Conſciouſneſs [every intelligent Be-
" ing] finds himſelf to be the *ſame Self*, which
" did ſuch or ſuch an Action ſome Years ſince,
" by which he comes to be happy or miſerable
" now." †

" *Perſon*, as I take it, is the Name for this
" *Self*. Wherever a Man finds what he calls
" *Himſelf*, there I think another may ſay is the
" *ſame Perſon*. It is a Forenſick Term, appro-
" priating Actions and their Merit; and ſo be-
" longs only to intelligent Agents capable of a
" Law, and Happineſs and Miſery. This Per-
" ſonality extends *itſelf* beyond preſent Exiſtence
" to what is paſt, only by Conſciouſneſs, where-
" by it becomes concern'd and accountable,
" owns and imputes to *itſelf* paſt Actions, juſt
" upon the ſame Ground, and for the ſame
" Reaſon it does the Preſent." ‖

Moreover, " Since Conſciouſneſs always ac-
" companies thinking, and 'tis That that makes
" Every One to be what he calls *Self*; and
" thereby diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all other
" thinking Things; in *This* alone conſiſts *Per-*
" *ſonal Identity*, i. e. the Sameneſs of a rational
" Being: And as far as this Conſciouſneſs can
" be extended backwards to any paſt Action,
" or Thought, ſo far reaches the Identity of
" that *Perſon*; it is the ſame *Self* now it was
" then; and 'tis by the ſame *Self* with this pre-
" ſent One that now reflects on it, that That
" Action was done." **

* Hum. Und. B. II. § 17. † Ibid. C. 27. § 25.
‖ Ibid § 26. ** Ibid. § 9.

By

By comparing which together, I think it muſt appear ſufficiently plain, that by *Perſon*, Mr. *Locke* does not mean either a *Man*, or any other *living Agent*, in general; but only *ſuch* a Rational Being, as is *actually* conſcious of its own Behaviour; *capable* of a Law, and *anſwerable* for its Actions. So that conſequently One in a Phrenſy, notwithſtanding his being a *Man* or *living Agent*, would not however, according to Mr. *Locke*, be eſteem'd a *Perſon*.——For *whatever Subſtance there is*, ſays he, *without Conſciouſneſs, there is no Perſon* *. As to *Perſonal Identity*, This conſiſts in *Identity* of *Conſciouſneſs*, and in That alone. His Reaſon is,—— "It "being the ſame Conſciouſneſs, that makes a "Man be himſelf to himſelf, *Perſonal Identity* "depends on That only." †

And indeed, ſince his *Idea* of *Perſon*, is a Being *actually conſcious* of its own Actions, in what elſe can the *Identity* of ſuch *Perſon* conſiſt? And therefore when Dr. *Butler* thus expreſſes himſelf —— "to ſay that Conſciouſneſs makes *Per-* "*ſonal Identity*, or is neceſſary to our being the "ſame Perſons, is to ſay that a Perſon has not "exiſted a ſingle Moment, nor done one Acti- "on, but what he can remember, *&c.*" ——

All This, I think is a plain Demonſtration, that by *Perſon*, the Dr. here only means in general, a *Man* or *living Agent*; and that therefore his Objections have nothing to do with *Perſon* or *Perſonal Identity*, as underſtood by Mr. *Locke*, ——However that Gentleman thus proceeds, —— "This wonderful Miſtake may poſſibly "have ariſen from hence, that to be indued with

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 23. † § 10.

Conſci-

" Conſciouſneſs, is inſeparable from the Idea of " a Perſon, or intelligent Being. For this " might be expreſs'd inaccurately thus, that " Conſciouſneſs makes Perſonality; and from " hence it might be concluded, to make *Perſo-* " *nal Identity*. But though preſent Conſciouſneſs " of what we at preſent do and feel, is neceſſary " to our being the Perſons we now are; yet " preſent Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions, or " Feelings, is not neceſſary to our being the " ſame Perſon, who perform'd thoſe Actions or " had thoſe Feelings."*

If this ingenious Objector had but duely conſider'd, what it is that makes a *Perſon*, according to Mr. *Locke*, he would not have given himſelf the trouble of accounting for what he ſuppoſes a *Miſtake*. However let us examine what is here advanced.

If by the *Sameneſs* of *Perſon* we are to underſtand the *Sameneſs* of *living Agents*, as this Gentleman elſewhere explains it; † then *preſent Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions* is certainly *unneceſſary* to our being the ſame *Perſons*, i. e. the ſame *living Agents*, who perform'd thoſe Actions: Since we are undoubtedly the ſame *living Agents*, whether we are conſcious of our *paſt* (or even *preſent*) Actions or not. —— But what has This to do with our being the *ſame Perſons* in Mr. *Locke*'s Senſe of the Word?

I am perſuaded if the learned Author would narrowly examine his *Ideas*, he would go near to find that he uſes the Word *Perſon*, not in the ſame ſtrict Meaning in both Places. In the former he appears evidently to uſe it in the Senſe

* The Analogy, *&c.* p. 302. † p. 11.

of

of Mr. *Locke*; in the latter, the Word ſeems only to ſtand for *Man* or *living Agent*. *Preſent Conſciouſneſs*, ſays he, *of what we at preſent do, is neceſſary to our being the Perſons we now are.* ——— That is, to our being *accountable Agents*, or *Perſons*, in Mr. *Locke's* Senſe. But what is the Reaſon that *Preſent Conſciouſneſs of paſt Actions is not neceſſary to our being the ſame Perſons, who perform'd thoſe Actions?* It is not indeed neceſſary to our being the ſame *Men*, or *living Agents*, as has been already obſerved: But is *Conſciouſneſs* of what is paſt *neceſſary* to our being the *ſame proper Objects* of Puniſhment, which we were at the Time of Commiſſion? If it be, then *preſent Conſciouſneſs* of paſt Actions is *neceſſary* to our being the *ſame Perſons*; that is, according to Mr. *Locke's* Idea of the Word *Perſon*. Or ſhall we ſay, that every Man, who was guilty of a Crime whilſt he enjoy'd his Senſes, is under all Circumſtances, *juſtly* puniſhable? Is the *Mad* Man *juſtly* puniſhable for what the *Sober* Man did? If he be not, then we muſt allow that ſomething more is neceſſary to conſtitute the *ſame Perſon*, in Mr. *Locke's* Senſe, than barely being the *ſame Man*. He that has loſt his Underſtanding, and the Remembrance of his Crimes, is yet the *ſame living Agent*, and may, I preſume, be call'd the *ſame guilty Man*: But if he be not the *ſame Conſcious Being*, or the *ſame proper Object of Puniſhment*, he is not in Mr. *Locke's* Phraſe, the *ſame Perſon*. And indeed his Opinion, that God Almighty will puniſh no Man hereafter for any Crime, but what is firſt brought home to his Mind and Conſcience*, ſeems to have plain Reaſon, if not plain

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 22, 26.

Revelation, on its Side. And he may well ſay, that "in this *Perſonal Identity*, is founded all "the Right and Juſtice of Reward and Puniſhment."* For tho' to reward a Man in a Phrenſy could do him no Hurt; yet the Attempt would be as abſurd, as the puniſhing of him in thoſe Circumſtances, would be irrational and cruel. —— But to proceed. ——— "The In- "quiry, ſays Dr. *Butler*, what makes Vegeta- "bles the ſame in the common Acceptation of "the Word, does not appear to have any Re- "lation to This of *Perſonal Identity*; becauſe "the Word *Same*, when apply'd to Them, and "to Perſon, is not only apply'd to different "Subjects, but it is alſo uſed in different Senſes. "For when a Man ſwears to the ſame Tree, as "having ſtood fifty Years in the ſame Place, "he means only the ſame as to all the Purpoſes "of Property and Uſes of common Life, and "not that the Tree has been all that time the "ſame in the ſtrict Philoſophic Senſe of the "Word. For he does not know, whether any "one Particle of the preſent Tree, be the ſame "with any one Particle of the Tree, which ſtood "in the ſame Place fifty Years ago. And if "they have not one common Particle of Mat- "ter, They cannot be the ſame Tree in the pro- "per Philoſophic Senſe of the Word *Same*; it "being evidently a Contradiction in Terms, to "ſay They are, when no Part of their Sub- "ſtance, and no one of their Properties, are "the ſame. ——— And therefore when we "ſay the Identity or Sameneſs of a Plant con- "ſiſts, in a Continuation of the ſame Life, com-

*§ 18.

"municated

" municated under the ſame Organization, to a " Number of Particles of Matter whether the " ſame or not; the Word *Same* when apply'd " to Life and to Organization, cannot poſſibly " be underſtood to ſignify, what it ſignifies in " this very Sentence when apply'd to Matter. " In a looſe and popular Senſe then, the Life, " and the Organization, and the Plant, are juſt- " ly ſaid to be the ſame, notwithſtanding the " perpetual Change of the Parts. But in a " ſtrict and Philoſophical Manner of Speech, " no Man, no Being, no Any-thing, can be the " ſame with That, with which it hath indeed " nothing the ſame. Now Sameneſs is uſed in " this latter Senſe when apply'd to Perſons. " The *Identity* of Theſe therefore, cannot ſub- " ſiſt with Diverſity of Subſtance." *

I beg leave here to obſerve, that if the *Sameneſs* of a Vegetable conſiſts in the *ſame* numerical Particles, the *Identity* is as much deſtroy'd by the Loſs of a *Few*, as by the Change of *All*. And a Tree is no more the *ſame*, which has ſtood fifty Days, than what has ſtood fifty Years. But if the *Identity* of a Plant conſiſts in what Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes, then a Tree of fifty Years ſtanding, is as much the *ſame* Tree, even in the ſtricteſt Senſe of the Word *ſame*, as a Tree which has ſtood but ſo many Hours. And tho' it be very certain, that *no Being*, nor indeed *any thing* elſe, can *ſtrictly be the ſame with That, with which it hath Nothing the ſame*; yet I think it may be a Queſtion, whether it be *Unity of Subſtance that comprehends all Identity, or will determine it in every Caſe.*†

* The Analogy, &c. p. 303, 304. † Hum. Und. B. II, C. 27. § 7

Mr. *Locke* is of Opinion, that the *Identity* of Vegetables and Animals depends not, like the *Identity* of a Maſs of Matter, on the ſame Number of Particles; but on the contrary, that "in "Them the Variation of great Parcels of Mat-"ter alters not the *Identity:* An Oak growing "from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp'd, "is ſtill the ſame Oak: And a Colt grown "up to a Horſe, ſometimes fat, ſometimes lean, "is all the while the ſame Horſe; tho' in both "theſe Caſes, there may be a manifeſt Change "of the Parts: So that truly they are not ei-"ther of them the ſame Maſſes of Matter, "tho' they be truly one of them the ſame Oak, "and the other the ſame Horſe. The Reaſon "whereof is, that in theſe two Caſes, of a Maſs "of Matter, and a living Body, *Identity* is not "apply'd to the ſame Thing." As to the former, "Whilſt two or more Atoms exiſt united "together, the Maſs, conſiſting of the ſame "Atoms, muſt be the ſame Maſs, or the ſame "Body."* Whereas "a Plant continues the "ſame, as long as it partakes of the ſame Life, "though that Life be communicated to new "Particles of Matter vitally united to the liv-"ing Plant."† And "the ſame Animal is "the ſame continued Life, communicated to "different Particles of Matter, as they happen "ſucceſſively to be united to that organiz'd liv-"ing Body." ‖

Indeed, to one, who will judge of the *Sameneſs* of all Beings, by what conſtitutes the *Sameneſs* of a Maſs of unorganiz'd Matter, it is impoſſible that either Vegetable or Animal ſhou'd

* Ibid. § 3. † § 4. ‖ § 8.

continue

continue the *ſame* for one Day together. Whereas he that judges of *Identity*, by what *anſwers to all the Purpoſes of Property, and Uſes of common Life*, can never be without the *ſame* Trees in his Park; provided, upon the Fall of any, there be others planted in their ſtead.

As to Mr. *Locke*'s Sentiments; I could as ſoon doubt, whether a Man were the *ſame Man*, after his Hair was cut and his Nails were pared, as I could doubt, whether a Tree was the *ſame Tree* (even in the ſtricteſt Senſe of the Word *ſame*) after its Leaves were fal'n, or its Boughs trim'd. It is true, neither the one nor the other wou'd conſiſt of the *ſame numerical Particles*, they did before; and conſequently they are not the *ſame Maſſes* of Matter: But then as my Idea of a *Man* or *Vegetable*, is not the Idea of a Maſs of *mere unorganiz'd Matter*; ſo That which is neceſſary to conſtitute the *Identity* of the One, does not appear to me neceſſary to the *Identity* of the Other. However this, as Mr. *Locke* obſerves, will be juſt according to our ſeveral Ideas of the Subjects, we apply *Identity* to: And Men may diſpute for ever, whether Vegetable or Animal, whether Perſon, Man, or Subſtance, be the *ſame*; 'till they have agreed amongſt themſelves, what Ideas thoſe different Words ſhall ſtand for*.

As to what the Dr. affirms, that "*Sameneſs* "is uſed in a ſtrict and Philoſophical Manner "of Speech, when apply'd to Perſons: And "that the *Identity* of Theſe cannnot ſubſiſt with "Diverſity of Subſtance:" ——— I could wiſh he had been more particular in explaining,

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27, § 7. 15. 28, 29.

what

what is here meant by *Perſons*, and what by *Subſtance*. For if by *Perſon* we underſtand the *Immaterial Spirit* only; and by *Subſtance*, the Subſtance of ſuch Spirit: In this Caſe it would be ſaying, that the *Identity* of an *Individual Spirit* cannot ſubſiſt with the *Diverſity* of its own Subſtance: And which, I preſume, has not been controverted. But if by *Subſtance*, be meant *That* of the Body, the Propoſition would amount to This, either that the Body never gain'd or loſt any Particles of Matter; or that an *Immaterial Spirit* could not continue the *ſame*, under ſuch a Variation of the Subſtance of the Body. Or laſtly, if by *Perſon*, be meant the whole Compound, *Spirit* and *Body* united; then the *Identity* of ſuch *Perſon* may certainly ſubſiſt with Diverſity of Subſtance; or we ſhall never be able to find the *ſame Perſon*, for perhaps two Hours together. ——— But this learned Writer thus proceeds.

" The Thing here conſider'd, and demon-
" ſtratively, as I think, determined, is propoſed
" by Mr. *Locke* in theſe Words:

" *Whether it*, i. e. the ſame Self or Perſon, be
" the ſame Identical Subſtance?

" And he has ſuggeſted what is a much bet-
" ter Anſwer to the Queſtion, than that which
" he gives it in Form. For he defines Perſon,
" a *thinking intelligent Being*, &c. and Perſonal
" Identity, *the Sameneſs of a rational Being*.*

" The Queſtion then is, whether the ſame
" Rational Being is the ſame Subſtance; which
" needs no Anſwer, becauſe Being and Subſtance,
" in this Place, ſtand for the ſame Idea. The
" Ground of the Doubt, Whether the ſame

* Locke's Works, Vol. I. p. 146. or Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. §9 10.

" Perſon

" Perſon be the ſame Subſtance, is ſaid to be " This, that the Conſciouſneſs of our own " Exiſtence, in Youth, and in Old Age, or " in any two joint ſucceſſive Moments, *is not* " *the ſame individual Action* *, i. e. not the ſame " Conſciouſneſs, but different ſucceſſive Con- " ſciouſneſſes. Now it is ſtrange that This " ſhould have occaſion'd ſuch Perplexities; for " it is ſurely conceivable, that a Perſon may " have a Capacity of knowing ſome Object or " other to be the ſame now, which it was " when he contemplated it formerly: Yet in " this Caſe, where, by the Suppoſition, the " Object is perceiv'd to be the ſame, the Per- " ception of it in any two Moments, cannot " be one and the ſame Perception.

" And thus, tho' the ſucceſſive Conſciouſneſſes " which we have of our own Exiſtence, are not " the ſame, yet are they Conſciouſneſſes of one " and the ſame Thing or Object, of the ſame " Perſon, Self, or living Agent. The Perſon, " of whoſe Exiſtence the Conſciouſneſs is felt " now, and was felt an Hour or a Year ago, is " diſcern'd to be, not two Perſons, but one and " the ſame Perſon; and therefore is one and " the ſame." †

Mr. *Locke* obſerves that " Doubts are rais'd " (by the Interruption of Conſciouſneſs, and our " loſing Sight of our paſt *ſelves*) whether we " are the ſame thinking Thing, *i. e.* the ſame " Subſtance or no?" Or as he had juſt before expreſs'd himſelf, —— " *Whether it* [i. e. the " ſame *Self* or *Perſon*] *be the ſame Identical Sub-* " *ſtance?*" ‖ So that, I apprehend, the Doubt

* Ibid. † The Analogy, *&c.* p. 304. ‖ Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 10.

here

here mention'd, is, Whether That, which a Man calls *Self* to Day, be that very *Being* or *Subſtance*, which he call'd *Self* Yeſterday? But I think, as the Dr. ſeems to have taken the Queſtion, it looks as if a Doubt had been ſtarted, Whether the *ſame Being or Subſtance*, was the *ſame Being or Subſtance?* And which, as he very juſtly remarks, *needs no Anſwer.*

As to the *Anſwer*, which this ingenious Gentleman ſuppoſes Mr. *Locke* has *ſuggeſted* to this *Queſtion*; it does not, I think, appear to have any manner of relation to it. Mr. *Locke* is only there mentioning, what he means by *Perſon*; and what, by the *Sameneſs* of ſuch *Perſon:* And ſince This, according to him, always depends on the ſame *Conſciouſneſs*, whether annexed to the *ſame* or a *different* Subſtance; thoſe Definitions can have nothing to do, towards ſolving a Doubt, whether a Man be the very *ſame* Subſtance to Day, which he was Yeſterday? —— Beſides, as Mr. *Locke* obſerves, theſe "Doubts, how "reaſonable or unreaſonable ſoever, concern not "*Perſonal Identity* at all." * That is, Mr. *Locke*'s Hypotheſis cannot be affected by them. For as that makes *Perſonal Identity* to conſiſt in *Conſciouſneſs* only; it ſeems to ſtand clear of all Difficulties of this Sort. For let Men doubt as long as they pleaſe, about their being the ſame individual *Self or Subſtance*, which they were a Day, a Week, or a Year before; they are equally, according to Mr. *Locke*, the *ſame accountable Perſons* or *Beings*, as far as their Conſciouſneſs reaches; and *anſwerable* for every Tranſaction of their whole Lives, which can thus by Con-

* Ibid.

ſciouſneſs

ſciouſneſs be appropriated to themſelves. So that let them determine of the ſame Identical Subſtance as they will, they can never get clear, upon Mr. *Locke's* Suppoſition, of the leaſt Guilt they have ever contracted, by imagining any Change or Variation of Subſtance whatever.

But now, tho' we are certainly able to *diſcern* ourſelves to be the ſame *Perſons*, we were formerly, as Mr. *Locke* every where ſuppoſes; yet, if by *Perſon* be meant the ſame *Subſtance*, how will Conſciouſneſs prove to any Man, that he is the ſame *Perſon*, in this Senſe; unleſs by *Perſon*, he underſtands the immaterial Spirit, and that Only? But as All do not exclude every thing material out of their Idea of *Perſon*; it is impoſſible they ſhould by *Conſciouſneſs* be able to diſcern, that they are the ſame *Perſons*, in the Senſe here underſtood.

Dr. *Butler* goes on to remark: ——— "Mr. "*Locke*'s Obſervations upon this Subject appear "haſty; and he ſeems to profeſs himſelf diſſatiſ- "fied with Suppoſitions, which he has made re- "lating to it*. But ſome of thoſe haſty Ob- "ſervations have been carried to a ſtrange Length "by Others; whoſe Notion, when traced and "examined to the Bottom, amounts, I think, "to this:† That Perſonality is not a perma- "nent, but a tranſient Thing: That it lives "and dies, begins and ends continually: That "no one can any more remain one and the "ſame Perſon two Moments together, than two "ſucceſſive Moments can be one and the ſame "Moment: That our Subſtance is indeed con-

*Locke's Works, p. 152. † See an Anſwer to Dr. *Clarke's* third Defenſe of his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, 2d Edition p. 44 and 56, &c.

" tinually changing, but whether This be ſo or " not, is, it ſeems, nothing to the Purpoſe, " ſince it is not Subſtance but Conſciouſneſs " alone, which conſtitutes Perſonality; which " Conſciouſneſs being ſucceſſive, cannot be the " ſame in any two Moments, nor conſequently " the Perſonality conſtituted by it*."

To how many Readers any of Mr. *Locke*'s Obſervations upon this Subject may appear *haſty*, I cannot pretend to ſay. He ſeems to have been no very haſty Writer in general, and perhaps even his Obſervations in this Chapter, may rather be thought by ſome to carry plain Marks of great Application of Mind. Tho', as to his appearing *diſſatisfied* with any of his own *Suppoſitions*; it is no wonder, that ſo modeſt a Writer as Mr. *Locke*, ſhou'd not be over confident, where he owns himſelf to be greatly in the Dark.

" I am apt enough, ſays he, to think I have, " in treating of this Subject, made ſome Sup- " poſitions that will look ſtrange to ſome Read- " ers, and poſſibly they are ſo in themſelves. " But yet, I think, they are ſuch as are par- " donable in this Ignorance we are in of the " Nature of that thinking Thing that is in us, " and which we look on as our *Selves*. Did we " know, what it was, or how it was tied to a " certain Syſtem of fleeting Animal Spirits; or " whether it could, or could not perform its " Operations of Thinking and Memory out of " a Body organized as ours is; and whether it " has pleas'd God that no One ſuch Spirit ſhall " ever be united to any but One ſuch Body, " upon the right Conſtitution of whoſe Organs

* The Analogy, *&c.* p. 305.

its

" its Memory ſhould depend, we might ſee the " Abſurdity of ſome of thoſe Suppoſitions I " have made*."

So that this great Man does indeed acknowledge his own *Ignorance*, and treats ſome of his *Suppoſitions* with a Freedom, that few Writers are guilty of in reſpect of themſelves. But ſome of theſe Obſervations, Dr. *Butler* remarks, *have been carried to a ſtrange Length by Others.* To which I beg Leave to add, that whoever will but compare what Mr. *Locke* has advanced upon this Subject, with what the Dr. mentions from thoſe other Writers, will find as wide a difference between them, as between any two *expreſs Contradictions* whatever.

For whilſt Mr. *Locke* every where maintains to this Effect, " That Conſciouſneſs unites the " moſt diſtant Actions into one and the ſame " *Perſon:* That wherever ſuch Conſciouſneſs is, " there is *Perſonal Identity:* That every *Perſon* " is ſtrictly accountable for whatever can be thus " appropriated to himſelf by this Conſciouſ- " neſs†: And that in this *Perſonal Identity* is " founded all the Right and Juſtice of Rewards " and Puniſhments‡:" whilſt Mr. *Locke* conſtantly maintains this, the *Others* affirm, "That " Perſonality is not a permanent, but Tranſient " Thing: That it lives and dies, begins and " ends continually: That no one can any more " remain one and the ſame Perſon two Moments " together, than two ſucceſſive Moments can be " one and the ſame Moment: And that Con- " ſciouſneſs being ſucceſſive, cannot be the ſame " in any two Moments, nor conſequently the

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 27. †Ibid. § 16. ‡§ 18.

" ſonality conſtituted by it."

Dr. *Butler* thus concludes his Diſſertation :—

" This *He*, *Perſon*, or *Self* muſt either be a " Subſtance, or the Property of ſome Subſtance. " If He, if Perſon, be a Subſtance, then Con- " ſciouſneſs that He is the ſame Perſon, is Con- " ſciouſneſs that He is the ſame Subſtance. If " the Perſon or He be the Property of a Sub- " ſtance, ſtill Conſciouſneſs that He is the ſame " (the ſame Property) is as certain a Proof, " that his Subſtance remains the ſame, as Con- " ſciouſneſs that He remains the ſame Subſtance " would be ; ſince the ſame Property cannot be " transferr'd from one Subſtance to another.

" But tho' we are thus certain, that we are " the ſame Agents, living Beings or Subſtances " now, which we were as far back as our Re- " membrance reaches, yet it is aſked, whether " we may not poſſibly be deceiv'd in it? And " this Queſtion may be aſked at the End of any " Demonſtration whatever. Becauſe it is a " Queſtion concerning the Truth of Perception " by Memory: And he who can doubt, whe- " ther Perception by Memory can in this Caſe " be depended upon, may doubt alſo, whether " Perception by Deduction and Reaſoning, " which alſo include Memory, or indeed whe- " ther intuitive Perception, can. Here then " we can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to " attempt to prove the Truth of thoſe Percep- " tions, whoſe Truth we can no otherwiſe prove, " than by other Perceptions of exactly the ſame " Kind with them, and which there is juſt the " ſame Ground to ſuſpect; or to attempt to " prove the Truth of our Faculties, which can " no otherwiſe be proved, than by the Uſe or

Means

" Means of thoſe very ſuſpected Faculties them-
" ſelves *."

Tho' *He*, *Perſon*, or *Self* be certainly a *Subſtance*; yet Conſciouſneſs that *He* is the *ſame Perſon*, cannot, I think, be Conſciouſneſs that *He* is the *ſame Subſtance*, to any Man, who makes the Body one Part of his *Self* or *Perſon*.

Indeed where the Idea of *Perſon*, is only the *Idea* of an individual immaterial Subſtance, a Conſciouſneſs we are the *ſame Perſon*, is beyond all Queſtion, a Conſciouſneſs, that we are the *ſame Subſtance*. And in this Caſe to doubt, whether the *ſame Perſon*, be the *ſame Subſtance*, wou'd be only to doubt, whether the *ſame individual Subſtance*, was the *ſame individual Subſtance*.

According to Mr. *Locke*, we may always be ſure, that we are the *ſame Perſons*, that is, the *ſame accountable* Agents, or Beings *now*, *which we were as far back as our Remembrance reaches*: Or as far as a perfectly Juſt and Good God will cauſe it to *reach*.

As to any Thing, that looks like *doubting*, either after a *Demonſtration*, *intuitive Perception*, or *Perception by Memory*; I am thoroughly perſuaded this ingenious Gentleman did not deſign in the leaſt to charge Mr. *Locke* with it. It is true indeed, Mr. *Locke* thus expreſſes himſelf:—
" Why one Intellectual Subſtance may not have
" repreſented to it, as done by itſelf, what it
" never did, and was perhaps done by ſome
" other Agent; why ſuch a Repreſentation may
" not poſſibly be without Reality of Matter of
" Fact, as well as ſeveral Repreſentations in

* The Analogy, &c. p. 308.

Dreams

" Dreams are, which yet, whilſt dreaming, " we take for true, will be difficult to con- " clude from the Nature of Things*," ——But the n it ſhould be remembered, that he thus immediately adds, ——" And that it *never is ſo*, will " by us, 'till we have clearer Views of the Na- " ture of thinking Subſtances, be beſt reſolv'd " into the Goodneſs of God, who, as far as the " Happineſs or Miſery of any of his ſenſible " Creatures is concern'd in it, will not by a *fa- " tal Error* of theirs transfer from one to another " that Conſciouſneſs, which draws Reward or " Puniſhment with it †."

And therefore it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that Mr. *Locke* has ſufficiently ſecured this Point; when he reſts it upon no weaker a Foundation, than the *Goodneſs* of God. Of which, I preſume, we may be as infallibly aſſured, as of the Truth of any of our Faculties whatever. A Man may certainly, with as much Modeſty, doubt of the Truth of his own *Memory* or *Perceptions*, as call in queſtion that Divine Attribute. And ſurely he that can do This, may with equal Reaſon, doubt of the very *Being* of a God, or of his own Exiſtence.

Mr. *Locke* indeed ſuppoſed, that we knew not enough of the Nature of Thinking Subſtances, peremptorily to determine that ſuch *Repreſentations* could never happen; and therefore he eſteem'd it the moſt effectual Way to obviate Doubts of this Kind, to reſolve the Whole into that Adorable Goodneſs, which could not ſuffer us to be ſo far deceived, as to be render'd for ever *undeſervedly* miſerable. And at the

*H. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 13. †Ibid.

ſame

ſame time, he "leaves it to be conſidered, how "far this may be an Argument againſt thoſe, "who would place Thinking in a Syſtem of fleet-"ing Animal Spirits *." And a very powerful Argument this muſt certainly appear to every Man, who has any juſt or rational Conceptions either of the Deity, or of his own Nature.

Upon the whole, Mr. *Locke* has been ſo far from encouraging any *Unreaſonable* Doubts (I mention this for the Sake of thoſe Readers, who may either miſtake Mr. *Locke* or Dr. *Butler*) that he has expreſsly endeavour'd to guard us againſt them, ſince he tells us, that let our Ignorance of the Nature of thinking Subſtances, and of their Operations upon one another, be what it will; yet we may be infallibly aſſured, we can never be deceiv'd in that *Conſciouſneſs which draws Reward or Puniſhment with it*, from the Hands of God. But that whatever Actions ſuch Conſciouſneſs appropriates to us, whether good or evil, are moſt certainly our own; that we are the *very Perſons*, who once actually did thoſe Actions; and that *we alone* are juſtly rewardable or puniſhable for them.

As to the learned Author of the *Diſſertation*, it is by no Means ſurprizing, if he and Mr. *Locke* differ with regard to *Perſonal Identity:* Since whilſt they both talk of the *ſame Perſon*, they ſometimes talk of very *different* Things. Mr. *Locke* will not allow any *unconſcious* Being, Agent, or Subſtance to be a *Perſon:* he eſteems Conſciouſneſs ſo eſſential in this reſpect, that he affirms "A Carcaſe may be a *Perſon*, as well as "any Sort of Subſtance be ſo, without Conſci-

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 13.

"ouſneſs."

ouſneſs*." Whereas, tho' a *preſent Conſciouſneſs* of what we at preſent do, is ſuppoſed *neceſſary to our being the Perſons we now are*; —— I think *Perſon*, in the Doctor's Senſe of the Word, may generally ſtand for any *living unconſcious Man* whatever. And therefore as their *Ideas* of what conſtitutes a *Perſon*, are different, it is no Wonder they diſagree as to what conſtitutes the *Sameneſs* of That *Perſon*.

However it is ſubmitted, whether Mr. *Locke*'s Sentiments in relation to *Perſonal Identity*, have been altogether placed by Dr. *Butler* in their proper Light; and withal, how far they have been affected by the Objections of that learned and ingenious Writer?

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 23.

THE

THE

OBJECTIONS

Rais'd againſt

Mr. *LOCKE*

BY

The Learned Author of *An* ENQUIRY *into the Nature of the* Human Soul, Conſider'd.

" SINCE Matter, ſays this Writer, " cannot be percipient, it cannot " have Ideas; Ideas are perceiv'd, " and are conſequently nothing " but Perceptions; and therefore " it cannot have Senſation, Feeling, or Life, " becauſe all theſe imply Perception." Vol. I. p. 192.

This being laid down, the ingenious Author proceeds thus to remark: —— " From this we

" may ſee what little Reaſon Mr. *Locke* had to
" be ſo peremptory in his Diſpute with the Bi-
" ſhop of *Worceſter* about the Poſſibility of Mat-
" ter's Thinking; where, to prove it poſſible,
" he ſays, for Example, God creates an extend-
" ed ſolid Subſtance, without ſuperadding any
" Thing elſe to it, and ſo we may conſider it at
" reſt: To ſome Parts of it he ſuperadds Mo-
" tion, but it has ſtill the Eſſence of Matter.
" Other Parts of it he frames into Plants, with
" all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life, and
" Beauty, which is to be found in a Roſe, or a
" Peach-tree, *above the Eſſence of Matter in ge-*
" *neral*, but it is ſtill but Matter. To other
" Parts he adds Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion,
" and thoſe other Properties that are to be found
" in an Elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted
" but the Power of God may go, [and that the
" Properties of a Roſe, a Peach, or an Elephant,
" ſuperadded to Matter, change not the Pro-
" perties of Matter; but Matter is in theſe
" Things Matter ſtill*:] But if one venture to
" go one Step farther, and ſay, God may give
" to Matter Thought, Reaſon, and Volition,
" as well as Senſe and ſpontaneous Motion, there
" are Men ready preſently to limit the Power
" of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he can-
" not do it, becauſe it deſtroys the Eſſence, or
" *changes the Eſſential Properties* of Matter†."

To this our Author replies, —— " A Man
" may warrantably ſay, That to effect a Con-

* The Words here incloſed are left out in the Quotation. The ingenious Objector might think them ſuperfluous; but they may not appear ſo to others.

† B. IV. C. 3. § 6. In the Notes at theſe Mords —— *We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking*, &c.

tradiction

" tradiction is not the Object of *any Power*;
" nothing leſs limits Omnipotence: And ſuch
" it is to effect that a Subſtance, which as ſolid-
" ly extended, muſt reſiſt all Change of State,
" ſhould, while remaining ſolidly extended, be-
" come of *dull*, *dead Earth*, Life, Senſe, and
" ſpontaneous Motion *; for that is to ſay, it
" becomes *living*, *ſenſible*, and *ſpontaneouſly mov-*
" *ing Earth*, while it remains dull and dead
" Earth." Vol. I. p. 192—194.

After our Author has reproved Mr. *Locke* for having been over *peremptory*; he proceeds next to charge him with a *Contradiction*, which, like the *Egyptian Darkneſs*, may really be *felt*. For it ſeems according to Mr. *Locke*, Earth may become *living*, *ſenſible*, and *ſpontaneouſly moving*, whilſt it remains without *Life*, or *Senſe*, or *Motion!* Not that Mr. *Locke* is taxed with maintaining this in ſo many Words; but *only* what amounts to it. If we enquire after Mr. *Locke*'s Propoſition, here it ſeems to be: —— " A Sub-
" ſtance, whilſt ſolidly extended, may become
" of *dull*, *dead* Earth, *Life*, *Senſe*, and *ſponta-*
" *neous Motion!*" At leaſt this Propoſition muſt be ſuppos'd to contain Mr. *Locke*'s Meaning; ſince we are refer'd to the very Page, Volume, and Edition of his Works. But whether our Author has not given us a very *faulty Paraphraſe* of his own, rather than the Words or Senſe of Mr. *Locke*, may be partly conjectured from the very Letter publiſh'd by Mr. *Locke* himſelf.

" If the Omnipotent Creator, ſays Mr. *Locke*,
" had not ſuperadded to the Earth, which pro-
" duced the irrational Animals, Qualities far

* In the Page immediately after, *viz.* 145. Vol. II. Edit. printed 1715.

" ſurpaſſing thoſe of the dull, dead Earth, out " of which they were made, Life, Senſe, and " ſpontaneous Motion, nobler Qualities than " were before in it, it had ſtill remain'd rude " ſenſeleſs Matter*."

Pray what is here of the *dull dead* Earth becoming *Life*, and *Senſe*, and *ſpontaneous Motion?* May not Creatures form'd of Earth, be endued with *Life*, and *Senſe*, and *Motion*, without *becoming* thoſe very *Powers* or *Qualities?* or does Mr. *Locke* affirm any thing elſe?

Indeed in theſe three Pages which begin the *Attack*, Mr. *Locke* is very cloſely preſs'd. At the Bottom of p. 193. after our Author has quoted a Paragraph from that Gentleman, where he ſays, " It is impoſſible for us, by the Con- " templation of our own *Ideas*, without Reve- " lation, to diſcover whether Omnipotency has " not given to ſome Syſtems of Matter fitly diſ- " pos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or elſe " join'd and fix'd to Matter ſo diſpos'd, a think- " ing immaterial Subſtance," [B. IV. C 3. § 6.] I ſay, after this we meet with the following *extraordinary* Remark: —— " This is founded " upon what Mr. *Locke* elſewhere endeavours to " maintain, That our Ideas are only *arbitrary* " *Combinations*, without Connexion to any Thing " in Nature."

What can this Gentleman mean by this Aſſertion? Was Mr. *Locke*'s Doubt, to wit, Whether *Omnipotence* had done the one or the other, founded upon this Suppoſition, *that our*

* Third Letter to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, p. 399, 400. See alſo the fifth Edition of the Eſſay, p. 458. As to that Edition of Mr. *Locke*'s Works which is refer'd to, I have had no Opportunity of conſulting it.

Ideas

Ideas are only arbitrary Combinations? Our Author ſeems evidently to affirm, *It is founded upon this.* Might he not as well have affirm'd, that *it was founded upon* the great Church at *Harlem?*

Beſides, ſince this Gentleman knows that Mr. *Locke* only maintains *ſome* * of our *Ideas* to be *arbitrary Combinations*; why ſhould he expreſs himſelf in ſo *looſe* and *careleſs* a Manner, as may poſſibly miſlead his Reader? Would not any Man, who was unacquainted with Mr. *Locke*, imagine he had maintained that *all* our Ideas were only ſuch *Combinations?* However, what theſe *Ideas* are, and what Mr. *Locke* ſays of 'em, we ſhall have occaſion to conſider hereafter.

But now before we proceed to what immediately follows in this Writer, I beg Leave to take Notice of an Obſervation at ſome Diſtance. He tells us, that " For the ſuperadded Proper-" ties of Thought, Reaſon, *&c.* to have no " Subject of inheſion, but the *Junction* of dead " Parts to dead Parts, is, notwithſtanding the " Word *Omnipotence* inſerted, as contradictory, " as any other Way of aſſerting the Materiality " of thinking Beings †."

A *Contradiction* is moſt certainly a *Contradiction* ſtill, whatever is, or is not *inſerted.* But tho' the Word *Omnipotence* will not alter a *Contradiction*, may it not, in ſome Meaſure render it *excuſable?* I think it certainly muſt in the Opinion of our Author. Let us hear how beautifully he ſpeaks of *Omnipotence* upon ſome other Occaſions: ——— " Muſt we know, ſays he,

* B. II. C. 22. § 2. B. III. C. 5. § 1——6.
† Vol. I. p. 370. and Notes.

" all

" all the Art and Power of an *Omnipotent Crea-*
" *tor?* or allow no Power and Art beyond what
" we know? Let any one anſwer this at his
" Leiſure. We are but in our firſt Stage of
" Exiſtence*." " Let him who hath the Term
" [*Infinite Power*] often in his Mouth, conſider
" only the *Import* of it †."

Is it poſſible for a Man to have ſo juſt a Senſe of the *Almighty Power* of God, without thinking great Indulgence due to that Perſon, who, thro' an awful Regard to *Omnipotence*, is betray'd into a Contradiction?

But be this as it will, after our Author has endeavour'd to fix the Abſurdity about the *dull dead* Earth upon Mr. *Locke*, he thus triumphs: —— " So that, notwithſtanding this Complaint,
" as if the Biſhop had been unreaſonable in op-
" poſing his Concluſion, it appears the Reaſon
" was good, and that he could not go one Step
" farther, without deſtroying the Eſſence of Mat-
" ter, *viz. ſolid Extenſion*; and that he had gone
" a *Step* or *two* too far before, in making the
" *ſpontaneous Mover* in an *Elephant*, and the
" *external Mover* in the Mechaniſm both of
" Plants and Animals, *Properties* of dull and
" dead Earth." Vol. I. p. 194.

The Reader, I durſt ſay, will obſerve, that all this is not *only* aſſerted, but aſſerted in the very Face of a Quotation where Mr. *Locke* plainly denies ſo much as *Motion* to be a *Property* of *Matter!* Where he affirms the *Vegetation* and *Life* of a *Roſe* or *Peach-tree* to be above the *general Eſſence of Matter*, tho' ſuch *Roſe* or *Peach-tree* be ſtill *Matter!* And withal, whilſt he

* Vol. I. p. 173. in the Notes. † Vol. II. p. 434.

tells

tells us (in the Place refer'd to by our Author) that the *Life*, and *Senſe*, and *ſpontaneous Motion* of Animals are *Qualities far ſurpaſſing* thoſe of the *dull dead Earth: Nobler Qualities* than are to be found in *rude ſenſeleſs Matter!* And yet this Gentleman *ventures* to tell his Reader, that "Mr. *Locke* makes the *ſpontaneous Mover* in an "*Elephant*, and the *external Mover* in the Me- "chaniſm both of Plants and Animals, *Proper-* "*ties of dull and dead Earth!*"

Let the judicious Reader now determine, which of theſe Gentlemen has advanced *a Step or two too far.*

However, it ſeems, "Mr. *Locke* hath well "obſerved, that they are different Conſidera- "tions that prove the Soul *immortal* and *imma-* "*terial*; but yet when he ſays, that *It is as evi-* "*dent to him that* [ſome] *Brutes reaſon in certain* "*Inſtances*, as that they have Senſe;" [B. II. C. 11. § 11. fifth Edit.] "and here takes it for "granted, that *it is but mere Matter with ſuper-* "*added Properties that thus reaſons* (tho' he offers "no Proof of either of theſe Aſſertions) and "ſince all Men ſuppoſe the Matter of the Brute "Body finally diſſipated at Death, this gives an "*ignorant Sceptic* Courage to affirm that it may "be ſo with the Human Soul: Why ſhould we "maintain a Point *gratis*, and barely for main- "taining's Sake; as here Mr. *Locke* allows the "Soul is immaterial, but contends it might "have been material; why, I ſay, ſhould he "maintain a Point *gratis*, that hath a bad Ten- "dency? Were all other Arguments wanting, "this itſelf would be one againſt it. No Truth "by being known, could have a bad Effect on "the Minds and Lives of Men: And contra-

"rily,

" rily, what will always have a bad Effect on " the Minds and Lives of Men, will have ſtrong " Probability at leaſt againſt its being Truth, " ſuppoſing no Argument could be brought for " or againſt it." Vol. I. p. 194, 195.

As to the firſt of theſe *prooffleſs Aſſertions*, Mr. *Locke* tells us in the very Section refer'd to, that " *If Brutes have any Ideas at all, and are* " *not bare Machines* * *(as ſome would have them)*

* Since the late learned Author of the *Procedure, Extent,* and *Limits* of *Human Underſtanding*, has maintain'd that " *Brutes* are *mere Matter*, p. 169. and that all their *Actions*, as " he calls 'em, are from a *Neceſſity* of Nature, like the Mo- " tion of a *Clock*, or a *Watch*, or as one *Ball* ſtruck againſt " another; and that they are moved by the *internal Impulſe* " of *Ideas*, without any Capacity of moving themſelves, or " of *intending*, *deſigning*, or *altering* any Motion," p. 162,—— 164, 395. Beſides what has been already obſerv'd, [See Vind. of Mr. *Locke*, Dial. VI.] I beg leave here to propoſe an Argument againſt this *Hypotheſis*, which, tho' not an Argument of the *abſtract* Kind, will, I hope, appear to have ſome Weight in it. —— It is confeſs'd on all Hands, that an Horſe, for Inſtance, will paſs quietly by ſome Objects, but not by others. Shall we ſay the Reaſon is, becauſe the great Author of their Being has, in Order to their Preſervation, united ſuch particular Effects to ſuch and ſuch Cauſes: So that whatever is hurtful, or likely to prove ſo, ſhall conſtantly be attended with ſuch various Motions of theſe Animals, as are moſt likely to ſecure and protect 'em from Danger? This, I preſume, is the moſt that can be ſaid for the different Behaviour of theſe Creatures, upon the *Carteſian Hypotheſis*, which ſeems to me much the ſame with that Gentleman's. [See the *Vindication* of Mr. *Locke*, in the Place juſt refer'd to.] But now if this be the Cauſe that *Brutes* will ſtartle at one Object, and not at another: What Reaſon is to be aſſign'd, why they will more frequently endanger their Rider at the Sight of that which can never hurt 'em, than at the Sight of that which actually may? Will not the ſame Horſe fly from a dead Dog, or a Bundle of Chips, who will paſs unconcern'd thro' an Army of Men? And on the other Hand, with what Difficulty are theſe Creatures remov'd when a Sta-

" *we*

" *we cannot deny them to have ſome Reaſon:*" Preſuming, I ſuppoſe, that if they have *Ideas*, they might make ſome uſe of 'em. And he moreover infers from the Behaviour of ſome of theſe Animals, that they not only have *Ideas*, but lay them up in their Memories, and uſe them upon Occaſion. [B. II. C. 1. § 19. C. 10. § 10.] But notwithſtanding this, it ſeems Mr. *Locke* has not ſo much as *offer'd* a Proof, *that* [*ſome*] *Brutes reaſon in certain Inſtances!*

Well, but Mr. *Locke takes it for granted, viz.* in his Diſpute with the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, that an *Elephant* (whom elſewhere he aſſerts to have ſome Degree of Reaſon) is only Matter with *ſuperadded Properties.* As Mr. *Locke* had no Diſpute with that learned Prelate in Regard to the Compoſition of *Elephants*, what were we to expect he ſhould *prove* about 'em? That

ble is in Flames, and they in the utmoſt Danger of periſhing? Surely if theſe helpleſs Animals have not a Power of *Self-motion*; but are neceſſarily impell'd by their *Ideas*, is it to be imagined that the wiſe Author of Nature would eſtabliſh ſuch Laws, as ſhould operate in ſo *prepoſterous* a Manner? Is it conceivable that *Brutes* ſhould lie under a Neceſſity of conforming themſelves to a certain blind Impulſe of *Ideas*; which in ſome Inſtances, forced them to fly where there was no Danger; and in others, oblig'd 'em to ſtay, tho' with the utmoſt Riſque and Hazard of their Lives?

I ſhould be glad to ſee theſe Difficulties fairly anſwer'd, upon that *Hypotheſis*. Whereas, allowing thoſe Animals a *Power* of *Self-motion*; that they are *really conſcious* of ſomething that affects 'em; that they can *properly diſcern* and *diſtinguiſh* one Object from another; and that as Objects are more or leſs familiar, and appear more or leſs agreeable or terrifying, they conform themſelves and their Motions accordingly; upon theſe Suppoſitions, where is the Wonder if *Brutes* are miſtaken as well as Creatures of a far ſuperior Rank; or if their Fears and Apprehenſions often impoſe upon 'em?

which is there mention'd, he plainly ſuppoſes his Lordſhip would grant; and therefore, as any other wiſe Man would have done, he ſays no more than he had Occaſion to ſay.

But ſtill theſe *Aſſertions*, whether *proved* or not, *encourage an ignorant Sceptic* to draw bad Inferences.

Suppoſe Mr. *Locke* had maintain'd, that not only *Elephants*, but *Fleas* and *Mites* have *immaterial Souls**; will this Gentleman aſſure us, that an *ignorant Sceptic* could not draw a fooliſh Concluſion from it?

But then, Why ſhould Mr. *Locke* maintain a Point *gratis*, which has a *bad Tendency?* With all Submiſſion, the proper Queſtion is, Why ſhould Mr. *Locke write* whilſt there were *Fools* to *read?* If Men will leave God Almighty out, where Mr. *Locke* has always declared *he is preſent*; if they will infer their Souls ſhall die, whilſt he maintains the reverſe†, as directly the reverſe, and as expreſsly the contrary, as Light is to Darkneſs; who is to be anſwerable for the *bad Tendency* of this? Suppoſe it be affirm'd, that "there is no Being but what is "*naturally immortal* as long as God doth not "extinguiſh it: And that otherwiſe there is "no Being at all, but what is *naturally mortal:* "—— That all Immortality is founded on the "*Will* and *Deſign* of God, and that it is therefore abſurd to ſeek for a Demonſtration of it "*in the Nature of the created Being itſelf*‡:" Let this be ſaid, and let an *ignorant Sceptic* read

* See the *Enquiry* Vol. I. p. 214——217, 241.

† B. I. C. 1. § 5. B. II. C. 7. § 5. C. 21. § 44. 70. B. IV. C. 3. § 6. C. 12. § 11.

‡ Ibid. p. 243. in the Notes.

it,

it, as he reads Mr. *Locke*; pray what would become of the *Immortality* of the Soul? Or where would be the Difference in Point of *Immortality*, betwixt the *Soul* of a *Man*, and the *Body* of a *Brute?* But who is anſwerable for all this? Shall we ſay that no one ought to anſwer for the *Folly* and *Wickedneſs* of others but Mr. *Locke* only? Or ſhall we find out a *Diſtinction*, and affirm that nothing is here maintain'd *gratis?* What a ſurprizing Difference muſt this make in the *bad Tendency* of a Propoſition? And how differently will an *ignorant Sceptic* find himſelf affected by it?

What our Author afterwards obſerves, that "*No Truth by being known could have a bad Effect on the Minds and Lives of Men*," is, I preſume, very firmly held by all the various Sects of Philoſophers whatever. Thus our own *Hypotheſes* being always *true*, and *Truth having no bad Effects*, it is plain all the *Danger* can only ariſe from the Doctrine of our Opponents. Tho' indeed this Gentleman has given us Authority to ſay, that "*the Things we are afraid of, may be but our own particular Prejudices.*" Vol. I. p. 247. in the Notes.

This Author diſputing againſt a Scheme of a very learned Prelate*, who undertakes to prove the *Non-exiſtence* of Matter, he thus expreſſes himſelf: —— "Mr. *Locke* ſpeaks of *ſenſitive* "*Knowledge* with much Fairneſs and Candor, "giving it the third Place, or making the Degrees of our Knowledge to be *Intuitive*, *Demonſtrative*, and *Senſitive*, B. IV. C. 2. § 14. "and C. 11. But with much Submiſſion, the

* Biſhop *Berkeley*.

" Exiſtence of Matter in general, or at leaſt of " material Senſories, to which the Soul is united, " ſeems to me — to be nearer *Intuitive* than *De-* " *monſtrative* Knowledge, if the ſame *Perception* " of *Parts* proves to us both the *Spirit* and a " *material Senſory*." Vol. II. p. 339.

Here appears to be ſome little Difference between this Gentleman's Thoughts and Mr. *Locke*'s; tho' what it is, I muſt own is not very clear to me. It ſeems however as if Mr. *Locke* had ſuppoſed the *Exiſtence of Matter* in general, or of *material Senſories*, to be the Object of *Demonſtrative* Knowledge; whereas according to Mr. *Locke*, ſuch Knowledge, I believe, is not *Demonſtrative* but *Senſitive**. However, let the Miſtake lie where it will, it is an Affair of little Importance. Our Author's Obſervation, that Mr. *Locke* ſpeaks of *Senſitive* Knowledge *with much Fairneſs and Candor*, is moſt certainly true. And I will beg leave to add, that he not only ſpeaks of *Intuitive* and *Demonſtrative* Knowledge in the ſame Manner; but that he has ſaid enough in the Places laſt mention'd (notwithſtanding he is ſo often charged with encouraging of *Sceptics*) to root out all unreaſonable *Scepticiſm* from the Minds of Men, if the Thing itſelf was capable of being done.

Mr. *Locke* had told his learned Antagoniſt, the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, that " if his Lordſhip " allow'd Brutes to have *Senſation*, it would fol- " low, either that God can and doth give to " ſome Parcels of Matter a Power of Perception " and Thinking, or that all Animals have im- " material, and conſequently, according to his

* B. IV. C. 2. § 14. C. 9. § 2. C. 11.

" Lordſhip,

" Lordſhip, immortal Souls, as well as Men." Lett. 3. p. 406.

" Here, ſays our Author, Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes " that *Senſation* implies *Thinking*, as much as it " implies *Perception*; which is quite wrong, I " conceive." Vol. I. p. 214. Notes.

It is not unlikely but Mr. *Locke* might *ſuppoſe* that a Creature could not be conſcious of Pain or Pleaſure, without attending in ſome Degree to thoſe different *Senſations*. And hence, I preſume it is, that in the Place juſt mention'd, he ſays, that *Senſation is comprehended under Thinking in general*; as elſewhere he makes *Senſation a Mode of Thinking*, B. II. C. 19. § 1. and how any Animal can be *ſenſible* of the Smart of a Wound, without *thinking* in ſome Meaſure upon it, let him that can, conceive.

But in Anſwer to this, we may be told, that, " without *Freedom* there cannot be a *thinking* " Being; and that an *active* Being, a *thinking* " Being, and a *free* Being are ſynonymous " Terms." Vol. I. p. 203. Notes.

However, does not this Gentleman allow *Brutes* to be *ſpontaneous* as to the Power of beginning ſome Motions, as well as Men? p. 177. Notes; and that they have a *ſpontaneous* Mover within 'em? p. 194. and withal that they are *active* in *willing* * Motion? p. 190. and that *Activity* and *Power* belong to *Spirit* by its *Nature*

* As to the being *active* in *willing*, ſee Dr. *Clarke*'s Remarks upon a *Philoſophical Enquiry* concerning Human Liberty, p. 7——9, 22, 23. Indeed our Author ſeems to uſe *willing* not for the *Paſſive Perception of the Underſtanding*; but for the *Exertion* of the *Self-motive* Power, for he maintains, that to *will* is to *act*. V. 1. p. 203. Notes: and conſequently, the being *active* in *willing*, is only the being *active* in *acting*.

and

and *Conſtitution?* p. 255. How then, it may be aſk'd, can a Creature be *active* in *willing*; or how can it have *Activity* and *Power* belonging to its very *Nature*, and yet be no *active* Being? or, which is much the ſame Thing, how can it be *ſpontaneous* * without *Freedom?* But be this as it will, neither the *Immateriality* of the *Souls* of *Brutes*, nor their *Spontaneity*, *Activity*, or *Power* will entitle 'em to the Privilege of *Thinking*: for "wanting the other Species of Activity, the "ſpontaneous Direction of their perceptive Ca-"pacity towards and thro' their paſt Percepti-"ons, they cannot be called *thinking Creatures.*" Vol. I. p. 190.

But ſtill ſome may apprehend, that ſince a *Brute Animal* can often remember his Leſſons; and frequently appears ſhy of one Man and fond of another, this looks as if his *perceptive Capacity* was *directed towards his paſt Perceptions.* However, what if this ſhould not be *ſpontaneous?* or granting it was, yet there may be as much Difference between *ſpontaneous* and *ſpontaneous*, as between *active* and *active.*——But now with Submiſſion to this Gentleman, to maintain that the *Activity* of the Human Soul is of *two Kinds*, and its *Perceptivity twofold*, the one more noble than the other; but that the Soul of Brutes has only the ſingle *Activity* and *Perceptivity* of the lower Sort, to which *thinking* does not belong; [Vol. I. p. 351—353.] all this is no more than *ſaying* in other Words, that *Brutes cannot think.* —— The vaſt Difference between the *thinking* of Men and Brutes is finely obſerv'd by Mr. *Locke*; [B. II. C. 11. § 5—11.] but becauſe the

* See Dr. *Clarke*'s firſt Letter to a Gentleman at *Cambridge* concerning *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*.

Thoughts

Thoughts of the one are neither employ'd about the ſame ſublime Subjects as thoſe of the other, nor in ſo extenſive a Manner, therefore to maintain they *think* not, is little better reaſoning than to infer a Creature *ſees* not, unleſs it has the Eyes of a *Hawk* or an *Eagle*. ——— Our Author farther obſerves, that "*if the Brute* "*Soul ſuper-exiſt the Diſſolution of the Body, we* "*cannot conceive it without the perceptive Capa-* "*city, as to external Objects; and that in a great-* "*er Degree than when confined to it; but even* "*here it is inferior to the Human Soul. It is not* "*percipient of Harmony in Sound,*" &c. p. 353. Notes.

If this laſt Clauſe relate to the *Super-exiſtence* of the *Brute Soul*, one would be glad to know how this Gentleman came by his Information? If it belong to their *preſent* State, it may be Matter of Surprize to ſome, how thoſe Creatures that can charm Mankind with their own melodious Notes, and who are capable of learning muſical Leſſons from us, ſhould yet *not be percipient of Harmony in Sound!* Again, "*if the* "[*Brute Soul*] *ſuper-exiſt, it is eaſier to conceive* "*that it muſt have ſome kind of Activity, than to* "*determine what that is.*" p. 354. Notes. I don't find that this ingenious Gentleman cares to let theſe Creatures think *hereafter*, any more than *at preſent*. He really ſeems to be as much afraid of their *thinking*, tho' he has furniſh'd 'em with *immaterial Souls*, as ever the learned * *Des Cartes* could be, who made nothing of 'em, but ſo many Syſtems of *Matter*.

* Lettre 67. p. 335 —— 338. & Diſſert. de Methodo, p. 44 —— 46.

But

But it ſeems, " ſince Mr. *Locke wrote* (that is ſince he told the learned Prelate what muſt follow from his Lordſhip's Conceſſion) " *others* " have caught the Hint, and brought in the " *Eels in Vinegar*, and other *Microſcopical Ani-* " *malcula*, to expoſe the Immateriality of Souls." Vol. I. p. 215. Notes.

I hope this Gentleman don't mean to inſinuate that *all* who have talk'd a little *jocoſely* of the *Souls* of ſuch *Animalcula*, have either done it with a Deſign to *expoſe* the *Immateriality* of the *Human Soul*, or that they *have caught the Hint* from Mr. *Locke**. If we had been favour'd with a more particular Account of thoſe *others*, it had been more eaſy to determine how far Mr. *Locke* might be involved in their Guilt.

The next Article againſt Mr. *Locke* relates to his " uſing the Word *Spirit* for a thinking Sub- " ſtance, without excluding Materiality out of " it, by the Authority of *Virgil* and *Cicero*." But firſt let us hear what Mr. *Locke* ſays upon this very Occaſion. [This] " perhaps will be " thought too great a Liberty, and ſuch as de- " ſerves Cenſure. —— I readily own, that Words " ſhould be ſparingly ventur'd on in a Senſe " wholly new; and nothing but abſolute Ne- " ceſſity can excuſe the Boldneſs of uſing any " Term in a Senſe, whereof we can produce no " Example. But in the preſent Caſe, I think " I have great Authorities to juſtify me." [After having mention'd his Authorities, he thus proceeds:] " Whether they thought right in " this, that is not the Queſtion; but whether

* See the Author of the *Procedure*, p. 173, 174. or the Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 110, 111.

" they

" they ſpoke properly, when they called an " active, thinking, ſubtle Subſtance, out of " which they excluded only groſs and palpable " Matter, *Spiritus*. I think that no body will de- " ny, That if any among the *Romans* can be " allow'd to ſpeak properly, *Tully* and *Virgil* " are the two, who may moſt ſecurely be depend- " ed on for it *."

" But with Submiſſion, replies our Author, I " think no Man ever before defended *the Propriety* " of an Expreſſion, excluſive of the Truth of it, " in a Philoſophical Controverſy †." —— Admitting this to be true, What may be the Miſchief or Abſurdity of it? Why, " If the Accep- " tation of a Word is ſuch as determines the " Queſtion, without farther Argument, as " in this Caſe; to juſtify the Propriety of it then, " is to make the common Uſe of Language de- " cide in Points of Philoſophy ‖."

What *Queſtion* may this Gentleman be here talking of? Mr. *Locke*'s Queſtion was only, whether *Virgil* and *Cicero* ſpoke *properly?* But whether they did, or did not, how will this *make common Language decide in Points of Philoſophy?* The Reaſon is, I preſume, becauſe the *Propriety* of *common Language*, and the *Truths* of *Philoſophy* are always *inſeparably* connected.

However, " If *Cicero* or *Virgil* had wrong " Ideas as to the Immateriality of the Soul, tho' " they expreſs'd theſe wrong Ideas right, that " doth not mend the Matter ‖."

Unfortunate Mr. *Locke!* The whole, he contended for, is admitted; and yet he has loſt his

* Firſt Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter, p. 68 —70.
† Vol. I. p. 220. in the Notes. ‖ Ibid.

Point notwithſtanding! For tho' *Cicero* and *Virgil* might with *Propriety* call That *Spirit*, which they thought was *ſubtle Matter*; yet Mr. *Locke* cannot with *Propriety* do the ſame Thing!

Beſides, "The Diſpute between the Biſhop "and Mr. *Locke*, was, whether Matter could "think, and not the claſſical Acceptation of the "Word *Spiritus*‖."

Now ſuppoſe this Gentleman had ſaid, that the *Diſpute* was, whether God Almighty can, if he pleaſes, *ſuperadd to Matter* a Faculty of Thinking; ——I ſay if our Author had choſe to expreſs himſelf in this Manner, it is ſubmitted, whether ſuch a Repreſentation had not been full as *kind* and as *juſt*, as his own preſent Account*? What we are to infer from his telling us, that *the Diſpute was not about the claſſical Acceptation of the Word* Spiritus, I know not. He could never deſign to inſinuate, that Mr. *Locke* was guilty of a needleſs or impertinent Digreſſion; for the ingenious Author moſt certainly knew better†.

But be that as it will, Mr. *Locke* is next corrected about the *Mobility* of Spirits.

"Having, ſays our Author, mention'd Mo-"ment as an Affection of real Motion in Mat-"ter, let me be permitted to explain, and re-"ſtrain a little, what Mr. *Locke* hath advanced "concerning the Motion of all finite Spirits. "In B. II. C. 23. § 17, 18. [Mr. *Locke*] having "enumerated the primary Ideas peculiar to *Bo-"dy* and *Spirit*, as contradiſtinguiſh'd to each "other; he makes *Mobility* common to them

‖ Ibid. * See Mr. *Locke*'s firſt Letter to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, p. 64. and Hum. Und. B. IV. C. 3. § 6.
† Firſt Letter, p. 64—75.

"both;

" both; which he illuſtrates and defends " *Sect.* 19—21. He hath before aſcribed *Mo-* " *tivity*, or a Power of putting Body into Mo- " tion by Thought, to Spirit, as one of the Ideas " peculiar to it; ſo that by *Mobility* he ſeems to " mean a Capacity in Spirit of being moved " by ſomething *ab extra*, and not the Power of " moving, which is included in *Motivity*; eſpe- " cially ſince he makes *Mobility* common to both " Matter and Spirit. Which, with Submiſſion, " I think is very wrong, and tends to confound " the Natures of the two Subſtances he would " diſtinguiſh. ——— A Subſtance that no way " impedes Motion, but effects it, can with no " Propriety, I think, have the Capacity of *Mo-* " *bility* aſcribed to it; as it is aſcribed to Body, " a Subſtance which reſiſts Motion, and no way " effects it. —— To make Spirit Material, and " ſo at once both to cauſe and hinder Motion, " is a plain Contradiction*. —— Even in the " Journey betwixt *London* and *Oxford*, where " the Man's Spirit is not the Mover, but the " Horſes move the Coach, his Body and all, " his Spirit doth not impede the Motion, *or* " *make the Draught heavier*; or is not properly " a *Moved*. So that, in Effect, Mobility doth " not belong in common both to Body and " Spirit. Nor farther, can Motion belong to " both, but in very different Senſes. —— It is " true, Spirits change Place, and Motion in this " Senſe is competent to all finite Spirits. But " in this Motion they are not *Moved* but *Movers*; " which is the Diſtinction endeavour'd to be " *confounded*. Sceptical People conclude from

* See the Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 57—60.

" this, that whatever *moves*, is material. But it " will not follow, that whatever moves as a " Mover, is material, and has the relations of " Matter*."

This Gentleman has very well obſerv'd in another Place, that " it is an eaſy but a falla- " cious Method, to run away with a *Flux* of " Words: We may draw up, ſays he, ſuch a " *ſpecious* Shew of *Probabilities*, ſupported by " *Prejudices*, as ſhall make a *dreadful Appear-* " *ance* taken all together; and yet *turn to No-* " *thing* at laſt, when *examined* and *ſifted* ſepa- " rately†."

But let us now conſider his Objections. And Firſt, the *Mobility* aſcribed by Mr. *Locke* to finite Spirits, *tends to confound the Natures of the two Subſtances he would diſtinguiſh.* After This we are told, that *the Diſtinction* between *Moved* and *Movers* is *endeavoured* to be *confounded.*

But This, notwithſtanding it looks a little *ſuſpiciouſly*, cannot be deſign'd for Mr. *Locke.* For how is it poſſible, he ſhould *endeavour* to *confound* That, which our Author aſſures us, he *would diſtinguiſh?*

However, as to the Suppoſition itſelf, that *One Spirit may be moved by another*, what *Confuſion* need it occaſion? or what bad Conſequences can ariſe from it? Why, *Sceptical People may conclude from this, that whatever moves, is material.* However, now this Gentleman has *explain'd* the Matter; it is to be hoped they will *conclude* more wiſely for the future. But then, *A Spirit is a Subſtance that no way impedes Motion, but effects it.* And yet Nothing is more demonſtra-

* Vol. I. p. 229—231. in the Notes. † Vol. II. p. 128.

ble,

ble, than that a *Spirit* can as well do the One as the Other.

Does not this Gentleman himſelf tell us,—— *Spirit, it is true, ſtops Motion?* P. 230. However, This is perform'd "by the ſame *living Efficacy*, "by which it begins it, not *by a Deadneſs and* "*Reſiſtance in itſelf to be moved.*—— It hath no "*Moment*, as Body hath, proceeding from its "*Vis inertiæ.* The Capacity of Mobility can "with no Propriety be aſcribed to it, as it is "aſcribed to Body. And it doth not in a Jour-"ney [whilſt the Body is in the Coach] impede "the Motion, *or make the Draught heavier**."

Well then, the whole ſeems to amount to this, —— A *Spirit* can both *effect* and *impede* Motion; tho' it never by its *Weight*, or *Deadneſs*, or *Sluggiſhneſs* hinders or reſiſts it.

But now, where has Mr. *Locke* ſo much as ſuggeſted one Word to the Contrary? Or how will all this prove, that One Spirit can't *move* Another?

If the Active Force of *A* be twice ſuperior to that of *B*, what ſhould hinder *A* from compelling *B* to *move*; tho' never ſo much againſt his Inclination? It is admitted, that *B* makes no Reſiſtance by his *Weight* or *Deadneſs*: He only reſiſts by the Exertion of his *Active* Power; but when that is overcome by a ſuperior Force, muſt he not of Neceſſity give Way to it? So that it is ſubmitted, whether *Mobility*, even in this Senſe, be not *competent* to *finite Spirits?*

But now after all, if by the *Mobility* of Spirits, Mr. *Locke* ſhould only mean their being *moved by themſelves*, or their *changing the Place* they were before in, by *their own proper Motion*; I ſay,

* Ibid.

if

if he ſhould mean no more than this, *the dreadful Appearance* may all *turn to Nothing*. And that he means no more, I appeal to any Reader, who will but turn to the Sections, where Mr. *Locke* ſpeaks of this *Mobility*.

" There is no Reaſon, ſays he, why it ſhould " be thought ſtrange, that I make *Mobility be-* " *long to Spirits:* For having no other *Idea* of " Motion, but *Change of Diſtance* with other " Beings, that are conſidered as at reſt; and " finding that Spirits cannot operate but where " they are; —— I cannot but attribute *Change* " *of Place* to all finite Spirits. —— For my " Soul being a real Being, as well as my Body, " is certainly as capable of *changing Diſtance* " with any other Being, as Body itſelf; and ſo " is capable of Motion. —— One may certain- " ly conceive a Diſtance, and a Change of Di- " ſtance between two Spirits; and ſo conceive " their Motion, their Approach, or Removal " one from another. —— The Soul being unit- " ed to the Body, —— *conſtantly changes Place* all " the whole Journey, —— and I think may be " ſaid to be truly all that while in Motion. To " conſider [the Soul] as going out of the Body, " or leaving it, and yet to have no *Idea* of its " Motion, ſeems to me impoſſible*."

But here it may be objected, If this be Mr. *Locke*'s Meaning †, how comes he to aſcribe *Mobility* both to Body and Spirit?

Has *Body* a Power of moving itſelf? Or if it has not, how does *Mobility* belong *in common* to Both?

* B. II. C. 23. § 18 — 21. See alſo § 28. and B. IV. C. 10. § 10. † B. II. C. 23. § 18.

Whoever

Whoever will with *Candor* conſider what Mr. *Locke* ſays in the Places juſt cited, will find that *Mobility*, as refer'd to *Body*, can mean no more, than a Power of *being moved* by *ſomething elſe*; but not a Power of *Self-motion*, which it ſignifies, when aſcribed to *Spirit*.

However, our Author approves of Mr. *Locke*, becauſe he "allows that the internal, unknown "Conſtitution of Things is *ſomething*; —— "which I think, ſays he, is very right, for "Qualities cannot depend on *Nothing*. This "is taken Notice of, becauſe ſceptical Men be-"gin to ſuppoſe they have Mr. *Locke*'s Autho-"rity for inſinuating that the unknown Conſti-"tution of Things is in itſelf Nothing; and "that *Subſtance*, or what he calls *Subſtratum*, is "but empty Sound*."

Tho' I am very glad that Mr. *Locke* is here out of Danger; yet I muſt beg Leave to take Notice, that there are ſome *other* Perſons, beſides *ſceptical Men*, who look upon *Subſtance*, as diſtinguiſh'd from certain *Powers* or *Properties*, to be no more than a very needleſs Word: And who ſeem to think they have, in ſome Meaſure, Mr. *Locke*'s Authority with them †. However ſuppoſe they are miſtaken as to both; as with regard to the latter, I preſume it will be ſhewn ‡; yet ſince neither of theſe Gentlemen, I believe, ever fell under the Suſpicion of *Scepticiſm*, this diſcovers, with how much Caution, Terms of an *odious* Sound ſhould be uſed.

* Vol. I. p. 323. in the Notes. † See the ſecond *Philoſophical Eſſay* of Dr. *Watts*. And the ingenious Mr. *Law* in his Notes on *Archbiſhop King*'s *Origin* of Evil. Vol. I. p. 4. Note 1*ſt*.

‡ See below the *Reflections* on Dr. *Watts*'s *Eſſays*.

But

But now, Mr. *Locke* having ſaid that *Eſſentia*, " in its primary Notation, ſignifies properly *Be-* " *ing*; and that *Eſſence* may be taken for the " Being of any thing, *whereby it is, what it is**;" our Author infers, that by *Eſſence*, Mr. *Locke* underſtands the mere *Being* or *Exiſtence* of a Thing†.

In anſwer to which, I would firſt obſerve, that Mr. *Locke* ſpeaks only of " two Sorts of " *Eſſences*, the *Real* and the *Nominal*‖." By the latter he means that " *Complex Idea*, which, " for Example, the Word *Gold* ſtands for, let it " be, for inſtance, ſays Mr. *Locke*, a Body yel- " low, of a certain Weight, malleable, fuſible, " and fixed. By the *Real Eſſence*, he means the " Conſtitution of the inſenſible Parts of that " Body, on which thoſe Qualities, and all the " other Properties of *Gold* depend**."

" I have often ſays he mention'd a *real Eſſence*, " diſtinct in Subſtances from thoſe abſtract " Ideas of them, which I call their *Nominal Eſ-* " *ſence*. By this *real Eſſence*, I mean that real " Conſtitution of any Thing, which is the " Foundation of all thoſe Properties, that are " combined in, and are conſtantly found to " co-exiſt with the *Nominal Eſſence*; that par- " ticular Conſtitution, which every Thing has " within itſelf, without any relation to any thing " without it‡."

Again, " The *real Eſſence* of a Thing, is that " internal Conſtitution, on which the Properties " of that Thing depend ‡." And thus what

* B. III. C. 3. § 15. † Vol. I. P. 322—324. and Notes.
‖ Ibid. ** B. III. C. 6. § 2. ‡ Ibid. § 6. ‡ Firſt Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter, p. 49.

he

he had before call'd the *Being* of a Thing, *whereby it is, what it is*; he immediately after expreſſes in theſe Words, —— *The real, internal, but generally in Subſtances, unknown Conſtitution of Things**.

But now, notwithſtanding Mr. *Locke* has ſo clearly explain'd what he means by the *Being* of any Thing; yet our Author can by no means approve of the Word.

"Mr. *Locke*, ſays he, rather takes Eſſence "for the *Being* of any thing; tho' we uſually "ſay, ſuch a Property is of the *Nature* or *Eſ-* "*ſence* of a thing, taking either Word indiffe- "rently; but never that it is of the *Being* of it, "which rather imports its *Exiſtence* †." Again, "*Being*, I think, is equivocal, and ſignifies the "*internal, unknown Conſtitution of Things*, leſs "properly, at leaſt, leſs commonly, than any "other thing. The *Being of a thing* is oftenest "taken in Oppoſition to the *not-being* of it; and "then it is the ſame as the *Exiſtence* of it. We "ſay ſuch a Thing is not *in being*. —— But "granting that *Eſſence*, *Being*, and the *internal* "*unknown Conſtitution* of Subſtances are pro- "perly the ſame Thing; we muſt reſolve the "Eſſence of things into *Idea*, and make it the "ſame with their *Nature* ‡."

However this Conceſſion is afterwards revoked: This Gentleman reſumes the Debate again after a ſhort Intermiſſion, and attacks Mr. *Locke* afreſh from a *Title Page* of the late learn'd Dr. *Clarke*.

*B. III. C. 3. §15. †Vol. I. p. 322---324. ‡P. 323, in the Notes.

" But then, ſays our Author, as to his Ac-
" ceptation of the Word Eſſence; as it ſeems
" not juſt in itſelf; ſo I think, it is inconveni-
" ent in Philoſophy. The Word Being, by
" which he explains *Eſſence*, rather imports the
" *actual Exiſtence* of a Thing, than its internal
" unknown Conſtitution, as hath been obſerved.
" Thus Dr. *Clarke* calls his Excellent Book,
" *A Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of*
" *God*; that is, a Demonſtration that there
" really exiſts a God, and what his Attributes
" are. It would have ſounded ſtrangely to have
" ſaid, a Demonſtration of the Eſſence, or inter-
" nal unknown Conſtitution," *&c.* * ——

This extraordinary Criticiſm may be left, I preſume, in its full Force, without any Remark. But ſince the learned Dr. *Clarke* is brought in upon this Occaſion, I beg leave juſt to obſerve, what he ſays of the Word in Controverſy.—— *Eſſence* according to him, may be taken either for the *inmoſt Subſtance* of Things, or for their *Eſſential Properties*. This laſt he calls the *proper metaphyſical* Senſe of the Word. In which Senſe, the *Attributes* of God conſtitute his *Eſſence*; and *Solidity* or *Impenetrability* is the *Eſſence* of Matter. " He does indeed himſelf uſe that Word
" for *Subſtance*; and which he likewiſe calls the
" *inmoſt Subſtance* of Things, and the *inmoſt Na-*
" *ture* of ſuch Subſtance †."

Whether *Eſſence*, in this Acceptation, be not exactly the ſame with Mr. *Locke*'s *real Eſſence*, is ſubmitted to the Reader's Judgment.

* Vol. I. P. 329. † See the Preface to the ſecond Volume of his *Boyle*'s Lectures *7th* Edit. p. 132, 133.

However

However, ſince our Author maintains, that "If there is any ſuch thing as Qualities or Properties, there muſt be ſome *farther Thing*, to "which they belong: ſince a Quality could "not ſubſiſt by itſelf, or without a Subject: "And that this *other Thing* —— muſt be call'd "*Subject*, *Support*, *Subſtance*, or ſome ſuch "Name, let Men ridicule as much as they "pleaſe: For though we know not what the "*Subſtratum*, or *Support* of Properties is, nor "have any particular *Idea* of it; yet we know "*that it is*, unleſs Properties could ſubſiſt by "themſelves*:" I ſay foraſmuch as this is maintain'd, why ſhould a *Demonſtration* of the "*Divine Eſſence* be thought by him to *ſound ſtrangely?* For is it poſſible, there could be a *Demonſtration* of the *Divine Attributes*, which would not at the ſame time be a *Demonſtration* of that *Real Eſſence*, that *inmoſt unknown Nature* of the *Divine Subſtance*, from whence thoſe *Attributes* flow, and on which they depend? And if by *Eſſence* we only underſtand *Modes* or *Properties*, what is then a *Demonſtration* of the *Divine Eſſence*, but merely a *Demonſtration* of the *Divine Attributes?*

But it is farther objected, "If Subſtances "have unknown Eſſences, and other things "have not; it will either follow, that there are "two different Species of *Eſſences*; or that other "things, beſides Subſtances, have *no Eſſence at* "*all* †."

And what if we ſhould ſuppoſe there are *two different Species of Eſſences*, would any *Inconveniency* ariſe from hence to *Philoſophy?* On the

* V. I. p. 324 Notes, and p. 328. † P. 329.

Contrary, ſuppoſe Mr. *Locke* has ſhewn that there "are *unknown Eſſences* belonging to *Subſtance*; "and that the *real unknown Eſſence*, on which "the diſcoverable Properties of Subſtance de- "pend, is a very different Thing from thoſe "Properties, which he calls the *Nominal Eſ- "ſence*; tho' this *Nominal Eſſence* be often miſ- "taken for the other: Suppoſe he has ſhewn "Men the Difference between them; has taught "us how to diſtinguiſh the one from the other, "and thus has clear'd up what was dark and "confuſed before. Suppoſe he has proved, that "things are not ſorted by Men according to "their *real unknown* Eſſence; but are put into "different *Claſſes*, according to the Conceptions "of Mens Minds: that is, according to that "*Abſtract Idea*, which Men by Obſervation "have framed of the ſeveral Properties and "Powers of Subſtances, and which Collection "contain'd in ſuch *Idea*, Mr. *Locke* calls the "*Nominal Eſſence**." If Mr. *Locke* has done all this, muſt it not be own'd that he has done real Service to Mankind; and that the learned World are greatly obliged to him? Some indeed may think ſo: but our Author ſeems of a very different Opinion.

"He obſerves that Mr. *Locke* hath been "thrown upon the Diſtinction of *real* and *No- "minal Eſſences*; which, ſays this Gentleman, "though it hath obtained, ſince he wrote his "Book, yet I humbly beg leave to ſay, I do "not ſee any Service it hath done to Philoſo- "phy†."

* B. III. C. 3. §11—14. C. 4. §19. 20. C. 6. See alſo the fifth Edition of the *Eſſay*, p. 354. 357. in the Notes. † V. I. p. 339.

But

But pray, did not this Gentleman *ſee* Cauſe of commending Mr. *Locke* *, for *allowing the internal, unknown Conſtitution of Things to be ſomething?* And does he not there make a *Diſtinction* himſelf, between that *ſomething*, and the *Qualities* which depend on it †? Well, but Mr. *Locke* having call'd that *internal, unknown Conſtitution*, the *real Eſſence* of *Subſtance*; and the diſcoverable *Qualities* depending on that *Conſtitution*, the *Nominal Eſſence*, he has, I preſume, by this means, undone every thing again; and our Author now *ſees no* manner of *Service done to Philoſophy!* Nor is this all; but as Mr. *Locke*'s Misfortunes ſeldom come alone, ſo his being *thrown* upon that *Diſtinction*, has been the Occaſion of *throwing* him upon ſomething elſe: and which is neither more nor leſs, than a downright *Abſurdity*.

" This again, ſays our Author, hath thrown " him upon the Abſurdity of aſſerting that all " our *Moral* and *Mathematical Ideas*, thoſe of Vir- " tue, Vice, Juſtice, *Temperance*; a Circle, Square, " Cube, Triangle, *&c.* (Things of as *fixt* and " immutable Natures, as any that can be named) " having only, according to his Diſtinction, no- " minal Eſſences, are nothing but the mere " arbitrary Compoſitions of Ideas in our Minds: " which admitted, would be of the greateſt *Diſ-* " *ſervice* both in *Philoſophy* and *Practice*, as ſhall " be ſhewn elſewhere ‡."

Would not any Mortal be inclined to think, that Mr. *Locke* had given a much greater Power to *every Individual*, than *ever Bellarmine* was charged with giving to the *Pope?* Not only a

* See above. † Vol. I. p. 323 Notes ‡ P. 330.

Power

Power of turning *Virtue* into *Vice*, and *Vice* into *Virtue*; but of turning *Circles* into *Squares*, and *Squares* into *Circles?*

But in what Part of his Works has Mr. *Locke* endanger'd the *fixt* and *immutable* Natures of theſe Things? Are the particular Places cited, which are to ſupport this Charge? Indeed they are not. They are left entirely to the Reader's *Sagacity*, to find out. The late learn'd *Le Clerc* ſomewhere calls ſuch an Omiſſion, a *bad Cuſtom.*

But with Submiſſion to that great Critic, there may be *good* Reaſons for it. To ſuch Readers, as are already acquainted with thoſe Paſſages, ſuch Quotations would be *ſuperfluous.* To thoſe of an *implicit* Faith, they would be to *little* Purpoſe. And as to the *candid* and *impartial* Enquirer, tho' they might ſave him *ſome Trouble*, they might however do a Writer *much Miſchief.* How far this may be the preſent Caſe, will be worth while to examine.

Mr. *Locke* then obſerves, that "*The Mind* "often *exerciſes an Active Power in making thoſe* "ſeveral *Combinations* of *Ideas*, which he calls "*mixed Modes**."

"Who can doubt, ſays he, but the *Ideas* of "of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed in "the Mind of Men, and have Names given "them; and ſo theſe Species of mixed Modes "be conſtituted, before either of them was ever "committed; and might be as well diſcourſed "of, and reaſoned about, and as certain Truths "diſcovered of them, whilſt yet they had no "Being but in the Underſtanding, as well as

* B. II. C. 22. § 2. See alſo Sect. 9. where he mentions all the different Ways, by which we get the *Complex Ideas* of *mixed Modes.*

"no,

" now, that they have but too frequently a real " Exiſtence? whereby it is plain, how much *the* " *Sorts of mixed Modes are the Creatures of the* " *Underſtanding*, where they have a Being as " ſubſervient to all the Ends of real Truth and " Knowledge, as when they really exiſt *." But now, what is here contrary to the *immutable Nature* of Things? How many *Ideas* would a Man find in that *Complex Idea*, *Sacrilege*, if he was to give himſelf the Trouble of taking the Compoſition to Pieces? But how came they together? Did they grow up like a *Plant?* Or is not the whole *Combination* the Work of the Mind? And is not this equally true, whether a Man framed this *Idea*, before the Crime was committed, or afterwards? And may not the ſame clear and certain Truths be affirmed of it?

Again, Mr. *Locke* having ſaid that " *abſtract*, " *complex* Ideas, *with Names to them*, *are Eſſences* " of the Sorts or Species of Things; and that " theſe *Eſſences* are ſuppoſed to remain ſteadily " the ſame, whatever Mutations the particular " Subſtances are liable to; which cannot be true " of the real Conſtitutions of Things, which " begin and periſh with them; he obſerves, " that by this means the *Eſſence* of a *Species* reſts " ſafe and entire, without the Exiſtence of ſo " much as one Individual of that kind. For " were there now, ſays he, no Circle exiſting " any where in the World (as perhaps, that Fi- " gure exiſts not any where exactly marked out) " yet the *Idea* annexed to that Name, would not " ceaſe to be what it is; nor ceaſe to be " as a Pattern, to determine which of the " particular Figures we meet with, have, or

* B. III. C. 5. § 5.

" have

" have not a Right to the Name *Circle*; and " ſo to ſhew, which of them, by having that " Eſſence, was of that *Species**." Whence now can ariſe any Danger to this *Figure*, or any of its *Properties*, from what Mr. *Locke* has ſaid? And if he has not dealt worſe by any other *mathematical Idea*, it is ſubmitted to the *Mathematicians*, what juſt Cauſe of Complaint Mr. *Locke* has given? Beſides, does not this Gentleman himſelf maintain, that Things which have only an *Ideal Exiſtence*, have their *Eſſence* or *radical Properties?* " The chief and radical Property, " ſays he, is the Eſſence of any thing in *Idea*, " though the Thing ſhould not exiſt, nor have " any internal, unknown Conſtitution †."

But tho' its Conſtitution be not *unknown*, yet if there be not a Foundation in the very Nature of that Thing for ſuch a Property, what can it be the *radical* Property of; from whence does it proceed; or on what does it depend? But to return to Mr. *Locke*: It may be farther objected, that he not only affirms " thoſe *Ideas*, which he " calls *mixed Modes*, ſuch as *Sacrilege*, *Parricide*, " and the like, to be *Creatures of the Under-* " *ſtanding*, but he maintains that the Mind pro- " ceeds *very arbitrarily* in framing ſuch *Ideas* ‡." He really does ſo; but ſtill, I hope, there is no manner of Danger.

" The Mind indeed in making this Sort of " *Ideas*, is not confined, as in the Caſe of *ſimple* " *Ideas*, where it has no Power to make any " One: Nor is it here obliged to examine them " by the real Exiſtence of Things, as it does " in the complex *Ideas* of Subſtances; but mak-

*B. III. C. 3. § 19. See alſo § 17. †Vol. I. p. 342.
‡B. III. C. 5. § 1—6.

ing

" ing Uſe of what *Ideas* it had before, it *chuſes* " a certain Number, *gives* them Connexion, and " *ties* them together by a Name*." This ſeems to be all the *Diſpenſing Power* Mr. *Locke* has given the Mind in framing this ſort of *Ideas*. And as a farther Check upon this *Power*, he has enter'd a *Caveat*, that " they ſhould *not be made* " *at Random*, or jumbled together without any " Reaſon at all: But that they ſhould be always " ſuited to the End, for which abſtract *Ideas* are " made; and that is for the Convenience of " Communication, which is the chief End of " Language †." So that if the Mind keeps up to theſe Rules, we ſhall be ſafe enough, notwithſtanding all her *Power:* If ſhe does not, Mr. *Locke* can hardly, in Reaſon, be blamed for it.

However, it may ſtill be urged, that all this will ſignify nothing; for if, according to Mr. *Locke*'s *Diſtinction*, *all our moral and mathematical Ideas* have *only a nominal Eſſence*; the Mind may compound her *Ideas* as ſhe pleaſes; but Things of a *fixt* and *immutable* Nature, will have no *real Eſſence* at all: And if this Suppoſition be not of bad Conſequence both in *Philoſophy* and *Practice*, nothing can. —— Let it be ſo. However, before Sentence is paſt, let us, according to the equitable Rule in Law, *hear the other Side.*

Does not Mr. *Locke* maintain, that " the " *real* and *nominal* Eſſence of *Modes* (of *mathe-* " *matical Ideas*, for inſtance) are *always the ſame?* " That a Figure including a Space between three " Lines, is the *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſence

*B. III. C. 5. § 2, 3, 4. †§ 7.

" of a Triangle; it being not only the abſtract " *Idea*, to which the general Name is annexed, " but the very *Eſſentia*, or Being of the Thing " itſelf; that Foundation, from which all its " Properties flow, and to which they are all " inſeparably annexed*." What is here call'd the very *Eſſentia*, or *Being*, Mr. *Locke* elſewhere calls the *formal Conſtitution*, or *Eſſence* of a Triangle. And this he obſerves *lies open to our Senſes*; which the *formal Conſtitution* [or *real Eſſence*] of a Subſtance does not †.

As to our *moral Ideas*; does he not maintain, that " *the true and only Meaſure of Virtue, is the* " *Rule preſcribed by God* ‡? that *Morality is capa-* " *ble of Demonſtration*; and that the preciſe *real* " *Eſſence* of the Things moral Words ſtand for, " may be perfectly known**? That the Mea- " ſures of *Right* and *Wrong* may be made out by " *neceſſary Conſequences*, as inconteſtable as thoſe " in *Mathematicks* ‖? And that the *Ideas* that " Ethicks are converſant about, are all *real Eſ-* " *ſences* †? " Does not Mr. *Locke*, I ſay, maintain all this? Beyond the leaſt Controverſy, he moſt evidently does. What Injury has he then done to *any* of our *moral* or *mathematical Ideas?* Or how can it be affirm'd, that *All* of them, according to his *Diſtinction*, have only *nominal Eſſences?* Good-nature inclines one to be in pain for the Man, who has *ventured* to affirm it.

But proceed we now to freſh Articles of Indictment.

" I cannot help being concern'd, ſays our " Author, to find ſome great and learned Men

* B. III. C. 3. § 18. † B. III. C. 11. § 22. See alſo B. II. C. 31. § 6. ‡ B. I. C. 3. § 18. ** B. III. C. 11. § 16. ‖ B. IV. C. 3 § 18. † B. IV. C. 12. § 8.

" taking

"taking the *wrong Side* of ambiguous Appearances, "and falling in with the ſceptical Notions of "the World, by inſinuating *that the Soul owes* "*the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body*; "and this in order to maintain another *Hypothe-* "*ſis* of no very great Conſequence in itſelf, "tho' it were true in this State of Union; viz. "*that the Soul thinks not always*; which yet is "not eaſily to be proved, even though the "Activity of *Spirit* be clogg'd with dead Matter, "and is certainly falſe in a State of Separa- "tion *."

The Paſſage here refer'd to in Mr. *Locke*, is as follows: ——

"'Tis true, we have ſometimes Inſtances of "Perception, whilſt we are *aſleep*, and retain "the Memory of thoſe *Thoughts*: But how *ex-* "*travagant* and incoherent for the moſt part "they are; how little conformable to the Per- "fection and Order of a rational Being, thoſe "who are acquainted with Dreams, need not "be told. This I would willingly be ſatisfied "in, whether the Soul, when it thinks thus a- "part, and as it were, ſeparate from the Body, "acts leſs rationally, than when conjointly with it, "or no. If its ſeparate Thoughts be leſs ratio- "nal, then theſe Men muſt ſay, that the Soul "owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to "the Body: If it does not, 'tis a Wonder that "our Dreams ſhould be, for the moſt part, ſo "frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul "ſhould retain none of its more rational Solilo- "quies and Meditations †." Upon this, our Author thus expreſſes himſelf:

* Vol. I. p. 319—321. † B. II. C. 1. § 16.

" We ſhall afterward ſee, *who in this Place* " aſcribes the Perfection of rational Thinking " to the Body; however here is a broad Hint " for material Souls. What *is for the moſt part* " *only*, is not *always:* That Side ought to have " been conſidered alſo. I hope it will appear, " that the moſt incoherent of our Dreams is an " Appearance far above Matter, or any Power " Matter can be endued with: and that, upon a " narrow Examination, the Actions properly of " the Soul, in dreaming, will not be found ſo " irrational, as is here preſumed, and generally " conceived*."

As this Gentleman here pretty *broadly* intimates, *who* is to be charged with *aſcribing the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body*; ſo in other Places, perhaps for the better *illuſtrating* Mr. *Locke*'s Opinion, we read this Charge with a little Variation. Thus in one Place,——

" If the Soul were endebted to *Matter* for " the Perfection of rational Thinking, *&c.*†."

In another, —— " It is very inaccurate, to a- " ſcribe all the wild Repreſentations, that are " involuntarily forced upon the Soul, —— to " the Soul itſelf, and then inſinuate that it owes " the Perfection of rational Thinking to *Mat-* " *ter* ‡." In a third, —— " We are injurious " in debaſing the Nature of our Souls all Man- " ner of Ways. We would have the Soul mate- " rial: If it be not, yet we would aſcribe the " Perfection of rational Thinking to *Matter* ‖."

And elſewhere having told us that Mr. *Locke*'s Repreſentation of the Appearance of Sleep and Dreaming was *unjuſt* and *inaccurate*, he thus pro-

* Vol. I. p. 320, Notes. † Vol. I. p. 321. ‡ Vol. II. p. 25. ‖ P. 164.

ceeds:

ceeds:—— "This Phænomenon of Sleep and "Dreaming therefore, which hath been made "uſe of to exalt the Nature of Matter, and "depreſs the Perfection of the Soul, rightly "conſidered, ſhews the very contrary *."

How *exalted* a Notion Mr. *Locke* had of the *Nature* of *Matter*; and how inclined he was to *depreſs* the *Perfection* of the *Soul*, have been ſet, I preſume, in a very clear and impartial Light†.

But now, tho' Mr. *Locke* in the Section juſt refer'd to, be only conſidering what muſt be allow'd by thoſe, who grant the *ſeparate Thoughts* of the Soul to be *leſs rational*; yet let us ſuppoſe he was of Opinion, that a Man generally thinks more rationally *awake* than *aſleep*: And that a *right Diſpoſition* of the Body was neceſſary, in this preſent State, to *the Perfection of rational Thinking*. If this be ſuppoſed; what can, by the common Rules of reaſoning (not to mention *Candor* or *Humanity*) be infer'd from hence? And that this is the whole, which Mr. *Locke*, with any Shadow of Reaſon, can be charg'd with, I appeal to every Man, who is able to read him without Paſſion or Prejudice. The ingenious Author, indeed, has in this Section found a *broad Hint* for *material Souls*. Perhaps ſome Readers would as ſoon have found a *broad Hint* for the *Longitude*. But ſo dangerous was it for Mr. *Locke* to affirm, that our *ſleeping Thoughts are, for the moſt part, extravagant*: and our *Dreams, for the moſt part, frivolous and irrational!* I ſhould be glad to know, whether this Gentleman would eſteem it a Complement, to ſuppoſe his learned Piece was the Production of

* P. 187, 188. † See he *Vindication* of Mr *Locke* p. 2.—7.

his

his *ſleeping* Thoughts? and if he would not; what might be the Reaſon?

But then it is obſerved, that "what *is for* "*the moſt part only*, is not *always:* And that "this Side ought to have been conſidered alſo." ——Whether Mr. *Locke* did not think his Subject required a more elaborate Diſſertation upon *Dreaming*; or whether he was *unable* or *unwilling* to engage in ſuch a Taſk; yet it may charitably be hoped, there was no *malicious* Deſign in that Omiſſion. And beſides, ſince he has by this means given our learned Objector a very fair Opportunity of *amply* ſupplying * his Defects; there ſeems the leſs Reaſon for this Gentleman to be ſo greatly diſpleas'd with him. But now, notwithſtanding our Author has here very plainly inſinuated, that Mr. *Locke* is the Man, who has *aſcribed the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body*; yet elſewhere he ſpeaks a little doubtfully; as for Inſtance,

"Mr. *Locke ſeems to favour* the Opinion of "thoſe, who aſcribe the Perfection of rational "Thinking to the Matter of the Body †." Or, as he afterwards expreſſes it, ——*to the* "*right Diſpoſition of that Matter* ‡." However, whether Mr. *Locke ſeems* only *to favour* ſuch an Opinion, as it is mention'd in one Place; or whether Mr. *Locke makes it appear to be his own Opinion*, as this Gentleman *thinks*, in another ‖; it may poſſibly be ſome Conſolation to Mr. *Locke*'s Friends, to underſtand, that this Opinion is capable of "*one Meaning, that is conſiſtent enough* "*with the Immateriality and rational Nature of the* "*Soul* **:" And that "it is no Reproach

* See Vol. II. p. 1—255. † P. 3. ‡ P. 185.
‖ P. 186. ** Vol. I. p. 386.

"upon

" upon the rational Soul to ſay, that the Per-
" fection of rational Thinking depends on the
" Matter of the Body, as an *impeding* or *obſtruct-*
" *ing Cauſe**." I ſay, perhaps, here Mr. *Locke*'s Friends may take Courage, and fancy that all is ſafe enough. But alas! they are utterly miſtaken; and their Hopes vaniſh the very Inſtant they are conceiv'd! For our Author thus immediately adds, ——

" But that the Perfection of rational Think-
" ing ſhould depend upon the Matter of the
" Body, as a *promoting* or *effecting Cauſe* (which
" is indeed the true Meaning intended in the
" Objection) is a direct Contradiction †." This " is that *other Meaning*, which he had before told us, was *artfully ſhuffled in*, *under Colour of* the former ‡.

'Tis true indeed, that in this laſt Place, none are mention'd, but the *modern Sceptic* ‖: And in the former, neither *Sceptic*, nor any other Perſon. However, ſince the Opinion itſelf is charged upon Mr. *Locke*; ſince he is taxed with giving, by this very means, a *broad Hint for material Souls*; and ſince no Exception is made in relation to him; it is therefore humbly enquired, whether Mr. *Locke* is to be underſtood as a Party concern'd with the *modern Sceptic*, in *artfully ſhuffling in this contradictory Meaning?* If he be not; —— Whether our Author has not left him (I hope altogether *undeſignedly*) very much expoſed to the undeſerved Cenſure of *certain* Readers? But if Mr. *Locke* is to be charg'd either with *artfully ſhuffling in*, or at leaſt with holding this *direct Contradiction*; then it is ſub-

* P. 395. † Ibid. ‡ Vol. I. p. 386. ‖ P. 385.

mitted,

mitted, whether our Author can assign any better Reasons for this Compliment upon Mr. *Locke*, than merely the two following:—— First, it is a *direct Contradiction*, and therefore the more likely to be Mr. *Locke*'s *Meaning*. And secondly, there could not otherwise have been a *broad Hint for material Souls*. But now granting that it is the *modern Sceptic* only, who has *shuffled* with regard to the *Meaning* of that Proposition; yet what will become of Mr. *Locke*, if he has been guilty of *shuffling* over the *Odiousness* of an Insinuation upon Others? But first let us view the Foundation of this Charge.

"This, says Mr. *Locke*, I would willingly be "satisfied in, whether the Soul, when it thinks "thus apart, and as it were, separate from the "Body, acts less rationally, than when conjointly with it, or no. If its separate Thoughts be "less rational, then these Men must say, that the "Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking "to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a Wonder "that our Dreams should be, for the most part, "so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul "should retain none of its more rational Solilo-"quies and Meditations *."

Our Author having quoted thus much out of Mr. *Locke*, excepting the last Paragraph, he raises the following Observations:—— "Here "this Absurdity is first made a *Consequence* of "what *these Men say*; and immediately it is "surmized, that the Quality of our Dreams "shews this Absurdity to be Fact. This is really "a strange Way of proceeding, to *shuffle* over "the Odiousness of an Insinuation upon *Others*;

*B. II. C. 1. § 16.

"and

" and in caſe *they* ſhould diſown it, and *that* " *Circumſtance* from which he would infer it, " (*viz.* that the Soul thinks without being con- " ſcious of it) to endeavour to prove it, by an " Appearance, which he has ready at hand *."

In anſwer to this, I deſire it may be obſerv'd, that Mr. *Locke* is there manifeſtly conſidering the Nature of this Suppoſition, *viz.* that the *Soul may think ſeparately and apart from the Body.* " Perhaps, ſays Mr. *Locke*, it will be ſaid, " —— that in the *Thinking of the Soul*, which " is not perceived *in a ſleeping Man*, there the " Soul thinks apart," *&c.* ‖ " *Upon this Hy-* " *potheſis*, Mr. *Locke* tells us, *the Thoughts of a* " *ſleeping Man ought to be moſt rational* †." However he proceeds to enquire in the following Section, whether this will be admitted, or not. If it be not; or, in Mr. *Locke*'s Words, *if the Soul's ſeparate Thoughts be leſs rational*, then, ſays he, it muſt be allowed by thoſe (who maintain that Suppoſition) that *the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body.* But if on the other hand, it ſhould be anſwer'd, that *theſe ſeparate Thoughts are more rational*, and that therefore *ſuch Perfection is not owing to the Body*; Mr. *Locke* replies, that if *theſe ſeparate Thoughts are more rational*, 'tis a Wonder, *the Soul retains none of them*; and that our Dreams ſhould *generally* be ſo *frivolous* and *irrational.* —— It is ſubmitted, whether this be not really the Caſe, and whether Mr. *Locke*'s Reaſoning be not levell'd at an *Hypotheſis*, which makes the *Soul to think by itſelf*, and in which the *ſleeping Man* partakes

* Vol. II. p. 186, 187. ‖ B. II. C. 1. § 15. † See the Title to that Section; tho' I think that Title is miſplac'd, and belongs to Sect. 16.

not. Mr. *Locke* is evidently conſidering what Difficulties attend that *Hypotheſis*; and obſerves that ſome Conſequences muſt follow from it, which either the Eſpouſers of it would not care to admit, or which would not readily be admitted by others. And is any thing more *uſual* or more *innocent*, than to argue upon a Suppoſition of what might poſſibly be offer'd; or to conſider what might be propoſed either *for*, or *againſt* an Hypotheſis?

But what a *frightful* Buſineſs has this Gentleman made of it? Here is *an Abſurdity ſurmiſed to be Fact*; *a ſtrange Way of proceeding!* the *Odiouſneſs* of an *Inſinuation ſhuffled over upon others*; and in caſe *they ſhould diſown it*, Mr. *Locke would infer it from that* very *Circumſtance*, which he all along oppoſes; *viz.* that *the Soul thinks without being conſcious of it* *. This *Circumſtance* however was to prove, that *the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body!* No one, I believe, beſides Mr. *Locke*, could ever have thought of ſuch a Proof! But what if *theſe Men* had deny'd both *Circumſtance* and *Inference?* why, as to the latter, he was ſtill provided for them; *he had an Appearance ready at hand*, in order *to prove it.* Whether he had any thing *at hand*, to prove the former, viz. *that Circumſtance*, our Author ſays not. However thus far Mr. *Locke*'s *black* Deſigns and Intentions are unravell'd! And moreover, "*theſe Men* deny that "the Soul thinks leſs or more rationally, with-"out being conſcious of it, and therefore any "Conſequence of ſuch a Poſition †."

One would be glad to know, by what means, our Author came here ſo well acquainted with

* B. II. C. 1. § 11. See alſo § 10, 12, 19. † Vol. II. p. 187.

theſe

theſe Men, ſince, two or three hundred Pages before, he ſeems to know nothing at all of them. "It were, ſays he, to be wiſh'd that [Mr. *Locke*] "had told us, what Author it is that aſſerts, that "the Soul in a ſleeping Man thinks, without "being conſcious of it*. So that in one Place, he is utterly at a Loſs to determine *whom* Mr. *Locke* could mean, and in another, he aſſures us, —— *they deny* any ſuch Thing. Perhaps ſome may wonder, that we were not directed to thoſe particular Authors, who *deny* what Mr. *Locke* inſinuates of them, ſince here was a fine Opportunity offered, of convicting that Gentleman of *ſhuffling* over his *Inſinuations upon Others*. But poſſibly our Author was a little *tender*; and did not care to preſs Matters too far. He does indeed immediately after, demand with an Air of Triumph, —— "But who is it here that ap-"peals to the *Frivolouſneſs* and *Irrationality* of "our Dreams to ſhew, that the Soul owes the "Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body†.' But what if Mr. *Locke* ſhould *appeal* to theſe, only *to ſhew* the Precariouſneſs of an *Hypotheſis*, which ſeparates the *ſleeping Man* from the *thinking Soul*‡? Or granting he *appeals* to theſe, *to ſhew* that a right Diſpoſition of the Body is neceſſary, during its preſent Union with the Soul, to *the Perfection of rational Thinking*; —— Pray what is there in all this, that deſerves ſo much ſevere Treatment? —— Again, "Here, "[Mr. *Locke*] ſays our Author, ſuppoſes that "the Soul itſelf produces all it hears and ſees in "Sleep, that it thinks apart and ſeparately at "that time, and exerts the utmoſt Perfection it

* Vol. I. p. 333, 334. †Vol. II. p. 187. ‡ B. II. C. 1. § 15, 16.

" is capable of, when deſtitute of the Help of " the Body. How *unjuſt* and *inaccurate* a Re- " preſentation of the Appearance is this*?"

If the Reader ſhould find upon Enquiry, that the *Soul thinking apart and ſeparately*, is the *very Suppoſition*, which Mr. *Locke* himſelf oppoſes †; he may poſſibly be of Opinion, that the Terms *unjuſt* and *inaccurate*, are here introduced a little *unluckily*.

Indeed this Gentleman is there upon a very *favourite Hypotheſis*, which is to account for the Nature of our *Dreams*; and therefore if he appears more out of Temper with what comes in his Way, than he might otherwiſe do, it is the more excuſable. Authors, in ſuch Circumſtances, are generally impatient of Contradiction. And hence, I preſume, it happen'd, that the immortal *Cicero* is pretty ſharply corrected by him. A ſhort Digreſſion in behalf of that great Man, I believe the learned Reader will very eaſily excuſe.

" It is known, ſays our Author, that *Cicero* " was profeſſedly an Academic, and that he " wrote deſignedly in his Treatiſe *de Divinatione*, " againſt this very Concluſion which I maintain, " and endeavour'd to account for the *Appearance* " of Dreaming, the ſame way, as is done here " in the Objection ‡." After this he proceeds to the Dream of *Cicero*, as it is related by his Brother *Quintus*, who manages the oppoſite Side of the Queſtion; and who, at the Concluſion, obſerves that *Cicero* had himſelf own'd, that *nothing could be more Divine than that Dream* ⸸. " But what does *Cicero* anſwer, ſays our Author to

* Vol. II. p. 187. † B. II. C. 1. § 15. ‡ Vol. II. p. 52, 53. ⸸ De Divinat. L. I.

" this

" this particulr Inſtance?" *Mihi* (ſays he) *Tem-*
" *poribus illis multùm in Animo* Marius *verſabatur,*
" *recordanti, quàm ille gravem ſuum Caſum mag-*
" *no Animo, quàm conſtanti tuliſſet. Hanc credo*
" *Cauſam de illo ſomniandi fuiſſe* *." Upon which our Author thus expoſtulates, —— " What a " poor unſatisfying Shift is this! Had he not " *Camillus* and *Scipio Africanus* alſo in his Mind? " why not have dreamed of theſe † ?" And it is afterwards left to be determined by others, how far *Cicero*'s Speech of *Democritus*, is applicable to *Cicero* himſelf ‡, —— *Nec cognovi quenquam qui majori Auctoritate nihil diceret* ‖. —— But now after all, it is not impoſſible, but that great Philoſopher might have the ſame Thoughts of his Dream, even when he aſſign'd this Reaſon of it to *Quintus*, which he really had at the Time he mention'd it in a private Converſation. " If we ſeek for *Cicero*'s true Sentiments (ſays a " a very learned Critic) it muſt not be in his " Diſputes againſt others, where he had Licence " to ſay any thing for Oppoſition Sake: But in " the Books where he dogmatizes himſelf; where " allowing for the Word *Probable*, you have all " the Spirit and Marrow of the *Platonic*, *Peripa-* " *tetic*, and *Stoic* Syſtems; I mean his Books *De* " *Officiis*, *Tuſculanae*, *De Amicitiâ*, *De Senectute*, " *De Legibus*; in which, and in the Remains of " others now loſt, he declares for the Being and " Providence of God, for the Immortality of " the Soul, for every Point that approaches to " Chriſtianity ⸸."

* Ibid. L. II. † Vol. II. p. 60, 61. ‡ Vol. II. p. 64, 65. ‖ De Divinat. L. II. ⸸ See *Remarks* upon a Diſcourſe of *Free-thinking*, in a Letter to N. N. by *Phileleutherus Lipſienſis*. Part II. p. 81, 82.

This

This very learned Writer had before obſerv'd, "that there's a vaſt Difference in the Manner of "Diſpute, that's exhibited in the *Tuſculanae*, "from what appears *In Academicis*, *De Finibus*, "*De Naturâ Deorum*, and *De Divinatione*. In "the latter no Man concedes; in the *Tuſculans*, "no Man reſiſts*." So that notwithſtanding *Cicero* might *aſcribe his Dream to quite another Cauſe, when it happen'd*, than he does now in his *Academical Philoſophy*, as our Author conjectures†; yet if "the *Academic* Objections be the "moſt unlikely Place where to find his real "Sentiments, and if *Cicero* there only uſes the "Privilege of an *Academic*, and ſpeaks, not "what he really believ'd, but what ſerv'd the "preſent Turn‡," it may be ſubmitted, whether the ingenious Author has not condemn'd, without ſufficient Cauſe, one of the greateſt Men of all Antiquity! He afterwards takes notice, that it "has been long ſince obſerved of this "*great Man*, that his *Academical Writings* "are at Variance with his other Works, and "that he may be confuted out of himſelf, and in "his own Words‖." But if our Author had recollected *how* this happen'd, and had made uſe of that excellenr Critic's Obſervations for finding out *Cicero*'s *real Sentiments*, he might perhaps have ſpared his Remarks with regard to the *Contradiction*, between what is advanced in the ſecond Book *De Legibus*, and in the Treatiſe *De Divinatione*†; as well as omitted his Cenſures on a Part of the fourth Book of the *Academical Queſtions***. In ſhort, if he had

*Ibid. p. 73. †Vol. II. p. 56. ‡The *Remarks* &c. p. 79, 80. ‖Vol. II. p 77, 78. †P. 77. **P. 74, 75.

con-

conſider'd *Cicero* in this View, I preſume he would have found him, not only a *Great*, but a *Conſiſtent* Writer; and that there was very little Reaſon to be ſo angry with him. —— Indeed in the Place laſt mention'd, our Author ſuggeſts that *Cicero* is guilty of a *Contradiction*, even admitting the famous *Academical Principle*; for *Cicero* having ſaid, that "*Strato* had reliev'd "him from *much Terror*, when he taught that "*God neither made, nor took care of the World**, the ingenious Author thus remarks,—— "It is "true, a little after [*Cicero*] endeavours to bring "himſelf off, by the *great Academical Principle*, "ſaying, "he neither aſſented to *Strato*, *who* "*deny'd a God*, nor to *Lucullus*, *who aſſerted one*. "But this ſeems ſomewhat contradictory to *his* "*being relieved of his Fears*†." Juſt as *contradictory*, as that he ſhould ſide with *Strato*, in Oppoſition to *Lucullus*, and then declare that he *aſſented* to neither: But is it to be wonder'd at, that whilſt he ſeems to ſide with *Strato*, he ſhould aſſign ſome Reaſon, or other for it? But tho' whilſt he is taking the Part of *Strato*, he tells us that *Strato* had *reliev'd* him from *much Terror*; yet ſurely this could not prevent him the Liberty of an *Academic*; that is of diſſenting afterwards both from *Strato* and *Lucullus*. Had he ſaid indeed, that he met with this *Relief* from the Former, even whilſt he *diſſented* from him; this had been an Abſurdity, which no *Academical Principle* could have excuſed: Whereas occaſionally to ſpeak both *for and againſt every Thing*, *and every Philoſopher*, was the Privilege of that Sect‡, and what may eaſily be accounted for,

* Acad. Quæſt. L. IV. † Vol. II. p. 74, 75. ‡ Acad. 2. 18. Nat. Deor. 1. 5. L. II. fine. See the *Remarks* on *Freethinking*, Part. II. p. 80.

upon

upon that *Principle*, without making any hard Reflections upon ſuch a Writer as *Cicero*.

But to return to Mr. *Locke:*—— Our Author in the following Inſtance, ſeems to introduce that Gentleman, merely to pay him a *Civility*.— "It is true, ſays he, Voyages and Books of "Travels tell us of ſeveral Nations, in different "Parts of the World, *who have no Sort of Re-* "*ligion, no Name, nor Notion of any ſupream-* "*Being:* But if this be ſo, as Mr. *Locke* would "have us believe, it ſeems the Inhabitants of "theſe Countries never dream."—— With Submiſſion to this learn'd Writer, one would rather think they were *always* in a *Dream*. However he gives the following Reaſon for this Opinion,— "Since we can ſcarce conceive that this ſingle "*Phænomenon* ſhould not be enough to kindle "up the Notion of ſome *Religion* or other in "the Minds of Men, though we could ſuppoſe "all Religion once entirely loſt in the World." ——— If Men were to loſe *all Religion*, with their Eyes *open*; it it greatly to be fear'd, they would hardly recover it, when their Eyes were *ſhut*.——— "However, the *Matter of Fact* it- "ſelf begins now to appear falſe; and theſe "*Monſters* gradually evaniſh, as the Countries "they were ſaid to be in, are more reſorted to, "and become better known. Nature ſeems to "be every where of a Piece with herſelf*."

What a Pleaſure muſt every good Man receive, when he reflects that there are no longer any, but who have *felt after, and found out God*; none, but who from the viſible Works of Creation and Providence, have *ſeen* and *underſtood the eternal*

* Vol. II. p. 116. in the Notes.

Power

Power and Godhead! Nature ſeems to be every where of a Piece with herſelf! If we aſk, whether *Nature* has always been thus? our Author does not acquaint us: Or if we enquire, how long? he is likewiſe ſilent. If any ſhould be ſo impertinent as to demand his *Vouchers*; it may be anſwer'd, that ſince there are only Mr. *Locke*'s Vouchers on the other ſide, ſuch as *Publick Miniſters*; *Private Gentlemen*; thoſe very Miſſionaries of *China*, who are the great Encomiaſts of the *Chineſes*; and one Divine, who was living when Mr. *Locke* wrote †; I ſay it may be anſwer'd, that ſince Mr. *Locke* has no other Vouchers, there was no Neceſſity for our Author to produce any, in order to confront their Authority. It was abundantly ſufficient to acquaint the Reader, that Mr. *Locke would have us believe there were ſuch Monſters*; *and that the Matter of Fact now appears to be falſe.* It is true, the learned Biſhop of *Worceſter*, in his Reply to Mr. *Locke*, does himſelf acknowledge, that "by the beſt "Accounts both of the *Cafres* of *Soldania*, and "the *Caiguæ* of *Paraquaria*, They are a People "ſo ſtrangely bereft of common Senſe, that "that they can hardly be reckon'd among Man-"kind *." However, by our Author's Report it appears that his Lordſhip's *beſt Accounts*, were in Truth and Reality but very *bad* ones.

But, ſuppoſe they were ſo, was it criminal in that learned Prelate, to believe the falſe Accounts of ſome Travellers? Moſt certainly it was not. This could be a Crime in none but Mr. *Locke* only.

† Hum. Und. B. I. C. 4. § 8. Or the fifth Edition of the Eſſay, p. 38—40. * His Lordſhip's Anſwer to Mr. *Locke*'s firſt Letter, p. 90.

" The laſt Objection, ſays our Author, I " ſhall mention, is an Inſinuation, *that our* " *Dreams are no more than the Thoughts and Buſi-* " *neſs of the Day recurring:* Or which it may be " ſuppoſed the Soul itſelf ſome Way or other " reſumes, without the Interpoſition of ſuch a " Cauſe* as is here aſſigned. Mr. *Locke* ſays, " The Dreams of ſleeping Men are, as I take it, " *all made up* of the waking Man's Ideas, though " for the moſt Part oddly put together†." " *Lucretius* ſays only *fere* and *plerumque*‡."

And can this Gentleman then get leave of himſelf to imagine, that Mr. *Locke* really ſuppoſed, that *all* the Dreams of Lawyers related to pleading of Cauſes; *all* the Dreams of Generals were made up of Battles; and that Mariners dreamt *only* of Storms and Tempeſts? If he did not imagine this, why is Mr. *Locke* here oppoſed to *Lucretius?* And the *fere* and *plerumque* of the one, ſet in Oppoſition to *all* the Dreams of the other? Or why is the Particle *all* put in *Italicks*, to render it the more remarkable? But if this be his Meaning, as it ſeems pretty plain; I would deſire any Man who is not in a *Dream* himſelf, only to examine the Paſſage refer'd to; and he will eaſily determine whether Mr. *Locke* and *Lu-*

* The learned Writer here means the Agency of other Spirits See his Eſſay on Dreaming.

† Hum. Und. B. II. C. 1 § 17.

‡ *Et quoi quiſque fere Studio devinctus adhæret,——*
In Somnis eadem plerumque videmur obire:
Cauſidici Cauſas agere, & componere Leges,
Induperatores pugnare, ac Prælia obire,
Nautæ contractum cum Ventis cernere bellum,
Nos agere hoc autem, &c.

L. IV. from Ver. 959 to 982

See our Author Vol. II. p. 197, 198.

cretius

cretius are not treating of different Things. Mr. *Locke* only maintains, there is no Appearance, that Men in their Sleep have any *Ideas*, but what are derived from *Senſation* or *Reflection*. This is evidently the whole Purport of that Section; as would appear from the very Title of it, was not that, by ſome Miſtake, prefixed to the 16th. Conſequently then, it is not the particular Subject of Mens Dreams, which Mr. *Locke* is there ſpeaking of; but the general Materials of which they are compoſed. Theſe Materials are the *waking Man*'s *Ideas:* That is, ſuch *Ideas* as he receiv'd originally from *Senſation* and *Reflection*; or they are the different Combinations of thoſe *Ideas*. But his Dreams are not compoſed of *Ideas*, which the Soul might be thought to have before its Union with the Body. That this is the whole of Mr. *Locke*'s Deſign, is ſubmitted to the Judgment of the Reader,

And therefore what this Gentleman demands, by way of Objection, with regard to *Aſtyages*, who dreamt that out *of his Daughter grew a Vine which overſhaded all Aſia**, is nothing at all to the Purpoſe. For tho' this very Dream never employed his waking Thoughts; yet I preſume the *Materials* of it might. Was not his *Daughter* one *Idea*, a *Vine* another, *Aſia* another, and *overſhading* another, which had preſented themſelves to *Aſtyages* whilſt *awake?* Let our Author apply this to all his other Inſtances, and he muſt find that Nothing is produced againſt Mr. *Locke*; and that Nothing can affect Mr. *Locke*'s Argument, till an Inſtance can be given of a Dream, in which *innate Ideas* are to be found.

* Vol. II. p. 199.

Even what he mentions of *Lucullus**, who dreamt of one *Autolycus*, will not do. For tho' *Lucullus* had never heard of that particular Name before; was it not however as much an *Idea* of *Senſation*, as *Lucullus* itſelf? It was indeed a ſtrange and new Sound to *Lucullus*, but does not Mr. *Locke* ſay, that our *Ideas* in Sleep (whether of *Sound*, or *Colour*, or *Figure*, it matters not) *are for the moſt part oddly put together?* But ſtill, ſince the Name and Hiſtory of *Autolycus* were unknown to *Lucullus*, when he dreamt of him, our Author demands, "can it be ſaid, that any of his "waking Thoughts had ſuggeſted [theſe Things] "to him†?"

Pray, where does Mr. *Locke ſuggeſt* any Thing like it?—— "We are placed, ſays our Author "himſelf, in Circumſtances every Night, and "ſee Things which for the *Newneſs* and *Strange-* "*neſs* of them, we are ſurprized how they could "enter our Fancy‡." That is, I preſume, our *Ideas* are put into a *new* and *ſtrange* Dreſs. But how much may this differ from *our Ideas being oddly put together?* However, "*This Obſervation* "of Mr. *Locke*'s it ſeems, is ſo far from being "exact, that if he had made *juſt the contrary* "Obſervation, it would have been equally true: "which is remarkable enough in a Man of his "Accuracy and Judgment ⸸."

It is undoubtedly *remarkable enough*, that a Man of ſuch *Accuracy* and *Judgment*, ſhould be for ever *blundering* in ſo egregious a Manner!

But again, "How could the *Soul*, upon Mr. "*Locke*'s *own Principles*, form to itſelf in Sleep a "Scene of our waking Actions, and Thoughts,

* Ibid. p. 200. † Ibid ‡ Ibid. ⸸ Ibid.

and

" and *the Man* be ſtill ignorant of it, without " being two diſtinct Perſons*?"

This ſurely can never be deſign'd for Mr. *Locke:* Since it is *Word for Word*, one of his Objections againſt the *Soul's thinking apart*, without the Privity or Knowlege of the *ſleeping Man*. Mr. *Locke* ſpeaking of that Hypotheſis, he thus expreſſes himſelf,——" Not to mention again " the Abſurdity of two diſtinct Perſons, which " follows from this Suppoſition, *&c.*†."

But yet if this Paſſage be not deſigned as an Argument againſt Mr. *Locke*, it will be exceedingly difficult ſo much as to gueſs, whom it can belong to. For it is preceded by three or four Pages, which contain Objections againſt Mr. *Locke* only; without the leaſt Notice taken of any other Antagoniſt. And if it is really levell'd at him, the Queſtion will be, whether our Author is not a little unfortunate in attacking Mr. *Locke*, upon what he calls Mr. *Locke*'s *own Principles?*

But now, before we proceed to the other Point in Controverſy, that is, whether the Soul *always thinks*, or no; it may not be amiſs, firſt, to conſider, what Mr. *Locke* means by *Thinking*.

" *Perception*, ſays Mr. *Locke*, is by ſome cal- " led *Thinking* in general. Though *Thinking* in " the Propriety of the *Engliſh* Tongue, ſignifies " that Sort of Operation of the Mind about its " *Ideas*, wherein the Mind is *active*; where it with " ſome Degree of voluntary Attention, conſiders " any thing: For in bare, naked *Perception*, " the Mind is, for the moſt part, only paſſive; " and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiv-

* Vol. II. p 201. † B. II. C. 1. § 15. See alſo § 11, 12, 19.

ing

" ing*." And in the Section, where Mr. *Locke* treats of this very Queſtion, it appears that *to contemplate Ideas*, *to think*, and *to be in Action*, are uſed by him to expreſs the ſame Thing†. So that I preſume, it muſt be allowed, that by the *Thinking* of the Soul, Mr. *Locke* chiefly, if not altogether, means the Exertion of that *active* Power, where the Soul *voluntarily*, and with ſome Degree of *Attention*, conſiders or contemplates *Ideas*.

And as to the ingenious Author himſelf, he ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes between *Thinking*, and barely having *Perceptions*‡: And, in ſhort, he maintains *Thinking* to be *Action*‖.

This being previouſly obſerv'd, we proceed to what Mr. *Locke* has advanced, and our Author objected.

" I confeſs myſelf, ſays Mr. *Locke*, to have " one of thoſe dull Souls, that doth not per- " ceive itſelf always to contemplate *Ideas*, nor " can conceive it any more neceſſary for the " *Soul always to think*, than for the Body always " to move; the Perception of *Ideas*, being (as " I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to " the Body, not its Eſſence, but one of its " Operations. —— It is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe " that it ſhould be always Thinking, always in " Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of " the infinite Author and Preſerver of Things, " *who never ſlumbers nor ſleeps.* ——— But whe- " ther that Subſtance [the Soul] perpetually " thinks, or no, we can be no farther aſſured, " than Experience informs us†."

*B. II. C. 9. § 1. †B. II. C. 1. § 10. ‡ Vol. I. p. 190. p. 203 in the Notes. ‖ P. 324. †B. II. C. 1. § 10.

" The

"The Reaſon, ſays our Author, why it is "improper to refer to Experience in this Caſe, "will appear immediately *." And in the mean while, he thus animadverts on ſome other Parts of this Section, —— "With Submiſſion to ſo "great a Name, there is this material Difference, "*Motion* is no more the Action of Matter than "*Reſt* is; it is equally inactive in both, as hath "been ſhewn †."

With *Submiſſion* to this learned Objector, Mr. *Locke* has himſelf *ſhewn* long ago, that the Motion of Body is rather a Paſſion than an Action in it‡; and that there never had been any *Motion*, without a more *Powerful Being* than *Matter* ‖. And elſewhere he aſſerts, that "two "Bodies, placed by one another at Reſt, will "never afford us the *Idea* of a Power in the one "to move the other, but by a borrowed Mo-"tion **. So that now we know Mr. *Locke*'s Meaning, I hope the *Motion* of the Body may be underſtood in a very *inoffenſive* and *Philoſophical* Senſe. —— But ſtill it is obſerved, that "Matter ſtands in need of an *external Cauſe* to "put it into Motion, or bring it to Reſt again; "but the Soul doth not want an *external Mover* "to ſet it a Thinking †. And does not Mr. *Locke*, every where maintain the ſame Thing? Or when he affirms "that we find in ourſelves a "*Power* to begin or forbear; continue or end "ſeveral Actions of our Minds, and Motions "of our Bodies, barely by a Thought ††. When he makes "*Thinking* and *Motivity* to be

* Vol. I. p. 327. in the Notes. † Vol. I. p. 326, 327. ‡ B. II. C. 21. § 4. ‖ B. IV. C. 10. § 10. ** B. II. C. 23. § 28. † Vol. I. p. 327. †† B. II. C. 21. § 5.

"the

" the *primary Ideas* of Spirit, and *peculiar* to it*;" when he affirms that " the Mind, every Day, " affords us *Ideas* of an active Power of moving " of Bodies; and ſuppoſes active Power to be " the proper Attribute of Spirits†;" ſhall we fancy he means, that the Soul *wants* an *external Mover* to ſet it a *Thinking?* However, " there " is no room, ſays our Author, to run a Com- " pariſon between the Action of the Soul, which " neceſſarily ſprings out of its own Nature, and " the Motion of Matter, which muſt be excit- " ed in it, by *ſome Being* not material. This " looks as if *Action* were equally extrinſick to " them both, or as if it were as natural for the " Soul to be without Action, as for Matter to " be without Motion; which is to pervert our " juſteſt Conceptions of ſpiritual Subſtance‡."

It is ſubmitted, whether any thing is more contrary to the whole Tenor of Mr. *Locke*'s Writings, than that *Action* ſhould be *equally extrinſick both to Spirit* and *Matter*. Or that it ſhould be *as natural for the Soul* [an *active ſelf-moving* Subſtance] *to be without Action, as for* [*inactive, dead*] *Matter*‖, *to be without Motion?* However, it ſeems, Things *look* ſo, from the *Compariſon* which Mr. *Locke* has *run*, whether this *Appearance* be really owing to that *Compariſon*, or to ſome *other Cauſe*, the judicious Reader muſt determine for himſelf.

The whole of Mr. *Locke*'s *Compariſon*, conſider'd in any *candid* View, amounting to no more than this, that he ſuppoſed the Soul might, without the leaſt Hurt to itſelf, ſometimes forbear

* B. II. C. 23. § 18. † § 28. ‡ Vol. I. p. 327.
‖ B. IV. C. 10. § 10.

to

to *act*, as well as the Body frequently ceaſes to be *acted* upon.

However, "It will not follow, ſays our Au-
"thor, that every Thing is ſeparable from Sub-
"ſtances, which is not this real internal Conſti-
"tution, as [Mr. *Locke*] ſeems to take for
"granted*."

Becauſe Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes, that if *Thinking* be only an Operation of the Soul, ſuch Operation may be ſometimes ſuſpended, without any Injury to that *thinking Subſtance*; therefore Mr. *Locke ſeems to take for granted*, that *Diviſibility*, *Figure* and *Magnitude* (as we ſhall ſee immediately) are *ſeparate* from Matter!

This *ſeems* ſo plain to the ingenious Author, that he has it over again, ſome Pages from hence, as we ſhall have Occaſion to obſerve hereafter. —— But he thus proceeds, —— "The
"Properties that immediately flow from the in-
"ternal Conſtitution of Things, are as inſepa-
"rable from them, as that Conſtitution itſelf;
"and we can as little conceive the Thing with-
"out theſe Properties, as without that Conſti-
"tution. *Diviſibility*, *Figure*, *Magnitude*, are
"not the internal Conſtitution of Matter, but
"Properties neceſſarily flowing from it; and
"and yet we can as little conceive Matter with-
"out theſe, as without its own internal Conſti-
"tution; that is, we can as little conceive it
"without theſe, as *without Subſtance*. This muſt
"be ſo; for it is by theſe that we conceive it at
"all to be a Subſtance, or to have an internal,
"unknown Conſtitution. And for a like Rea-
"ſon, Activity and Perceptivity, by which

* Vol. I. p. 328.

" Powers alone we diſcover that there is a Sub-
" ſtance different from Matter, and which is the
" neceſſary Subject of their Inheſion, muſt be
" in the Mind, even previous to the internal
" unknown Conſtitution of that Subſtance; as
" neceſſarily as it, and with much more Clear-
" neſs than an *unknown Thing* can be, If it were
" pardonable to run ſo high, I might ſay, that
" thoſe very Powers of Activity, and Percep-
" tivity, which are not the internal, unknown
" Conſtitution of ſpiritual Subſtance, are yet
" inſeparable from the *neceſſarily exiſting Spirit*;
" and the conſtant Exerciſe of them alſo; as
" Mr. *Locke* obſerves, in the Place laſt quoted
" from him *."

But now unleſs it follow from all this, that *actual Thinking* is as *eſſential* to the Soul, as *Magnitude* is to Matter, or as a *Power* of *Thinking* is to a *Thinking* Subſtance, the Point in Controverſy ſeems to be juſt where it was. Matter without *Figure* or *Magnitude*; and a *Thinking* Subſtance without a *Power* of *Thinking*, are directly *contradictory Ideas*. But will this Gentleman ſay, it is a *Contradiction* to ſuppoſe, that the actual Exerciſe of the active Powers of the Soul, may be *ſometimes* ſuſpended? He certainly appears, in ſome Places, to be of a different Opinion.—— " When we are, ſays he, ſick, or
" heavy with Sleep, or Fatigue, it becomes
" eaſy to abſtain from Action of the Body, or
" Mind; and only then †." Again, " It is
" only the Indiſpoſition of the Body, that can
" interrupt the Exerciſe of this Power [*of*
" *Thinking*] at any time ‡." Elſewhere he thus

* P. 328, 329. † Vol. I. p. 270. ‡ P. 324, 325.

expreſſes

expreſſes himſelf. —— "It hath been ſhewn be-
"fore that the Soul would never ceaſe to exert
"its Activity upon a rightly diſpoſed Body;
"unleſs ſome Defect and Want of Reparation
"in the Body, forced this Principle of Life and
"Action to deſiſt, and leave the material Or-
"gan 'till the Indiſpoſition under which it la-
"bours be repaired*." In another place,
"ſince Sleep is a State in which the Faculties
"of the Soul are obſtructed, or impeded, by
"the Indiſpoſition of the Matter of the Body,
"*&c.* †." —— And again. —— "If the Pow-
"ers of the Soul were not impeded in Sleep,
"that State would not differ from being awake,
"except in the Indiſpoſition of the Body ‡."—
It is true, our Author tells us, that "the Soul
"*not thinking inceſſantly* has been often ſuppoſed
"to avoid unneceſſary Debates in improper
"Places ‖." But whether the Paſſages juſt
quoted from this Author, are ſome of thoſe
Suppoſitions that are to paſs for *Nothing* we ſhall
better diſcover hereafter. But I beg leave here
to take Notice, that this Gentleman had before
obſerv'd, "that they who placed the Eſſence of
"the Soul in Thinking, rather expreſſed their
"Meaning unwarily, than had falſe Concepti-
"ons of the Nature of it ⸸." And that "if they
"had made a Diſtinction between *Activity* [that
"is, a *Power* of acting**] and *real Action*;
"—— no body could have taken Exception to
"their Opinion ††.

If theſe Writers, whoever they were, made no
Diſtinction between *Power* and the *actual Exer-*

* Vol. II. p. 6. † P. 320. ‡ P. 321. ‖ Vol. I. p. 330. ⸸ P. 322. ** Vol. I. p. 249. †† P. 325.

tion of it, we are not to wonder, if they *expreſſed their Meaning unwarily.* Had they made the Diſtinction, which this Gentleman allows they ought to have made; and only maintain'd with him, that "*it is contradictory that the Soul* "*ſhould at any time, even while united to the Body,* "*be without the Power of Action* *," it is ſubmitted, whether they would have met with the leaſt Oppoſition from Mr. *Locke?* But it is ſtill urged —— "This farther may be ſaid for thoſe, "who place the Nature of the Soul in Think-"ing, and ſuppoſe it to think inceſſantly (tak-"ing Thinking in the Senſe of being always "percipient of ſome Idea or other) that it is "impoſſible to ſhew the contrary, even in this "State of Union with the Body; though it "hath been here allowed and often ſuppoſed, "to avoid unneceſſary Debates in improper "Places †."

But now, as what this Gentleman here tells us *has been often ſuppoſed, to avoid unneceſſary Debates in improper Places*, ſeems only to relate to *Thinking*, underſtood in the Senſe of being *Percipient*; it may well be preſumed he had no Deſign to revoke any Thing he had advanced, about the *Action* of the Soul being ſometimes *impeded* or *interrupted*; —— And if this be ſuppoſed, how *ſmall* muſt the Difference appear between him and Mr. *Locke?* The one imagines there is no Neceſſity for the Soul to be *always thinking*; that is, *always in Action:* And the other affirms, that in certain Circumſtances, the *Action* of the Soul may be *interrupted, obſtructed* or *impeded.* Tho' whether this Agreement be

* P. 324. † Vol. p. 330.

in

in Appearance only, or not, will once more fall under Conſideration. But our Author thus proceeds —— "Who can ſay that ever he found "himſelf in a State of Unconſciouſneſs, or when "there was no Idea at all ſubſiſting in his "Mind*?" To the ſame Purpoſe he had before aſk'd, "who ever ſurprized himſelf at any "time, either aſleep or awake, impercipient or "in a State of pure Inaction; or was ~~he~~ ſure "he was, for the leaſt poſſible Time, in ſuch a "State†?" It may poſſibly be ſaid, that this is only aſking, whether a Man ever found himſelf *percipient* and *impercipient* at the ſame Time? And truely the ingenious Author himſelf ſeems to have much the ſame Opinion of it, ſince he immediately adds, —— "Indeed it is contradict-"ory that any Man ſhould ſo ſurprize himſelf, "impercipient to wit, of all Things, with re-"ſpect to the *preſent Time*: For he is conſcious "by Suppoſition, and reflecting upon an uncon-"ſcious State. And as to the paſt Time, he can-"not have any Memory of ſuch a State: For "whether ever ſuch a State *was*, or *was not*, it "is either Way a Contradiction that he ſhould "remember it; and he cannot bring an Argu-"ment for it, from his not remembring of it‡." Mr. *Locke* ſeems only to proceed upon this Suppoſition, that if his Mind "was *conſciouſly* em-"ployed for ſeveral Hours, during Sleep, it "would be *likely* he ſhould remember ſomething "of it, the inſtant he waked‖." I durſt ſay he never once dreamt, that a Man could either *forget* and remember at the ſame Time, or could remember that, which was *never once* preſent to his Thoughts. But our Author thus

* P. 331. † P. 271. Notes, ‡ P. 331. ‖ B. II. C. 1. § 13, 14, 18.

continues

continues his Argument, ———

" If a Man came through a dark Room, he " may be certain there was no Light there; for " his Eyes were open, and he miſſed the Light: " But if a Man paſſed an Hour of unconſcious " Exiſtence laſt Night, there is a wide Differ- " ence." ———

Who ever queſtioned it? — " He did not per- " ceive an Abſence of Conſciouſneſs then;" — *It would be ſtrange if he did.* —— " Nor can " he now; ſince he could do it but by re- " membring it. He hath not two diſtinct Con- " ſciouſneſſes, one to be extinguiſhed, and ano- " ther remaining to perceive the Abſence of the " firſt *." Moſt certainly he hath not: nor has Mr. *Locke* any where ſuggeſted the contrary.

Again, " it is eaſy, ſays our Author, for a " Man to confeſs, *that he hath one of thoſe dull* " *Souls, that doth not always perceive Ideas* †: " But I beg Leave to obſerve, that this *Mo-* " *deſty*, which is deſigned to paſs for an Argu- " ment, is ſomewhat *inaccurate*; for he confeſſes " a Thing for certain, which he can never be " certain of ‡."

Poor Mr. *Locke!* even his very *Modeſty*, when it appears in the Form of an *Argument*, is found to be *inaccurate!* the Reaſon here aſſign'd for this Charge of *Inaccuracy*, is afterwards further enlarged upon. But firſt, this Gentleman obſerves, that " it is not in the Power of the Soul " to become impercipient of Ideas *at Pleaſure*, " and [that] were the Thing effected, it would " be the Sign of an ill-diſpoſed Body, and not " of the Dulneſs of the Soul ‖."

Who it is that ſuppoſes it to be *in the Power of the Soul to become impercipient of Ideas at Plea-*

* P. 331. † B. II. C. 1. § 10. ‡ P. 332 ‖ Ibid

ſure

ſure, our Author ſays not. But that the Soul can thus become impercipient *at Pleaſure*, by means of an *ill-diſpoſed* Body, may perhaps admit of ſome Doubt.

Again, "it is ſtrange enough, ſays this Gentleman, to appeal to Experience for the Reality of a State, which, by Suppoſition, is an utter Negation of all Experience*." This relates to the following Paſſage in Mr. *Locke*,—

"And laſt of all, ſound Sleep cloſes the Scene quite, and puts an End to all Appearances. This, I think, almoſt every one has Experience of in himſelf, and his own Obſervation without Difficulty leads him thus far." B. II. C. 19. § 4. Upon which our Author thus remarks, —— "But this is only Experience of having no Memory of Conſciouſneſs then, which doth not infer that we had no Conſciouſneſs then. When an Evidence makes Oath, that his Memory doth not ſerve him ſo far, how much proves he by this? Nothing ſurely on either ſide. He only owns that the Point in Controverſy might have been ſo, or otherwiſe, for any thing he can remember. Mr. *Locke* ſays, B. II. C. 1. § 10. "The Queſtion is about a Matter of Fact." To this I reply directly, the "Queſtion is about a Matter of *Not-fact*; about a Negation of all Fact. Every Body allows we are generally conſcious; this is not the Queſtion then: But if we are ſometimes without Conſciouſneſs, it is abſurd to ſay, we forget our Unconſciouſneſs, it is abſurd to ſay, we remember our Unconſciouſneſs. Where is the Matter of Fact to

* P. 332, 333.

"be

" be teſtified to then? Or how is Experience ap-
" plicable? Let a Definition of Experience be
" given *."

Our Author has very rightly obſerved, that " *it*
" *is abſurd to ſay, we forget or remember our Un-*
" *conſciouſneſs.*" If it be enquired, who it is that is guilty of all this *Nonſenſe?* why, ſince Mr. *Locke* has appeal'd to *Experience*, where there *is an utter Negation of all Experience:* Where there is *no Matter of Fact to be teſtified to:* and where *Experience* is not *applicable*; the *Honour* of it, I preſume, belongs to him. But has not our Author himſelf appeal'd to *Experience* in much the ſame Caſe with Mr. *Locke?* For having told us, how far the Soul may *remit* its Activity in Thinking, does he not ſay, that *Experience* confirms *this?* 'Tis true he does; but then it certainly is with proper Caution, for he immediately adds, " — *as far as we can have Experience* †." And therefore ſince Mr. *Locke* has not thus guarded his Words; how do we know, but he appeals to *Experience* even *much farther*, than we *can* have Experience? However let us hear Mr. *Locke* as to the Paſſage laſt cited from him,—— " We know certainly by Experience, that we " ſometimes think, and thence draw this infal-
" lible Conſequence, that there is ſomething in
" us, that has a Power to think: But whether
" that Subſtance perpetually thinks, or no, we
" can be no farther aſſured, than Experience
" informs us. —— 'Tis doubted whether I
" thought all laſt Night, or no; the Queſtion
" being about a Matter of Fact, 'tis begging
" it, to bring as a Proof for it, an Hypotheſis,

*Ibid. in the Notes † Vol. I. p. 344.

" which

" which is the very Thing in Diſpute; by which " way one may prove any thing *."

The learned Reader will now judge, whether Sleeping *without* Thinking may moſt properly be call'd a *Matter of Fact*, or a Matter of *Not-Fact*: Whether Mr. *Locke* could be capable of any thing ſo extravagantly *abſurd*, as to appeal to Experience, where *no Experience* can be had; and whether the ingenious Author could have exerted himſelf more, in caſe Mr. *Locke* had appeal'd to the *Experience* and *Obſervations* of Mankind, even *during* their ſuppoſed *unconſcious* State.

But now, notwithſtanding it would be ridiculous to infer, that a Man was never *Conſcious* of any particular Action or Thought, either ſleeping or waking, becauſe he has now no *preſent Conſciouſneſs* of it; yet perhaps it may be a Queſtion, whether our Author himſelf might not think even this *Negative Proof* to have its Weight in ſome particular Caſes. Suppoſe then, for inſtance, that this Gentleman was examined, whether for ſeveral Nights laſt paſt, he has not been *conſcious* in his Sleep, of a *generous* Concern for the *cruel* Uſage, which the Memory of Mr. *Locke* has met with. Let us ſuppoſe him to anſwer, that, to the beſt of his Remembrance, Mr. *Locke* never employ'd any of his ſleeping Moments: and that, as far as he can recollect, he never had any Dream or Viſion relating to that Gentleman. All this may be very true; but what Satisfaction can it give, as to the Point enquired after? For Mr. *Locke*, might notwithſtanding, have engroſs'd our Author's whole laſt

* B. II. C. 1. § 10.

Night's Thoughts. His Want of Conſciouſneſs *now*, is no Proof he had no Conſciouſneſs *then*: He has indeed no *Memory* of ſuch Conſciouſneſs, and this Want of *Memory* is all he *experiences*; *but this doth not infer that he had no Conſciouſneſs* at the Time in Queſtion. So that, for any thing he can be ſure of, Mr. *Locke* may often have taken up his ſleeping Hours, and have made him his moſt humble Acknowledgments for all the *Favours* he had received from him.

It is true, our Author can be *as ſure* this *never* happen'd, as he can be *ſure* he never did any thing, of which he has not the leaſt Conſciouſneſs; becauſe the Foundation of his Aſſurance is the ſame in both Caſes; and that is, the Want of *preſent* Conſciouſneſs. But then we have ſeen, that there is no depending upon this; which *is only Experience of having no Memory of paſt Conſciouſneſs*. And beſides, "there is cer-"tainly a great deal of our paſt Conſciouſneſs, "which we retain no Memory of afterward. It "is, as this Gentleman obſerves, a particular "Mark of our finite and imperfect Natures, "that we cannot become conſcious of all our "paſt Conſciouſneſs at Pleaſure*."

Tho' after all, whether our Author can be perſuaded he was ever *conſcious* of ſuch a Scene, may poſſibly admit of ſome doubt. — However, he thus continues to preſs Mr. *Locke*, —— "No "Man, ſays he, at Night would infer, that he "was not in a State of Conſciouſneſs and Think-"ing *at ſuch a certain Minute* about twelve a-"Clock of the Day, becauſe now perhaps he "hath no Memory what particular Thought he

* Vol. I. p. 334.

had

"had at that *Minute*. And it is no better Ar-
"gument, conſidered in itſelf, that a Man was
"not conſcious *at ſuch a Minute*, in his Sleep,
"becauſe next Morning he hath no Memory o
"what Ideas were in his Mind then*." —— I readily agree with this learned Writer, that one of theſe Arguments is no better than the other; for indeed, if *Day* be changed into *Night*, there can appear no Difference between them. But poſſibly it may be here objected, that Mr. *Locke*'s Argument is not ſtated right. That he no where talks of a *ſingle Minute*, or ſuppoſes it *improbable* that a Man ſhould forget what he was thinking on, *at ſuch a Minute* either of Day or Night. But that he ſometimes mentions *four Hours* †; ſometimes *ſeveral Hours* ‡; and ſometimes *a long while together* ‖, and eſteems it to be unlikely that the Mind ſhould be conſciouſly employ'd all that time, and yet be able to recollect Nothing the Moment after **. However, as *four Hours* are a pretty large Portion of Time, for a Man to be thus employed to no Purpoſe; and as *ſeveral Hours*, and a *long while*, are very *indeterminate* Quantities; perhaps our Author, for the greater *Exactneſs*, or for ſome *other Reaſon*, choſe to reduce the latter to a *greater Certainty*, and to bring the former within a much *narrower Compaſs*.

But Mr. *Locke* has ſtill more to anſwer for. "If the *Soul*, ſays Mr. *Locke*, doth *think in a* "*ſleeping Man*, without being conſcious of it, "I aſk, whether, during ſuch Thinking, it has "any Pleaſure or Pain, or be capable of Hap-"pineſs or Miſery? I am ſure the Man is not,

* P. 334, 335. † B. II. C. 1. § 13. ‡ § 14. ‖ § 18
** Ibid.

" no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on.——
" Or if it be poſſible, that the Soul can, whilſt
" the Body is ſleeping, have its Thinking,
" Enjoyments, and Concerns, its Pleaſure, or
" Pain apart, which the Man is not conſcious
" of, nor partakes in: It is certain that *Socrates*
" aſleep, and *Socrates* awake, is not the ſame
" Perſon: But his Soul when he ſleeps, and *So-*
" *crates* the Man, conſiſting of Body and Soul
" when he is waking, are two Perſons *." And in the following Section, he maintains, that " they make the Soul and the Man two Perſons, " who make the Soul think apart, what the " Man is not conſcious of:" Juſt as *Caſtor* and *Pollux* would be two Perſons, upon a Suppoſition that only one Soul ſhould actuate both Bodies by turns †. Upon Occaſion of theſe two Sections, in which Mr. *Locke* endeavours to ſhew how groundleſs a Suppoſition it is, either that the Soul ſhould think without being conſcious of it; or that it ſhould have its Enjoyments, without the Knowledge of the Man, our Author thus expreſſes himſelf, —— " It were " to be wiſhed that he had told us, what Author " it is that aſſerts, that the Soul in a ſleeping " Man thinks, without being conſcious of it; " upon which he aſks the Queſtion, whether, " during ſuch Thinking, it has any Pleaſure, " or Pain, or be capable of Happineſs or Miſery? " and adds, *I am ſure the Man is not, no more* " *than the Bed or Earth he lies on.* Becauſe it is " ſtrange, if any Man put him to the Trouble " of confuting this Contradiction, with the Sup- " poſition of *Caſtor* and *Pollux*, *Socrates* and

* B. II. C. 1. § 11. † § 12.

Plato

" *Plato.* The Poſition his Adverſaries main-
" tain, infers no ſuch Contradiction; nor juſti-
" fies another to infer it for them *."

The learned Reader may eaſily judge how very properly this Gentleman here replies to Mr. *Locke.* But perhaps, if our Author had known what Perſon it is, who aſſerts, that *the Soul thinks in a ſleeping Man, without being conſcious of it*, he might have return'd Mr. *Locke* a more compleat and ſatisfactory Anſwer. Indeed it muſt be own'd, that if the *Poſition* of Mr. *Locke*'s *Adverſaries infers no Contradiction*, it cannot *juſtify* Mr. *Locke to infer it for them.* But as it is not eaſy to ſay, what that *Poſition* may infer, or how far Mr. *Locke* can be juſtified, without knowing what the Poſition is; ſo it is pity this Gentleman would not favour us with a Sight of it. However, as Mr. *Locke* has here made a falſe Inference for his Adverſaries; ſo in another Place †, he *doth not repreſent the Objection right* ‡. If we turn to to the Section refer'd to, we meet with theſe Words, —— " 'Twill perhaps be ſaid, that the " *Soul thinks*, even *in* the ſoundeſt *Sleep*, *but the* " *Memory retains it not.*" —— Can any one now diſcover what *Objection* is here repreſented *wrong?* May not This *be ſaid?* or does Mr. *Locke* affirm any thing more? But, alas, this is only the *Dwarf* before the *Giant.*

" We are, ſays our Author, by no Means " juſtified in Philoſophy, to draw weighty In-
" ferences, ſuch as that the Perfection of ratio-
" nal Thinking may depend upon Matter, or
" that *the Soul may owe its Perceptivity and Life,*

* P. 333, 334. † B. II. C. 1. § 14. ‡ P. 336. in the Notes.

" *to that dead Subſtance*; I ſay, we are by no " means juſtified in drawing ſuch weighty Infe- " ferences from a perplexed and dark Phæno- " menon, without narrowly examining the Na- " ture and Circumſtances of it, as far as they " are acceſſible to us*."

Some Readers would be glad to know, how far that Man is *juſtified* either in *Philoſophy*, or *Humanity*, who can *draw an Inference*, which deeply wounds his Neighbour's Character, *not* from a *perplexed* and *dark* State of Things; but in Defiance of the *cleareſt* and moſt *evident* Proofs, that his Neighbour is altogether *innocent?* Indeed as our Author has kept pretty well up to his firſt ſetting out; ſo, if a *poetical Juſtification* is ſufficient, I really think he is entitled to it.

——— *ſervetur ad imum*
Qualis ab incepto proceſſerit, et ſibi conſtet.
Hor. de Art. Poet. ℣. 126, &c.

But he thus proceeds. ——— " It is not to be " diſſembled by Mr. *Locke*'s greateſt Admirers, " that his Method of Reaſoning all along on " this Subject, tends to lead weak and ſceptical " Men, to make theſe Inferences; not to ſay " that *he points out the Way to them, by hinting* " *broadly at theſe Inferences himſelf* †." ——— The Gentleman who *can* get Leave of himſelf to inſinuate, that Mr. *Locke* has *broadly hinted*, that *the Soul may owe its Perceptivity and Life to dead Matter*, in expreſs Contradiction to what he conſtantly maintain'd ‡, need not ſcruple telling Mr. *Locke*'s *Admirers*, whatever he pleaſes; nor will

* P. 338. † P. 338, 339. ‡ See the Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 2—7.

thoſe

thoſe *Admirers* I believe be much ſurprized at it.

This Author has, in another Place well obſerv'd, that "it is eaſy to hoiſt our Sails, but "uncertain whither the Winds and Waves may "carry us*." And truly ſuch *Sailing* may happen to be the more dangerous; ſince we are informed by a learned Writer †, that Mr. *Locke* would ſometimes divert himſelf with ſetting Traps to catch the *Homines ad depugnandum paratos*. But whether our Author be one of thoſe, or not, who are *ſomewhat* inclined to pick Quarrels with that Gentleman, the judicious Reader muſt determine for himſelf. Be this as it will, the *Sails* of this ingenious Author are ſtill up, and Mr. *Locke* is cloſely purſued.

"It looks, ſays this Gentleman, as if he not "only thought it poſſible that Matter might "think, but true that the Soul was really Mat-"ter ‡. Pray let us attend to the Paſſage, from whence our Author has made this wonderful Diſcovery. "I grant, ſays Mr. *Locke*, that the "Soul in a waking Man is never without "Thought, becauſe it is the Condition of being "awake ‖." I preſume that the being *awake*, and *conſtantly Thinking* when *awake*, are, according to Mr. *Locke*, two Affections of *Matter*, and conſequently here is another *broad Hint* for *material Souls!* But then Mr. *Locke* adds, —— "whether ſleeping without Dreaming be not an "Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as "Body, may be worth a waking Man's Con-"ſideration ‡." Now if our Author had only ſaid, that this *looks as if the Soul was Matter*; this would merely have pointed out a Conſe-

* P. 365. in the Notes. † *Geometry no Friend to Infidelity*, p. 82. ‡ P. 339. ‖ B. II. C. 1. § 11. ‡ Ibid.

quence

quence of Mr. *Locke*'s Suppoſition, which poſſibly he was not aware of; but to affirm, *it looks as if Mr.* Locke thought *that true*, which he has manifeſtly declared he believed was *falſe* *; this, I may venture to ſay, is a Piece of *Civility*, which few Men of *Politeneſs* would offer to any but Mr. *Locke*. Beſides we have this further Remark, —— "*then it ſeems ſeparate Souls may* "*ſleep*." Ibid. It is ſubmitted to any Perſon who is thoroughly *awake*, whether Mr. *Locke* be there ſpeaking one Word of *ſeparate Souls*; but only of the *whole Man*, the whole *Compound* of Soul and Body united in their preſent State? He mentions not one Syllable of *ſeparate Souls*, or of *Immaterial Being* † [in general] which is ſtill worſe.

But where is the Offence, either againſt Religion or Philoſophy, to ſuppoſe the Soul liable even to many Inconveniences, whilſt united to the Body, and confined to a Priſon; to which it will not be ſubject when delivered from that Priſon? Does not our Author himſelf maintain —"It is certain that Sleep *hinders* and *deadens* the "active Power of the Soul ‡." And elſewhere,— "It is true, we know that in a State of Separa- "tion the Soul muſt be freed from all Reſtraint "and Impediment, becauſe *Union to Matter* limits and confines it ‖." But Mr. *Locke* having ſaid, that to be "always Thinking, always in "Action, is perhaps the Privilege of the infi- "nite Author and Preſerver of Things, *who* "*never ſlumbers nor ſleeps* ⸸,—— our Author obſerves, that "*God differs from his Creatures* "*in higher Prerogatives, than that he doth not* "*ſlumber nor ſleep* **."

*B. II. C. 23. § 15 laſt Edition. † P. 341. ‡ Vol. II. p. 68. ‖ P. 240. ⸸ B. II. C. 1. § 10. ** Vol. I. p. 339.

Therefore

Therefore, I ſuppoſe, he cannot differ from them in this! In another Place, Mr. *Locke* having obſerv'd that the *Attention* of the Mind in Thinking, admits of various Degrees; and that the Mind is ſometimes very *intent*, at others, very *remiſs*, he only infers it is "probable that "*Thinking is the Action, and not the Eſſence of* "*the Soul.* Since the Operations of Agents "will eaſily admit of *Intention*, and *Remiſſion*; "but the Eſſences of Things are not conceived "capable of any ſuch Variation *."

Our Author tells us here, that "this Argu- "ment is indeed ſpecious at firſt View, and yet "it is a very equivocal Argument, and concludes "different Ways, according to the different Ac- "ceptation of the Word *Eſſence.* Mr. *Locke* "grants that Thinking is Action, and ſup- "poſes Eſſence to be the internal, unknown "Conſtitution of Things, whereon their diſco- "verable Qualities depend. Now that Think- "ing or Action, which is a known Property of "the Soul, ſhould be the internal, unknown "Conſtitution of the Soul, is a Contradiction; "and proving the contrary, is proving what "was never denied †."

But now, notwithſtanding this peremptory Declaration, in which Mr. *Locke* appears as a moſt *ſolemn Trifler*, and is charged with uſing a very *equivocal Argument*; —— if there ſhould happen to be ſome Philoſophers, who eſteem *actual Thinking* to be the very *Eſſence*, and the whole *Subſtance* of the Soul, then the *proving the contrary*, is not *proving what was never denied.*

"*Conſcious Activity*, ſays an ingenious Writer,

*B. II. C. 19. § 3, 4. †P. 341, 342.

" is the *Eſſence* of every Spirit. *Cogitative* " *Power* is a *real Subſtance**. This *Power* never " ceaſes from *actual Exerciſe*, and is the *very* " *Subſtance* of the Soul. If the Soul *ceaſes* to " *think*, what is it of the Soul that then remains " exiſting? I confeſs I have no Idea of any thing " that remains †." Indeed thoſe Writers, that Mr. *Locke* oppoſes, ſeem to uſe *Eſſence* for an *inſeparable Property* ‡. But whatever they underſtood by it, if Mr. *Locke* uſed it in the ſame Senſe, how can he be ſuppoſed to *prove what was never denied*; or to take any Advantage of the *equivocal* Meaning of that Word? —— But does not Mr. *Locke* call the *internal Conſtitution* of Things, their *real Eſſence?* He does ſo. And therefore I ſuppoſe it follows, that whilſt thoſe Gentlemen talk'd only of an *inſeparable Property*, he artfully took Advantage of a *doubtful* Expreſſion, and what they maintain'd of a *known Property*, he denied of that *unknown Conſtitution*, on which that *very Property* depended! Indeed the great Misfortune is, this Suſpicion has nothing in the World to ſupport it. However our Author attacks his *Fallacy* again; but firſt objects to his Account of *real Eſſence*, —— " This, ſays he, is not the genuine Acceptation of the Word *Eſſence*. A late Author " hath rightly obſerved, that *Eſſence is explained* " *by the chief and radical Property of a thing, or* " *all the Properties of it.* —— *Eſſence* (as the ſame " Writer remarks) is very different from *Exiſtence:* The Eſſence, or Nature of Things " is *invariable*, and their Exiſtence only *contingent* ‖."

* *Philoſophical Eſſays* of Dr. *Watts*, p. 56. † P. 116. See alſo p. 52, 53, 164. ‡ B. II. C. 1 § 9. ‖ P. 342.

It

It is impoſſible for Mr. *Locke* to pleaſe this Gentleman with regard to *Eſſence*. One while he explains it by a Word, that rather imports the *actual Exiſtence* of a Thing, than its *internal Conſtitution:* at another, the *internal Conſtitution* of a Thing is not the *genuine Acceptation* of the Word *Eſſence*. Had Mr. *Locke* been ſo happy, as to hit upon *Radical Properties*, how much Trouble had he ſaved this ingenious Author? However, "from this we may ſee the Fallacy of "Mr. *Locke*'s Argument: He makes Eſſence the "internal, unknown Conſtitution of Things; "and becauſe it is contradictory that *Thought* "ſhould be of the Eſſence of the Soul in this "Senſe, he infers it is not of the Eſſence of the "Soul in the other Senſe, or ſo as to be inſepa-"rable from it*."

That Mr. *Lock infers* this, for this Reaſon, wants nothing but Proof. Again, Mr. *Locke*, in his Way of arguing "takes it for granted, "that if a Property doth not enter into the in-"ternal, unknown Conſtitution of a Subſtance, "it is ſeparable from that Subſtance; which ſtill "was the main Point to be proved; for, as has "been remarked [N°. 22.] a Property which ne-"ceſſarily flows from the internal Conſtitution "of any Subſtance, muſt as neceſſarily belong "to it, as that Conſtitution itſelf†."

Some of this Sort of *Properties*, our Author had mentioned before, ſuch as *Diviſibility*, *Figure*, and *Magnitude*‡. Theſe evidently are the *Properties*, which Mr. *Locke ſeems to take for granted* are *ſeparable* from Subſtance‖. If we demand, in what Part of his Works? We are, I

* Ibid. † P. 344, 345. ‡ P. 328. ‖ See the *Vindication of Mr.* Locke, p. 62—64.

preſume, to look for it *in his Way of arguing.* This has been conſidered before. But in the *ſame Place*, perhaps, this Gentleman has alſo found Mr. *Locke*'s *Inference*, to wit, that *Thinking* is not of the *Eſſence* of the Soul, in one Senſe; *becauſe* it is *contradictory* it ſhould be ſo, in another.— All Readers are not born to make the ſame happy Diſcoveries. But now, if *Thinking* be as *neceſſary* to the Soul, as *Diviſibility*, *Figure*, or *Magnitude* is to the Body; How comes it, that an *active* Being, a *thinking* Being, and a *free* Being, are *ſynonymous* Terms*? Surely *Action* and *Freedom* and *neceſſary* Properties, are not likewiſe *ſynonymous!* Indeed the Truth is, *Thinking* does not ſeem to ſtand every where in this Writer, for the *ſame Idea.* Its Meaning varies according to different Occaſions. Sometimes it is needful that *Thinking* and *Freedom* ſhould be the ſame. At N° 23. p. 330. he ſpeaks of *Thinking* in the Senſe of being *percipient* of ſome *Idea* or other. At the Beginning of his N° 24, it takes up both the *Action* and *Perception* of the Soul. At N° 25, he ſuppoſes *Thinking* to be *Action*, and a known *Property* of the Soul; and before he finiſhes that Number, *Thinking* ſeems to be dwindled into a mere *neceſſary* Perception.

At N° 26, it is a *neceſſary* Property, belonging to the *Eſſence* of the Soul; and this he endeavours to illuſtrate in the following Manner.

"Figure, ſays our Author, is but a Property "of Matter, and a variable Property; for it "may be changed in the ſame individual Quan-"tity; yet this variable Property *invariably* and "*inſeparably* belongs to Matter. So Thinking

* Vol. I. p. 203. in the Notes. † P. 345.

"(allowing

" (allowing it a variable Property) may invari-
" ably belong to the Soul †."

That *Thinking*, whether it be call'd *Eſſence*, *Property*, or *Action*, is certainly *variable*, I believe no Man ever queſtioned, that could but look into his own Mind. And that it may, in ſome Degree or other, *invariably* [or *inceſſantly*] *belong to the Soul*, is no inconceivable Suppoſition. But whether what is here advanced in relation to *Figure*, will ſolve Mr. *Locke*'s Objection, the learned Reader muſt determine. " The Opera-
" rations of Agents, ſays Mr. *Lockee* will eaſi-
" ly admit of *Intention* and *Remiſſion*; but the
" *Eſſences* of Things are not conceived capable
" of any ſuch Variation *." However our Author has found an *inſeparable* Property, which is capable of *Variation*. I hope *Figure* is not a *radical* Property: Since *radical* Properties, I think, have already been pronounced *invariable*.—
" *Eſſence*, we have been told, *is the chief, and*
" *radical Property of a Thing, or all the Proper-*
" *ties of it*. And *the Eſſence or Nature of Things*
" *is invariable* †."

And yet, if it be not as *radical* a Property as *Thinking*, what is it here brought for? But be this as it will; of what *Variation* is *Figure* capable? Is it capable of *Intention* and *Remiſſion?* Is a Triangle a *more intenſe* Figure, than a Square? Or what other *Variation* is Mr. *Locke* ſpeaking of? He does not ſay, that the *inſeparable* Properties of Things are not conceived capable of *any* Variation. He knew certainly that the *ſame individual Quantity* of Paſte or Wax, in any Shape, or Figure whatever, might be *varied* into a *Triangle*, a *Square*, or a *Circle*. But he ſays, that

* B. II. C. 19. § 4. † P. 342.

the

the *Eſſences* of Things (or if this Gentleman likes it better, the *eſſential* or *inſeparable* Properties of them) are not conceived capable of any *ſuch* Variation. And what can this relate to, but *Intention* and *Remiſſion?* Or what Analogy is there between theſe, and the *Figure* of Body? But our Author tells us, ——— "it is only the "*Exerciſe* of the Power, not the *Power* itſelf, "which is ſubject to the Variation of being *in-* "*tended* or *remitted.* This doth not make the "*Power* itſelf ſeparable from the Soul*." — Who in the Name of Wonder ever ſaid it did? When Mr. *Locke* mentions the *Action* or *Operation* of the Soul, are we to underſtand by theſe, the *Power*, or the *Exerciſe* of that Power? However, even "the *Exerciſe* itſelf of this "Power is not ſeparable, ſays our Author, from "free or active Beings, ſince, as hath been "ſhewn [N° 8.] ſuch Beings are not free to "act, or utterly to abſtain from all Action, but "to do this or that Action by a Preference†." I preſume this Gentleman will allow, that *ſo far* as any Being is *not free* to act, *ſo far* he is *no free* Being: Otherwiſe *Freedom* and *Neceſſity* will, in ſome Caſes, be juſt the ſame Thing.

Again, "Life itſelf, ſays our Author, con- "ſiſts in being percipient, in this we are neceſ- "ſary. And if we are percipient, we muſt "have Perceptions, by the Terms. Thus it is "very conceivable that the Soul ſhould *remit* its "Activity in Thinking, through all Degrees, "till at length it can *remit* no farther, and finds "itſelf neceſſary in having ſome Perception or "other‡."

Well then, the Soul may *remit* its *Activity* "in Thinking, till it finds itſelf only in ſuch a

*P. 345. †P. 346. ‡P. 344.

neceſſary

neceſſary percipient State, as *Life* itſelf conſiſts in. That is, according to this Gentleman's former Definitions, *till it finds itſelf* in a State of *not Thinking*. For does not *Thinking* imply *Active Perception*, or *Activity* joined with *Perceptivity**? Is not *Thinking* the ſame as *Action*†? Does not *Thinking* imply *the turning the perceptive Capacity from one Perception to another, by an Act of the Will*‡? Is not the Want of ſuch a Power, the very Reaſon why *Brutes* are not ſuffer'd to be *thinking* Creatures, tho' they are allow'd to have *Perceptions*‖? And therefore how can the Soul be ſaid to *think*, when it has *remitted its Activity in Thinking, through all Degrees*, and has nothing remaining but thoſe *neceſſary Perceptions*, in which the very *Life* of the Soul *conſiſts*? However let this Gentleman have his Liberty. Let him ſometimes uſe the Word for *Action*, or *active* Perception, and let it be ſynonymous with *Freedom*; eſpecially when *Brutes* are not ſuffered to *think*. And at other Times, let the Word ſtand for *neceſſary* Perceptions, or be ſynonymous with *neceſſary* Property; yet, if by *Thinking* Mr. *Locke* principally means "that Sort of "Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, where-"in the Mind is active;" as his own Words manifeſtly imply ⸸; It is then ſubmitted, whether our Author does not here acknowledge, that the Soul may ſo far *remit its Activity in Thinking*, till, in one chief Senſe of the Word, it really *thinks* no longer?

It is true indeed, that two or three Pages beyond this he thus expreſſes himſelf, ——

* P. 190. † P. 324, ‡ P. 203 in the Notes.
‖ P. 190. ⸸ B. II. C. 9. § 1.

"The

" The Soul may *ſlacken* and *remit* its Activity " more and more, to a certain Degree, till it " can go no farther upon the Side of Inactivity: " But ſtill it muſt have ſome Perception or o- " ther in *View*. And when we have come this " Length, if we would endeavour to keep this " *one ſolitary* Perception, ſtill in view, and be " no farther active, we ſhall find a prodigious " Difficulty in it, or to ſpeak more truly, it is " impoſſible with all the *Care* and *Attention* we " can *beſtow*. Now doth not this ſhew us, that " when we would endeavour to be inactive be- " yond a certain Degree, *we encreaſe the Activity* " by that very Endeavour *?

If it ſhould be now ſaid, that this Gentleman has been entirely miſunderſtood; and that, he ſuppoſes it impoſſible for the Soul to be one Moment *inactive*; but that, let it *remit* as much as it *can*, it muſt however be perpetually varying its *Ideas*. And that the Soul can no more ſuſpend the Exerciſe of its *active* Powers, in this reſpect, than it can prevent its *paſſive Perceptions*; and that all he has ſaid about the *Thinking* or *Action* of the Soul being *interrupted*, *impeded*, or *obſtructed*, muſt be underſtood in a Senſe perfectly conſiſtent with the *inceſſant Action* and *Operation* of it:—— If this be really ſo, the Queſtion then is, whether our Author has expreſſed himſelf altogether ſo *clearly* as might well have been expected from ſo good a Writer? But however, let his Meaning be what it will; let it be allowed that he has demonſtrated the *inceſſant Thinking* † of the Soul, either in *one* Senſe, or in *every* Senſe whatever; yet what has our Au-

* P. 347, in the Notes. † P. 343, 344. 347—349, in the Notes.

thor

thor done by this Demonſtration? Why, after *various* Toil and Labour; after treating a great and worthy Man, as *no Man* could wiſh to be treated himſelf, and as *few good* Men would ever chuſe to treat others; —— he has proved the *Miſtake* of a certain *Hypotheſis*, which, according to his own Confeſſion, *is of no very great Conſequence in itſelf* !*

Upon the whole, it is refer'd to the Judgment of every diſpaſſionate Reader, whether, if this learned Author had been leſs liberal of his Criticiſms upon Mr. *Locke*, he would have *much* diminiſh'd the *intrinſick* Value of his own excellent Book? And withal, whether this Gentleman did not deſign to be underſtood with *ſome Exception*, when he affirms in ſo many Words, that "we *never* had a *diſintereſted* Examiner of "other Men's Notions †?"

* P. 320. † P. 634, in the Notes.

REFLECTIONS
ON
Some Paſſages of Dr. WATTS's *Philoſophical Eſſays.*

THIS Gentleman having ſuggeſted, that Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſed *ſome* Matter might be *cogitative* *, Notice has been already taken of it †, and the Suggeſtion, I preſume, ſhewn to be entirely groundleſs: However, till the contrary appears, I ſhall leave it with what has been before obſerved upon it; and proceed to conſider ſome other Objections of this ingenious Writer.

But firſt, the Doctor ſeems to think, that Mr. *Locke* is guilty of ſome Inconſiſtency with regard to *Subſtance*; as if he had ridiculed the Notion of it in ſome Places, and defended it in others. "Tho' Mr. *Locke*, ſays this Gentleman, would

* P. 62. † Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 6, 7.

ſeem

" ſeem to exclude and abandon any *general No-*
" *tion of Subſtance*, as another real, phyſical di-
" ſtinct Being, provided to ſupport all its real,
" or ſuppoſed Accidents or Qualities, and ſeems
" to banter it by the *Indian's unknown ſomething*,
" *which ſupports the Tortoiſe, which ſupports the*
" *Elephant, which ſupports the World*; yet he too
" often repreſents this Notion of *Subſtance* as
" ſome real *unknown* Thing or Being, which
" holds the Properties in Union, and which is
" different from all thoſe Things, which he calls
" *Qualities* or *Properties*, and which ſupports
" them all in Exiſtence; tho' he owns, *we know*
" *it not*, and have no Idea of it: And thus he
" ſeems to build again, and maintain the very
" Notion which he before deſtroyed *." And elſewhere, " thus we ſee he maintains his Notion " of a *general Subſtance*, which he had before " ridiculed †."

Moſt certain it is, that Mr. *Locke* frequently affirms, the *Subſtance* of Things is unknown to us. And he juſtly *ridicules* all Pretences towards clearing up the Myſtery, by ſaying it is *that*, which ſupports *Accidents:* Since this leaves us as much in the dark, as the *Indian*'s unknown *ſomething*, which ſupports the *Tortoiſe*. But where is the Inconſiſtency between this, and maintaining that there muſt be a *Subſtance* for the Support of *Qualities* or *Properties*; — that this *Subſtance*, tho' unknown, is diſtinct from ſuch *Qualities*, and that they cannot ſubſiſt without it ‡?

* P. 49. See alſo p. 47, 48. † P. 62. This relates to p. 66. of Mr. *Locke*'s firſt Letter to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*.
‡ See B. I. C. 4. § 18. B. II. C. 13. § 18—20. C. 23. § 2, 3, 6. 23. C. 31. § 13.

Mr. *Locke* had been before charged, with *almoſt diſcarding Subſtance out of the World:* But let us juſt hear what he ſays for himſelf. Having quoted ſeveral Paſſages out of his own *Eſſay*, he thus remarks, —— "theſe, and the like "Faſhions of ſpeaking intimate, that the Sub- "ſtance is ſuppoſed *always ſomething*, beſides the "Extenſion, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Think- "ing, or other obſervable Idea, though we "know not what it is." Again, "as long as "there is any ſimple Idea, or ſenſible Quality "left, according to my Way of arguing, Sub- "ſtance cannot be diſcarded, becauſe all ſimple "Ideas, all ſenſible Qualities, carry with them "a Suppoſition of a *Subſtratum* to exiſt in, and "of a Subſtance wherein they inhere *." Moreover, it having been objected, that his *Simile* about the *Elephant* and *Tortoiſe* was to *ridicule the Notion of Subſtance*, and the Europæan *Philoſophers for aſſerting it*, Mr. *Locke* refers to the very Section †, on which the Charge is founded, to prove he had no ſuch Intention: But ſays, thoſe Paſſages were "to ſhew, that though *Subſtance* "did ſupport Accidents, yet Philoſophers, who "had found ſuch a Support neceſſary, had no "more a clear Idea of what that Support was, "than the *Indian* had of that, which ſupported "his *Tortoiſe*, tho' ſure he was, it was ſome- "thing ‡."

So that now ſuppoſing, that Mr. *Locke* had at firſt ſo expreſs'd his Sentiments, in relation to *Subſtance*, that it might be thought, he really deſign'd to *ridicule* the Notion of it, or *diſcard* its very Being *out of the World*; yet after he has

* Firſt Letter to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, p. 9, 10.
† B. II. C. 13 § 19. ‡ Third Letter, p. 379.

ſo

ſo clearly told us his Meaning, and that he had no ſuch Deſign; —— what could poſſibly induce an ingenious Gentleman to repeat a ſtale Objection, which Mr. *Locke* himſelf, had long ſince anſwered? But the Doctor further obſerves, that " if the *Subſtance of Body*, and the *Subſtance* " *of Mind* be ſo much unknown, then the Sub- " ſtance of Body may be the ſame with the " Subſtance of Mind, for ought we know to " the contrary. If we know nothing of this " Subſtance, but that it is ſomething that ſub- " ſiſts by itſelf, and upholds and unites Proper- " ties, how can we tell but that the very ſame " individual Subſtance, may be the *Subſtratum*, " or Subject both of *ſolid Extenſion* with all its " Modes, and of *Thinking* with all its Modes, " and may unite the Modes, or Properties of " Body and Mind together*?"

Again, " If this Subſtance or *Subſtratum* be " ſo unknown a Thing, as Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes, " how can I deny any thing concerning it? or " at leaſt how can I be ſure that God and the " material World have not one common Sub- " ſtance†?"

But now, if it can be demonſtrated, as it certainly may, and as this Gentleman affirms it has been, by many learned Writers‡, that *Matter cannot think*; does it not evidently follow, that *Thinking* can only be the proper Attribute of an *immaterial* Being? And therefore tho' we ſhould never know the very Subſtances of Things themſelves; yet we may be abundantly aſſured, from their well known Properties, that the *Subſtance* of *Body*, is not the ſame with the *Sub-*

*P. 61. †P. 63, ‡P. 115. He mentions particularly Dr. *Clarke*, Dr. *Bentley*, Mr. *Grove*, and Mr. *Ditton*.

ſtance

ſtance of *Mind*; and that *God* and the *material World*, neither have, nor can have, *one common Subſtance*. And beſides, theſe Things have been fairly demonſtrated by thoſe very Men, who acknowledged their Ignorance, as to what the inmoſt Nature of Subſtance might be*. Indeed, if the very *Subſtance* of Spirit, was a *Power* of *Thinking always in Act*, as this Gentleman maintains, and if *Nothing remained of the Soul, when it ceas'd to think* †, the attempting to prove that the *Subſtance* of *Body* was not the *Subſtance* of *Mind*, would be only proving that *actual Thinking*, and a *marble Statue* were different Things. Nor would there, one might hope, be much Difficulty in convincing Men, that theſe Things were not the *ſame*.

But ſince the Generality of Men have been accuſtom'd to ſuppoſe, that *Powers* and *Properties* are one Thing, and *Subſtance* another: And ſince, if there really be a *Subſtance* diſtinct from all ſuch *Powers* and *Properties*, the inmoſt Nature of it ſeems to be conceal'd from us; it may therefore be ſubmitted, whether demonſtrably proving that *Thought* and *Conſciouſneſs* cannot ariſe from a *material Syſtem*, be not a rational Method to convince Men, that *Thinking* is by no Means a *Mode* of *Matter?*

However it is ſtill urged, that upon Mr. *Locke*'s Hypotheſis, "our own Souls may be "material Beings, for ought we know, and "conſequently diviſible and mortal ‡."

* As to the latter, ſee Hum. Und. B. IV. C. 10. And as to both, ſee Dr. *Clarke's* firſt Vol. of *Boyle*'s Lectures, and Preface to the ſecond. And to mention no other, ſee the Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul.* What he thinks of our Knowledge of Subſtance, ſee Vol. I. p 323, 324, in the Notes, and p. 328. † P. 52. 116. ‡ P. 62.

I pre-

I preſume it has been ſhewn *, that Mr. *Locke* very firmly believed both the *Indiviſibility* and *Immortality* of the Soul. It is true, the Doctor here only mentions the Conſequence of that, which Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes might be effected by *Omnipotence*. But will this Gentleman maintain, that the Soul, upon his own *Hypotheſis*, is *ſecurer* of *Immortality*, than upon that, which Mr. *Locke* mentions? Tho' even this, 'tis evident, he mentions only as a bare *Poſſibility*, and not as his own Opinion †. However, will the Doctor's *Hypotheſis* better ſecure the Soul, than Mr. *Locke*'s, from the Power of that *Being* who created it? Or can he think of any *firmer Baſis*, to reſt the *Immortality* of the Soul upon, than the *Veracity*, the *Power*, the *Goodneſs* and *Juſtice* of God?

The learned Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, whoſe *Zeal* for Mr. *Locke* has been already conſidered, not only acknowledges, that Mr. *Locke* "allows the Soul "is *Immaterial:*" But tells us, that "Mr. *Locke* "hath *well obſerved*, that they are different Con- "ſiderations, that prove the Soul *immortal* and "*immaterial* ‡." And tho' that Author be as ſtrenuous an Aſſertor of the Soul's *Immateriality*, as ever wrote in Defence of it; yet he ſuppoſes, he has ſhewn the Folly of thoſe, "who, to prove "the Soul *mortal*, think it enough, if it were "ſhewn *material* ‖."

How far the ingenious Dr. *Watts* may give into this Opinion, which is here condemn'd; and how far he may be wrong, in ſo doing, the learned Reader muſt determine.

* Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 2—6. 9, 10, 14. † Ibid. p. 2—6. ‡ Vol. I. p. 194, 195. ‖ P. 294. ſee alſo p. 242—245. in the Notes.

But

But now, tho' the Doctor does not miſtake Mr. *Locke*'s Meaning about the *Mobility* of Spirits*, as the learned Author, juſt mentioned, certainly does; yet he will not allow that *Mobility* belongs to them.

He ſuppoſes that Spirits are neither *extended*, nor have any *Relation* to Place†. That they do not properly *exiſt* or reſide *any where*; but that it may be philoſophically ſaid, *they exiſt or reſide no where*‡. It is therefore no Wonder, he will not allow them a *Power to move themſelves* from one Place to another. For it is certain, as he obſerves, that "if *Mobility* be aſcrib'd to Spi-"rits, or a Power to change their Place, then it "neceſſarily follows that *they are in a Place*‖." Whereas on the contrary, if they are properly in *no Place*, or *no where*; it really ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould move *any where*.

The ingenious Author ſays a great deal to ſupport his Opinion; but I wiſh his *Metaphyſics* are not too *abſtracted* for the Generality of Readers. For tho' the Doctor tells us, that "Spirits pro-"perly belong to another Rank of Natures, ano-"ther World of Beings, which require only Acti-"vity and Conſciouſneſs, and do not require any "proper Situation to be given them, any Space "to poſſeſs or *Place* to exiſt or reſide in†;" yet how is it poſſible to conceive (for me I am ſure it is not) that any real Being ſhould be *active* and *conſcious*, without being active and conſcious *ſomewhere?* He ſays indeed, that "tho' a Body "cannot be without Being *ſomewhere*; yet a Spi-"rit, which is a conſcious active Power, may "have a real Exiſtence, and yet have *no proper*

* See his Eſſays, p. 132, 147. † P. 296. ‡ P. 161, 162. ‖ P. 147. † P. 162.

Place;

" *Place*; that is, may reſide, or be ſituated *no* " *where* in the Senſe he has explain'd it, *i. e.* " have no Proximity of Situation to Bodies, or " fill up no ſuppoſed Dimenſions of Space *." And moreover, that " our Spirits act immedi- " ately upon our Bodies, and receive Senſations " from them †."

If the Doctor had only maintain'd, that Spirits are not in *any Place*, or *any where*, in *ſuch* a Manner, as to exclude either Body, or Spirit, from that *very Place*, I could eaſily, I think, have underſtood it; but how Spirits can *act*, and be *acted* upon, without being *ſomewhere*; or how they can *really exiſt*, as ſo many *Subſtances* ‡, and yet not be *nearer* to, or *farther* from, every finite Being in the Univerſe, is a Piece of re- fin'd *Metaphyſics*, which muſt always be admi- red, even by thoſe, who can never underſtand it. But Mr. *Locke* is again attack'd in relation to Spirits, in the following Article of *Identity*. This Gentleman ſays, that Mr. *Locke*, " having " written more intelligibly on this Subject [of " Identity] than preceding Philoſophers, grows " bold, and aſſerts, that the Difficulty of this " Subject ariſes from Names ill uſed, rather " than from any Obſcurity in the Thing itſelf; " and that 'tis want of Care and Attention that " has clouded and confounded the Thoughts of " Men." And then the Doctor proceeds to ob- ſerve, that " in his general Scheme of *Identity*, " and *Diverſity*, as well as in his particular Ap- " plication hereof to *Body*, *Mind*, *Plant*, *Ani- " mal*, &c. he has performed with great Inge- " nuity." Tho' the Doctor thinks " there re- " main ſome Difficulties to remove ‖."

* P. 164. † P. 162. 165, 166. ‡ P. 52, 53. ‖ P. 295.

The Reader will judge, from what has been before obſerv'd on Dr. *Butler*'s *Diſſertation*, whether it be not a juſt Remark of Mr. *Locke*, that the chief Difficulty *ariſes from Names ill uſed.*

As to Mr. *Locke*'s growing *bold*, tho' it may ſound a little harſh to ſome Readers; yet I durſt ſay the Doctor meant nothing worſe, than *valiant* or *couragious*. In which Senſe, *Virgil* ſeems to uſe *audax* and *audentior* *, and *Homer*, τολμήεις†

But Mr. *Locke* is of opinion, that Spirits, as well as Bodies, "muſt each of them exclude "any of the ſame Kind, out of the ſame Place: "Becauſe otherwiſe the Notions and Names of "*Identity* and *Diverſity* would be in vain, and "there could be no ſuch Diſtinction of Subſtances, "or any thing elſe, one from another ‡." Upon which the Doctor obſerves, that this "is not "only oppoſed by the vulgar Philoſophers, "who ſuppoſe a thouſand *Minds* may be in the "ſame *ubi*, but 'tis very diſagreeable alſo with "the juſter Notion of a *Mind*, which being not "extended and having no relation to Place, "can neither be ſaid to admit, or exclude Fellow "Minds from the ſame Place ‖."

As it is impoſſible that *Fellow Minds* ſhould *admit* or *exclude* one another from the *ſame Place*, which never were in *any* Place; So it muſt be allow'd that Mr. *Locke*'s Language is not exactly ſuited to the Doctor's Hypotheſis.

But it is much this Author ſhould oppoſe the *vulgar Philoſophers*, as he calls them, to Mr. *Locke:* Since having himſelf deprived Spirits even of their *ubi*, which has been allotted them by ſeveral, as a more becoming Habitation than

* Æneid. IV. ℣ 615. VI. ℣ 95. IX. ℣ 625. † Iliad. κ. ℣ 205. ‡ B. II. C 27. § 2. ‖ P. 296.

Locus;

Locus; — moreover, having himſelf ſmiled at the *Diſtinction* which is made between theſe two Names; and withal having plainly intimated that Spirits can be in neither, but they muſt be *circumſcribed**, in expreſs Contradiction to the Doctrine of the *Schools*, viz. that a Spirit is only *definitivè in loco*; I ſay, for theſe Reaſons, he might have been ſilent on this Head; ſince he lies equally expoſed with Mr. *Locke* to the Cenſure and Diſpleaſure of thoſe Gentlemen.

However the Doctor thus proceeds, —— "If "Minds were extended, why may not two cre- "ated Minds be in the ſame Place, and pene- "trate each other, as well as [Mr. *Locke*] ſup- "poſes God, the infinite Mind, to penetrate all "Minds, and all Bodies whatſoever? Muſt God "be the *ſame* with all Minds, becauſe he pene- "trates all Minds? If a Spirit be never ſo little "denſer than Space, 'tis Matter; and if Spirits "be no denſer than Spaces, why may they not "penetrate each other, as well as both Space "and Spirit are ſuppoſed to penetrate Matter? "I thought it had been a peculiar Property of "Matter to be impenetrable by a Being of its "own kind. What? is Spirit, impenetrable "by Spirit too? Can a Spirit penetrate the "groſſeſt Matter, and yet not penetrate that "thin Extenſion of a fellow Spirit, which is "finer than the moſt refined Matter, and as te- "nuious and unſolid as Space itſelf, as mere "Emptineſs †?"

What a ſtrange Metaphyſician was Mr. *Locke!* He makes a manifeſt Difference between the *infinite* Spirit *penetrating* every Subſtance; and one *finite* Spirit *penetrating* another! That is, he ſup-

*P. 147, 148. †P. 296.

poſes that the *Omnipreſence* of the Eternal and Unchangeable Creator, can occaſion no Doubt concerning his *Identity:* Whereas if *finite* Spirits did not "exclude each other out of the ſame "Place, he thinks the Notions and Names of "Identity and Diverſity would be in vain, and "there could be no ſuch Diſtinction of Sub-"ſtances*." Let the learned Reader judge of his Miſtake. The Doctor indeed ſeems greatly ſurprized, that Mr. *Locke* ſhould not allow an *extended*, *finite* Spirit to be *penetrable* by another; a Being as *unſolid* as *Space* itſelf: That is, if I rightly underſtand the Doctor, as *unſolid*, as juſt *Nothing* at all †.

But has not Mr. *Locke* given a Reaſon, why every finite Spirit ſhould have a Place peculiar to itſelf?

However to this the Doctor replies, "that e-"very Spirit is ſufficiently diſtinguiſh'd from all "others, by its particular Cogitations, and Con-"ſciouſneſs ‡."

Let us firſt ſuppoſe, that all the finite Spirits in the Univerſe were extended, and that a thouſand of them penetrated each others Subſtance; and were thus in the Language of the *School-men* in the ſame *ubi*. Now, notwithſtanding each would have a Conſciouſneſs of its own, and ſo be ſenſible of its particular Exiſtence, Pains, or Pleaſures; it may be aſk'd, whether any one of them could diſtinguiſh its own Subſtance from that of another? Or whether any other finite Spirit whatever could thus diſtinguiſh? And conſequently whether, as Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes, "the "Notions and Names of *Identity* and *Diverſity* "would not be in vain," in ſuch a *Jumble* of Sub-

*B. II. C. 27. § 2. † See p. 40. 116. ‡ P. 296.

ſtances?

ſtances? Two Drops of Water, or two Globules of Quickſilver, would, I think, be full as *diſcernible* from each other, after they were incorporated, as ten thouſand Spirits, who had penetrated each others Dimenſions. And therefore it is ſubmitted, whether for a proper *Diſtinction of Subſtances* of the ſame kind, a *Diſtinction of Place* be not abſolutely neceſſary?

But now ſuppoſing theſe Beings to be *unextended* *, and that a *Power of Thinking* is the very *Subſtance* of Spirit †, it would then be an odd kind of Jargon, to talk of one Spirit's *Power of Thinking* penetrated by the *Power of Thinking* of another. So that notwithſtanding this Author ſeems to plead ſo ſtrenuouſly for the *Penetrability* of Spirits, 'tis plain that his own *Hypotheſis* will not admit of it, any more than Mr. *Locke*'s; tho' he was willing to ſhew what Arguments might be brought againſt that Gentleman. Indeed there is this Difference between the two Hypotheſes, that, whilſt the one will not *admit* fellow Minds into the *ſame Place*, the other will neither *admit* or *exclude* them ‡.

The Dr. next proceeds to obſerve, that Mr. *Locke* "makes the *Identity of Vegetable and Ani-*
"*mal* Beings, to conſiſt in a Participation of
"the ſame continued Life by conſtantly fleeting
"Particles of Matter in Succeſſion vitally united
"to the ſame organized Body ‖." Here, ſays this Gentleman, "I aſk Leave to remark, firſt,
"perhaps it would be too hard to aſk this Au-
"thor ** to explain with great Exactneſs what
"he means here by *Life* and *vitally*; the ſame

* P. 296. † P. 116. ‡ P. 296. ‖ B. II. C. 27. § 4, 5, 6. ** The Doctor here takes Notice, that Mr. *Locke* was living, when this was wrote.

Life

" *Life* in a Plant cannot ſignify the ſame Juice, " or nutritive Particles; for it may be tranſ- " planted from Clay to Chalk, or from a Bed of " Earth to a Bottle of Water, and ſtill 'tis the " ſame Plant. Nor can *Life* mean the ſame " Tubes, or the ſame Channels betwixt the " Fibres, for they may by Degrees be obſtruct- " ed, and new ones found or formed, till the " old are narrowed, withered, and grown im- " pervious to the Juice. Nor can *Life* mean the " ſame Method of Motion of that Juice thro' " the Plant; for if you bend the Head of a " Plant down to the Earth, and let its Top " take Root, as may be done to Vines or Bram- " bles, then cut off the old Stalk near its firſt " Root, and the Paſſage of the nouriſhing " Juice will be juſt contrary, and yet perhaps " 'tis the ſame Plant ſtill. I would aſk further, " when the Graft of a Pearmain has grown three " Months, or ſeven Years, upon the Stock of a " Crab, is it the ſame Tree? Has it the ſame " Life, or has it not *?"

I beg Leave here firſt to obſerve, that ſince we are not ſo happy as to have Mr. *Locke*'s Explanation of his own *Meaning*, we can only gueſs at it. Tho' I will venture to believe, he would have found no manner of Difficulty in *explaining* himſelf, even *with great Exactneſs* —— But now, whatever Plant or Tree is capable of receiving Nouriſhment, whether from *Chalk*, or *Clay*, or *Water*, or each of them alternately; let the *old Tubes* or *Channels wither*, and *new* one's be *formed*; or let the Nouriſhment ſuch Tree receives, be diſtributed in any manner or Direction whatever; yet whilſt ſuch Nouriſh-

*P. 297, 298.

ment

ment was continued, would not that Tree be ſaid to have a *vegetable Life?* And whilſt ſuch *Life* was not interrupted by any Accident, might it not be ſaid to be the *ſame Life?* And whatever was ſo *united* to that Tree, as to partake of that *common Life* with it, might not this be ſaid to be *vitally united* ?*

And therefore, whether the *Pearmain* growing upon the Stock of a *Crab*, be eſteem'd *one* and the *ſame Tree*, or not (in either of which Views, it may appear to different Men, according to their ſeveral *Ideas* † of a Tree) yet whilſt the *Graft* and *Stock* are ſo *united*, as to partake of one *common Life*, might they not be ſaid to have the *ſame Life*, as much as any other Tree, and its Branches?

The ingenious Author thus proceeds, —— "I might ſay the like concerning the Life of "Animals. It can't be the ſame Blood, that is "the *ſame Life*; for in a few Months perhaps, "we have few of the ſame Particles of Blood as "before; however by Dr. *Lower*'s Experiment "of *Tranſfuſion*, it may be all changed in an Hour. "Nor can the ſame Veins, or Veſſels, make "the *ſame Life*, for they are the ſame when the "Animal is dead, or they may be changed in "Life-time. Nor is it the ſame Motion of the "Blood and Juices, that makes the *ſame Life*; "for individual Motion can't be communicated "to ſucceſſive Parts of Matter, ſince 'tis periſh-"ing every Moment, as [Mr. *Locke*'s] ſecond "Section aſſures us ‡."

Whatever that may conſiſt in, which is call'd *Animal Life*; whether in a certain *Motion from*

* See Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 4. † Ibid. § 28, 29.
‡ P. 298.

within

within, as Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes*; or *only in the Heat of the Heart*, as the famous *Des Cartes* maintains †; or howſoever it is kindled up by the Great Author of Nature; yet as long as any Creature enjoyed ſuch *Life* without Interruption, tho' it be communicated to *conſtantly fleeting Particles*; tho' the *Blood*, the *Veſſels*, and the Motion of the *Fluids* undergo never ſo many Alterations; yet whilſt ſuch Life is enjoy'd by the ſame Animal without Interruption, might it not be call'd the *ſame continued Life* ‡?

But "If a Tree, or Animal, ſays the Doctor be "dead for ſome time, and by Almighty Power "new Life and vital Motion be given to the "ſame Matter, 'tis a different Life, according "to [Mr. *Locke*;] for 'tis not the ſame continu-"ed Life, yet it ſeems to be the ſame Plant, "and the ſame Animal ‖."

If any thing ſo extraordinary ſhould have happened, let us ſuppoſe Mr. *Locke* would have call'd one the *ſame* Plant, and the other the *ſame* Animal, *reſtored to Life*. If we ſuppoſe this, would ſo remarkable a Caſe any way injure his general Deſcription either of *vegetable* or *animal Identity*?

However the Doctor afterwards approves of what Mr. *Locke* ſuppoſes is neceſſary to conſtitute the *ſame Man***, and then proceeds to conſider what is ſaid of *Perſonal Identity*; but firſt he makes the following Quotation out of Mr. *Locke*, "A *Perſon* is a thinking intelligent Being, "which has Reaſon and Reflection, and can "conſider itſelf as itſelf, the ſame thinking "Thing in different Times and Places; which

* B. II. C. 27. § 5. † Lettre 67. p. 338. ‡ B. II. C. 27. § 6. 8. ‖ P. 298. ** P. 298, 299.

it

" it does only by that *Conſciouſneſs*, which is in-
" ſeparable from Thinking *." " Now I que-
" ſtion, ſays Dr. *Watts*, whether we may ſo ea-
" ſily agree with him in this, as a ſufficient Ac-
" count of what a *Perſon* is.

" Let us conſider a little. The Words *Self*,
" and *Conſciouſneſs of ſelf* refer only to the Pro-
" noun *I*; but are not the Pronouns *Thou* and
" *He* perſonal Pronouns as well as *I*†? "

Beyond all Controverſy they are; but what then? Can either *Thou* or *He* judge of another Man's *Conſciouſneſs?* If they cannot, what ſignifies their being *perſonal Pronouns?* —— But the Doctor thus proceeds, —— " ſuppoſe *Armando*
" has ſlain his Neighbour in the Sight of *Martys*
" and *Criton*, and ſhould be ſeized with ſuch a
" Loſs of Memory afterwards, or ſuch Di-
" ſtraction, as to blot out the Conſciouſneſs of
" this Action from the Mind. *Armando* then
" would ſay, *it was not I*; but may not *Martys*
" and *Criton* ſtill charge him, *Thou art the Mur-*
" *derer?* May they not juſtly ſay, that *He is*
" *guilty*, and *He* ſhould be put to Death? Are
" they not as good Judges of the *ſame Perſon*,
" as *Armando* is himſelf? "

If the Doctor uſes *Perſon* here in Mr. *Locke*'s Senſe, the Queſtion then is, —— are they not as well acquainted with *Armando*'s *Conſciouſneſs*, as he is himſelf? But if *Perſon* ſignifies any thing elſe; how does this Objection affect Mr. *Locke?*

Again, " what if *Armando* ſhould deny the Fact,
" as having really loſt all Conſciouſneſs of it? Is he
" not ſtill the *ſame Perſon* that ſlew his Neigh-
" bour?"—According to Mr. *Locke*'s *Idea* of the *ſame Perſon*, he certainly is not. And why will

* B. II. C. 27. §9. † P. 299, 300.

Gentlemen diſpute againſt Mr. *Locke*, without attending to the Meaning of his Words?

However, "Does not the Witneſs of *Mar-*
"*tys* and *Criton* declare him to be the *ſame Per-*
"*ſon?*" —— But if he be not the *ſame Perſon*, in Mr. *Locke*'s Senſe, will all the *Declarations* in the World make him the *ſame?* And as to his being the *ſame Perſon* in any other Senſe, what has Mr. *Locke*, in the leaſt, to do with it?

But ſtill, "they know his Body to be the
"ſame, and according to the Laws of Nature,
"they juſtly infer his Soul muſt be the ſame alſo,
"whatſoever *Armando*'s Diſtraction might dict-
"ate concerning himſelf*."

Whatever they might *juſtly infer* as to the *Sameneſs* of *Armando*'s Soul and Body; they could not ſurely *infer* with any Reaſon or Juſtice, that the *diſtracted Armando* ought now to be puniſhed for what the *ſober Armando* formerly did.

The Doctor afterwards quotes ſeveral Paſſages from Mr. *Locke*'s 9th and 10th Section †, where we are told, that "in *Conſciouſneſs* alone con-
"ſiſts *Perſonal Identity*. And that it is not con-
"ſidered in this Caſe, whether the ſame *ſelf* be
"continued in the ſame, or divers Subſtances.—
"And that the ſame Conſciouſneſs unites diſtant
"Actions into the ſame *Perſon*, whatever Sub-
"ſtances contributed to their Production."—
The Doctor having mentioned theſe, and more to the ſame Purpoſe, he is pleaſed to make the following Remark, —— "any Man that reads
"this, and knows that the Author is in doubt,
"whether Matter may not think‡, would be
"ready to ſuſpect that he is ſo very ſollicitous

* P. 299, 300. † B. II. C. 27. ‡ See the Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 2—7.

to

" to make the *ſame Subſtance* unneceſſary to *Per-*
" *ſonal Identity*, that ſo he may maintain his ſup-
" poſed Poſſibility of Matter being made ca-
" pable of Thinking, *&c.** "

WithSubmiſſion to theDoctor, I believe that *any Man*, at leaſt moſt *unprejudiced* Men, who *know* that Mr. *Locke* maintains that Matter is of itſelf incapable of ſo much as *Motion* †; who *know* he believed that his Senſations could not be the Action of bare, inſenſible Matter, nor ever could be, without an *immaterial* thinking Being ‡, and who likewiſe *know*, that his Doctrine of *Perſonal Identity* would hold equally true (at leaſt in his Opinion) whether the Soul was allowed to be *immaterial* or not ‖; I ſay moſt *unprejudiced* Men who *know* theſe Things, would, I believe, be inclined to think, that the Doctor's *Suſpicions* are neither very *kind*, nor *well-grounded*. But beſides, does not the Doctor's own *Hypotheſis*, full as much as Mr. *Locke*'s, require that the *ſame Subſtance* ſhould be *unneceſſary* to *Perſonal Identity?* I really think it does; ſince *Body* is one Part of the Doctor's *Idea* of *Perſon* ††.

However, I ſuppoſe, the Doctor's *Hypotheſis* may *innocently* require that, which renders poor Mr. *Locke*'s highly *ſuſpicious*. Such a Misfortune is it to be a *ſuſpected* Man!

" But to indulge, ſays the Doctor no further " Suſpicions ‡." —— In my humble Opinion, he has rather *indulged* too many already. And I ſhould hope, when the ingenious Author comes to review them, he will heartily wiſh they had not been *indulged*.

* P. 301, 302. † B. IV. C. 10. § 10. ‡ B. II. C. 23. § 15. laſt Edition. ‖ B. II. C. 27. § 16, 17, 25. †† P. 309 ‡ P. 302.

Towards the Concluſion of his laſt *Eſſay*, he thus expreſſes himſelf, —— "To do Mr. *Locke* "Juſtice, he acknowledges * that *the more pro-* "*bable Opinion is that this Conſciouſneſs* (in which "he ſuppoſes Perſonal Identity to conſiſt) *is an-* "*nexed to one individual immaterial Subſtance* †." Well then, ſince Mr. *Locke acknowledges* this, and ſtill maintains that *Perſonal Identity* conſiſts in *Identity* of Conſciouſneſs; this evidently ſhews, what has been juſt obſerved, that he thought the *Immateriality* of the Soul and his Doctrine of *Identity* were very conſiſtent with each other.

But farther, Mr. *Locke* does not only acknowledge, "the more probable Opinion to be, that "this Conſciouſneſs is annexed to one indivi- "dual immaterial Subſtance;" but that it "is "annexed to, [and the *Affection* of,] one indi- "vidual immaterial Subſtance ‡." Thereby plainly making it, not a mere *ſuperadded* Property, as ſome might poſſibly ſuſpect him; but a Power belonging to the very Nature of an *immaterial* Subſtance.

And therefore the Doctor ſhould not have curtail'd this ſhort Paragraph, when perhaps the whole was no more than neceſſary to take off thoſe bad Impreſſions, which his Repreſentations of Mr. *Locke* might have made upon the Reader.

This might indeed proceed only from *Haſte*, or *Inattention*, or the Doctor might think that the greateſt Part of the Propoſition was ſufficient; I would not ſo much as inſinuate it aroſe from any worſe Principle. But the Doctor has ſtill more Objections to Mr. *Locke*'s Notion of *Perſonal Identity*.

* B. II. C. 27. § 25. † P. 311. ‡ B. II. C. 27. § 25.

"Mr.

" Mr. *Locke*, ſays that Gentleman, ſeems to " allow, that according to his Deſcription of " Perſonal Identity, two different Men may be " one and the ſame Perſon; for in his 13th and " 14th Sections, as well as in other Parts of this " Chapter*, he grants that a different Spirit " created long after, may poſſibly have the Con- " ſciouſneſs of Actions done by a Spirit exiſtent " many Ages before, impreſs'd upon it; by this " Means the Mayor of *Queenborough* might ſup- " poſe his Soul had been the Soul of *Socrates*, " as Section 19, and then this latter Soul or " Spirit, or this Man, becomes the *ſame Perſon* " with the former, and thus *Socrates* and the " Mayor of *Queenborough* become one Perſon.

" But I deny, continues the Doctor, this to be " proper conſcious Remembrance: 'Tis only a " deluſive Impreſſion on the Mind or Fancy " imitating the Act of Memory: 'tis a ſtrong " Belief of what is falſe. And can ſuch a Frenzy " be ſufficient to turn two Men into one Per- " ſon †?"

The Doctor having tack'd what is ſaid in the 13th Section, concerning the *Poſſibility* of a *falſe Repreſentation*, with what Mr. *Locke* mentions in the 19th; to wit, that if *Socrates* and the Mayor of *Queenborough* agree in the *Identity* of *Conſciouſneſs*, they are the *ſame Perſon*; he maintains that what is here call'd *Conſciouſneſs*, is only *Phrenzy* and *Deluſion*. But how could this Gentleman get Leave of himſelf to imagine that Mr. *Locke* wou'd call *Madneſs* by the Name of *Conſciouſneſs?* Has Mr. *Locke* any where ſo much as intimated that *Phrenzy* and *Conſciouſneſs* are identical Terms? Or that *Madneſs* is

* Ibid. † P. 304.

eſſential

eſſential to *Perſonal Identity?* He affirms indeed, that *Socrates* and the Mayor of *Queenborough* wou'd be the *ſame Perſon* in caſe they agreed in the *ſame Conſciouſneſs*. But in anſwer to this, the Doctor firſt takes it for granted, that the poor Mayor is actually in a *Phrenzy*, and then demands, whether *ſuch a Phrenzy* (which I preſume is the *ſame* with *Conſciouſneſs*) *be ſufficient to turn two Men into one Perſon?* Mr. *Locke* ſurely knew full well, that *mad Men* were capable of imagining any thing whatever. But in his whole Diſcourſe upon *Perſonal Identity*, which he makes to conſiſt in *Identity* of *Conſciouſneſs*, I believe it will be found upon a careful Examination, that he means only ſuch a *real Conſciouſneſs* as renders Men *juſtly* liable either to Rewards or Puniſhments for their paſt or preſent Behaviour. This is the *Conſciouſneſs* upon which, according to him, *Perſonality* depends; and as far as this extends, ſo far reaches the *Identity* of every *Perſon*.

"As far, ſays Mr. *Locke*, as any *intelligent* "Being can repeat the *Idea* of any paſt Action "with the *ſame Conſciouſneſs* it had of it at firſt, "and with the *ſame Conſciouſneſs* it has of any "preſent Action; ſo far it is the ſame *perſonal* "*Self**."

Can the Meaning of this be—ſo far as any *diſtracted* Being, can thro' his *Frenzy*, appropriate any Action to himſelf, of which he was never *truly* conſcious, ſo far he is the *ſame Perſon*: Or in other Words, ſo far he is *juſtly* entitled either to Reward or Puniſhment.

But the Doctor thus proceeds,——

"Muſt *Domitian* be really the ſame Perſon "with *Romulus*, if his Pride cou'd ſo far impreſs

* B. II. C. 27. §18.

"his

" his Imagination, and impoſe upon his Memo-
" ry, as to perſuade him that he built *Rome?*
" Is not this contrary to all the Senſe and Rea-
" ſon, as well as the Language of Mankind?
" And might not *Domitian* by the ſame Mad-
" neſs become *Ninus* and *Darius* and *Plato*, and
" twenty Perſons as well as two*?"

One would think Mr. *Locke* had ſaid enough in that 14th Section which the Doctor quotes, to have diſcouraged him from aſking all theſe Queſtions, and others to the ſame Purpoſe.

Mr. *Locke* there mentions a learned and conſiderable Man, who was perſuaded that his Soul had been the Soul of *Socrates:* But yet Mr. *Locke* will not allow him to be the *ſame Perſon* with *Socrates*, becauſe not *conſcious* of any of that Philoſopher's Thoughts or Actions†.

Can we now ſuppoſe that Mr. *Locke* would own *Domitian* for *Plato*, becauſe *Domitian* thro' Pride and Madneſs would be taken for him? Or that *Domitian*'s Soldier (who is afterwards mention'd) was *Domitian* himſelf, becauſe by a *Diſorder of his Brain*, he imagin'd himſelf Emperor‡." On the contrary, ſo far would Mr. *Locke* be from acknowledging the *mad Domitian* to be the *ſame Perſon* with *Plato*, or the *mad* Soldier to be the *ſame Perſon* with the Emperor; that he cou'd not, I preſume, allow either *Domitian* or the Soldier, to be *any Perſon* at all: I mean in that ſtrict Senſe, in which Mr. *Locke* uſes the Word. For what is it that he underſtands by *Perſon?* Is it not " a thinking, *intelli-*
" *gent* Being, that has *Reaſon* and *Reflection*‖?" Is not *Perſon*, according to him, a " forenſick
" Term appropriating Actions and their *Merit*,

* P. 304, 305. † B. II. C. 27. § 14. ‡ P. 305.
‖ B. II. C. 27. § 9.

" and

" and ſo belongs only to *intelligent* Agents, " *capable* of a Law, and Happineſs and Mi- " ſery *?"

But does any *mad* Man whatever come within this Deſcription? Can they properly be ſaid to be *intelligent* Agents *capable* of a Law; or their Actions to have either *Merit* or *Demerit* belonging to them?

Again, the Doctor having mention'd Mr. *Locke*'s Diſtinction betwixt the *ſame Man* and the *ſame Perſon*, he thus remarks, —— " So I " may be the ſame Man that performed a hun- " dred former Actions of Life, tho' I have en- " tirely forgot them all; but I am not the ſame " Perſon that performed Millions of thoſe Acti- " ons, ſince I have entirely forgotten a far " larger Number of my Thoughts than I can " recollect. Now, I wou'd only enquire whe- " ther ſuch a Diſtinction between *Man* and *Per- " ſon*, is either correſpondent with the Nature " and Reaſon of Things, or with the common " Language of all Men, or the accurate Ex- " preſſions of true Philoſophy †?"

But now, if the *ſame Man* ſhou'd ſometimes differ as much from himſelf, as the *ſober Man* does from the *mad* Man; can it really be thought any Violation either of *Grammar* or *Philoſophy*, or the *Nature* or *Reaſon* of Things, to adapt a particular Name to the one State, which ſhou'd not belong to the other; even notwithſtanding ſuch a particular Expreſſion may not altogether agree *with the common Language of all Men?*

But, perhaps it may be enquired, how far the Doctor has acquitted himſelf in this Affair, in order to approach nearer to the *Nature* and

* Ibid. § 26. † P. 305, 306.

Reaſon

Reaſon of Things, to *common Language*, and the *accurate Expreſſions* of *true Philoſophy?* Why, this Gentleman defines *Perſonal Identity* in the following Manner, — "the *ſame Perſon*, in a *com-* "*pleat Senſe*, is the ſame Spirit united to the ſame "Body, that is, in ſhort, the *ſame Man**."

This, according to the Doctor, is "conſider- "ing *Perſonality* rather in its *philoſophical* Signi- "fication, [but] which yet is by no Means ſo "very different from the more uſual Meaning "of it in common Life, as Mr. *Locke*'s Account "of it is †."

And moreover, whilſt Mr. *Locke*'s is a *ſtrange* "and *novel* Opinion, [this] is much plainer in "itſelf, and much more agreeable to the com- "mon Senſe of Mankind ‡." And thus, I ſuppoſe, the Doctor has avoided thoſe "many In- "conveniencies that may ariſe from [Mr. *Locke*'s] "Notion of *Perſonal Sameneſs*, even in the com- "mon Affairs of human Life, as well as in Phi- "loſophical Science ‖."

Theſe Inconveniences the Doctor not only apprehends to be ſuch, "as may utterly diſcou- "rage our Aſſent to this Notion;" but he "fears this Opinion, if univerſally received, "would bring in *endleſs Confuſions*, whereſoever "the Word *Perſon* was introduced ⸸." Some Inſtances of theſe *Confuſions* and *Inconveniences* the Doctor gives us, and therefore it may be proper to conſider them.

"According to [Mr. *Locke*'s] Doctrine of "*Perſonal Identity*, many Men, ſays this Au- "thor, may ſucceſſively or ſimultaneouſly be "one Perſon; and thus every private Soldier in "the Army of *Lewis* XIV. may become the

* P. 309. † Ibid. ‡ P. 313. ‖ P. 307, 308. ⸸ Ibid.

" ſame Perſon as *Alexander the Great*, if a gene-
" ral *Frenzy* ſhould ſeize them, *&c.* And ſo
" any one Man may become many Perſons:
" For if Mr. *N. Lee* the Tragedian hath a
" ſtrong Impreſſion on his Fancy, that he taught
" *Plato* Philoſophy, then he is the ſame Perſon
" with *Socrates*; or that he pleaded in the *Roman*
" Senate againſt *Mark Antony*, then he is *Cicero*;
" or that he ſubdued *Gaul*, and made himſelf
" Maſter of *Rome*, then he is *Julius Cæſar*; that
" he wrote the *Æneid*, then he is *Virgil*; that he
" began the Reformation from Popery, then he is
" *Martin Luther*; and that he reign'd in *England*
" at the latter End of the ſixteenth Century, and
" then he is the ſame Perſon with Queen *Elizabeth*.

" On the other hand, this Doctrine ſeems to
" allow us to believe, that if St. *Paul* ſhould
" irretrievably forget all the Labours and Suf-
" ferings that he underwent for the Sake of the
" Goſpel, he would not be the ſame Perſon that
" fulfill'd his Apoſtleſhip ſo gloriouſly: And if
" *Judas* ſhould never think again through all
" his future Exiſtence, that he betray'd the Sa-
" viour of the World, he would not be the Per-
" ſon that committed that heinous Wickedneſs*."

But now, after the Doctor has ſet forth the dreadful Tendency of Mr. *Locke*'s Notion, in ſo *tragical* a Manner, he immediately acquaints us, that " the Way Mr. *Locke* comes off from " any terrible Conſequences of theſe Poſſibilities " in his 26*th* Section, is by applying the Word " *Perſon* to Man only in a *forenſic* Senſe, as he " is the Subject of Happineſs or Miſery, and is " an Object of Rewards or Puniſhments: And " in Section 13. he ſuppoſes the Goodneſs and

* P. 306, 307.

Juſtice

" Juſtice of God will not ſuffer ſuch extrava-
" gant Poſſibilities to come to paſs, which may
" affect the Rewards or Puniſhments of Men;
" but his Equity and Truth will diſcover them-
" ſelves in attributing proper Recompences to
" *Men* or *Spirits*, conſider'd only as *Perſons*, or
" in their Perſonal Identity, *i. e.* as conſcious of
" their own former Actions of Vice or Virtue *."

I don't at all wonder, that a *fair* Writer ſhould give us Mr. *Locke*'s Anſwer to theſe extraordinary Objections; but I really wonder, that an *ingenious* Writer can get Leave of himſelf to ſuffer *ſuch Objections* to ſtand, when he has already *ſuch an Anſwer* to them.

However the Doctor next proceeds to mention certain *Inconveniences* that may attend Mr. *Locke*'s Notion, with reſpect to the *common Affairs* of *Human Life.*

" The Word *Perſon*, ſays this Gentleman,
" is often uſed, if not moſt frequently, without
" any forenſic Senſe: We ſay, *there were five*
" *Perſons preſent in the Room at ſuch a Time, or I*
" *had but one Perſon with me*, &c. And how can
" we tell how many Perſons were, or were not
" preſent, if the ſuppoſed Conſciouſneſs of five
" other Perſons ſhould place them there at that
" Time, and render them the ſame Perſons?
" Or if the ſuppoſed Forgetfulneſs of the Per-
" ſons really preſent ſhould take away their
" Perſonal Identity †?"

It muſt indeed be acknowledged, that the introducing a Diſtinction betwixt *Man* and *Perſon*, either at *Balls* or *Drawing-Rooms*, or many other Places of public Reſort, might be often attended with ſome *Diſorder* and *Confuſion:* but as it

* Ibid. † P. 308.

does

does not appear that Mr. *Locke* had any ſuch Deſign, or that he was for altering the *common Language* of Mankind in the *common Affairs* of *Human Life*, perhaps theſe laſt Objections might as well have been ſpared.

The Doctor concludes his *Eſſays* with this Remark, —— "*Perſonality* and *Sameneſs of Perſons*, "either in this World or the other, muſt not "ſtand upon ſuch a ſhifting and changeable "Principle, as may allow either one Man to "be two Perſons, or two Men to be one Perſon, "or any one Man or Perſon to become another, "or to be really any thing but himſelf*."

If this Gentleman only means, that *Perſonality* and *Sameneſs of Perſons* cannot ſtand upon the *Principles* laid down by Mr. *Locke*, this is what every one muſt judge of for himſelf. But if he means, that *Nat. Lee*, notwithſtanding his *Diſtraction*, is neither *Cæſar*, nor *Cicero*, nor *Luther*, nor Queen *Elizabeth*, the Doctor is entirely in the right; but then the Point to be conſider'd, is, whether he be not altogether miſtaken, when he ſuppoſes Mr. *Locke* to be his Antagoniſt?

I ſhall give the learned Reader no farther Trouble, than juſt leaving the two following Queries to his Reflections.

Firſt, Whether it be not highly reaſonable that Gentlemen ſhould *underſtand* Mr. *Locke*, before they undertake to *cenſure* or *confute* him?

And, in the next Place, If they had always done this, whether the Number of his Opponents might not have been conſiderably leſſen'd?

* P. 313.

FINIS.

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM